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Although there is little consensus on the impact of trade liberalization on poverty 
and food security, it is nevertheless widely acknowledged that there is a need for 
governments to establish safety-nets to guard against any potentially harmful effects on 
the poor and vulnerable sections of society.  
Against this background, programs aimed at achieving food security and reducing 
poverty gain increased importance in the reform era. This study aims to evaluate several 
such programs that are currently in place in the country from the point of view of their 
impact, efficiency and financial sustainability. The purpose is to determine how these 
programs may be improved and propose appropriate policy options for reform, while also 
keeping in mind the new challenges that might lie ahead. 
Specifically, the study evaluates the Public Distribution System (PDS), Public 
Works Programs, and certain food-based direct intervention programs such as the 
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition 
Program (TINP), with a view to suggest how they can be made more cost effectiveness 
and better targeted.  A summary of the main findings of the study is presented here. 
 
The Background: Food Security in the Era of Reforms 
The first chapter of this report provides the background in which the issues of 
food security and poverty are being studied in the Indian context. During the last five 
decades there have been highly interventionist trade policies in India that have 
discriminated against agriculture, particularly in the category of basic foods such as 
cereals. On the domestic front, there has been substantial control over the pricing, 
procurement, stocking, marketing and transport of foodgrains. These domestic and 
international trade policies resulted in a considerable wedge between the domestic and 
international price of wheat and rice, as observed by Gulati and Kelly (1999).  
  
vii 
Due to the historically lower domestic price relative to the international price, it 
was expected that with liberalization, (i) the volume of exports of rice and wheat would 
increase and (ii) domestic prices of rice and wheat would rise.  In the immediate years 
following liberalization, both of these were true for wheat, and for rice, export volumes 
increased while domestic prices did not rise as expected. Against this background, several 
studies have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on food security but the results 
appear to be mixed. Nevertheless, to guard against any possible adverse impacts on the 
poor and vulnerable sections of the population, there is agreement over the fact that 
adequate safety nets must be in place in the country. 
 
Changes in Patterns of Food Consumption 
In the second chapter, the study analyzes the trends in food consumption in India 
as a backdrop to understanding the status of food security and poverty in the country. The 
consumption patterns of an average Indian are undergoing significant changes. In general 
there is an expansion of the shares of non-cereal food and non-food in the consumption 
basket, while the share of cereals is shrinking. This is true even for the bottom 30% of the 
population, although in absolute terms cereal consumption per capita has not fallen.  
The substitution of non-cereals with cereals is resulting in a decline of calorie 
intake and is not contributing substantially to protein intake. While the decline in the 
cereals consumption can be explained by the slow down in the growth in the incomes of 
the poor and adverse prices of cereals versus non-cereal food, its decline in the seventies 
and eighties seem to be related to shifts in tastes and preferences. 
The complete set of expenditure and own and cross price elasticities are estimated 
by the demand system. The following results emerge from the exercise: There are marked 
differences in consumption behavior among the income groups and between rural and 




The simulation exercise indicates that the adverse relative price of cereals 
dampens the demand of not only cereals but also that of other food items. The adverse 
movements in the relative price of cereals together with lower growth in rural incomes 
may have resulted in the stagnant food consumption in rural areas. 
It is noted that during the economic reform period, cereal prices increased faster 
than in the 1980s. The increase in prices in the 1990s was primarily on account of the 
increase in procurement price. Procurement prices rose due to devaluation and because 
the government wanted to compensate the farmer for the prevailing restrictions on trade.  
Finally, another significant finding is that consumption of non-cereal food, 
particularly fruits and vegetables, has increased faster during the reform period than in 
the 1980s.  
 
An Evaluation of the Public Distribution System 
The third part of the analysis studies the effectiveness of public distribution of 
food within the country. In particular, the objective is to examine the performance of the 
Public Distribution System (PDS) with a view to provide suggestions for cost-effective 
and better-targeted alternatives. This is probably the first study to look at the impact of 
the PDS on consumption and poverty after the introduction of targeting in 1997. 
Two basic questions are addressed with respect to the performance of the PDS: 
(a) Does the target group receive significant subsidy? 
(b) Are the subsidies provided in a cost-effective manner?  
The evaluation of performance is in terms of extent of food subsidy provided, 
coverage, impact on consumption and calories, impact on the poor in particular, leakages 
from the system and targeting errors, and cost effectiveness. The political economy of the 
PDS is also discussed. The following are the findings from this exercise:  
ix 
(i)  The impact on consumption by the poor increased in rural areas between 
1986-87 and 1999-00 and poverty also declined during this period. The impact on urban 
areas has been more or less same.  
(ii)  A higher impact of the PDS on consumption by the poor is found in 
certain states like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Tamil Nadu. However, overall the impact 
of the PDS on the poor is still marginal at the all-India level.  
(iii)  The finding in terms of the political economy of the PDS is that the 
dealers of the PDS, the bureaucrats, politicians, and the Civil Supplies departments have 
a vested interest in keeping the present system in operation. 
Based on the findings, three options for reform are suggested: (i) revamping the 
existing PDS through decentralization, (ii) introducing food stamps, and (iii) replacing it 
with the food-for-work program. In the short run the authors also recommend that 
decentralization of the PDS and better targeting through village-level government units, 
known as Panchayats, can be attempted. The study is also in favor of linking the PDS 
with employment programs and the ICDS in order to improve targeting. This aspect is 
discussed in greater detail in a later section of the study. In the medium term, a move 
toward food stamps and the replacement of the PDS with a food-for-work or cash-for-
work program are suggested. 
 
The Impact of Public Works Programmes on Food Security 
The fourth chapter of the study looks at the impact of the Public Works 
Programmes on food security in the country. Public works programs play an important 
role in raising economic access of the poor. The case for RWPs (Rural Works Programs) 
lies primarily in the self-targeting nature of the schemes. However, public works are 
often criticized, with some justification, for creating unproductive (low productive) 
assets, providing only short-term supplementary income, and for not raising the skill-
levels of workers. The analysis shows that wage employment programs like the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme, Jawahar Rojgar Yojana and Employment Assurance  
x 
Scheme seem to be more pro-poor than programs like the Integrated Rural Development 
Program (self-employment programs) and the Public Distribution System.  They also 
achieve the additional objective of creating productive assets. However, the authors 
recommend the effective involvement of Panchayats (village-level government units) in 
order to ensure better planning of projects at the local level using local priorities and 
greater involvement of voluntary organizations as ways to ensure that the assets created 
may be more productive and better maintained.  
Finally, the authors also make the point that in the changing context of trade 
liberalization, public works also can be used promoting diversification of agriculture. 
Although they are not a substitute for a sustained and broad based growth process, the 
authors believe that in a country like India, which has surplus labor and poor 
infrastructure, these programs can be a useful component for providing food security at 
the household level. 
 
A Study of Two Specific Direct Food-based Intervention Programmes 
The next section of the report analyzes two direct food-based intervention 
programs for pre-school children in India, namely the Integrated Child Development 
Service (ICDS) and the Tamilnadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP). These schemes 
are evaluated using three parameters: targeting - whether they cover the entire group for 
whom they have been designed, effectiveness ￿ do the programs bring about the 
anticipated results, and efficiency - for a unit of money spent per person, how much 
eventually reaches the individual and the benefit-cost ratio of the programs. The 
important findings of the study are presented below: 
About 50 percent of children below three years are undernourished in rural India 
and about 38 percent in urban India. Even in states like Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu 
where per capita (real) state domestic product has grown significantly in the last decade, 
commensurate improvements in nutritional status cannot be seen.  
  
xi 
The recent evaluation studies of the ICDS have shown improving trends in child 
nutritional status in the project areas. The studies found a reduction in severe under-
nutrition but minimal impact in reducing moderate under-nutrition. The projects also 
contributed to a reduction in the infant mortality rate and the incidence of low birth 
weights. 
A national evaluation of the ICDS, however, revealed an unsatisfactory 
performance overall. The nutritional status of children in ICDS areas was found to be 
only slightly better than in non-ICDS areas. The percentage of severely malnourished 
children below the age of three in the ICDS areas is lower by 1.8 percentage points than 
the non-ICDS areas, and for children 3-6 years old, by 1.5 percentage points. The 
percentage of moderately malnourished children in ICDS areas is 2.5 and 3.4 percentage 
points lower than in the non-ICDS areas for the two subgroups. The two major 
limitations of this study are that there has not been an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness 
of the ICDS program and regional disaggregates have not been provided.  
The Tamil Nadu Integrated Program on the other hand has been hailed a success. 
The scheme has reduced severe malnutrition without any apparent need to fear a reversal 
of the problem. The important lessons to be drawn from this scheme￿s success are 
effective management with very few leakages, educating the mother and adolescent girls 
about good nutrition and health practices, and increasing participation by the community 
and the involvement of the government in running the program efficiently. However, the 
questions of sustainability in terms of the cost of the program and its contribution in 
reducing moderate and mild under-nutrition are yet to be addressed. 
This study finds that there is a paucity of relevant, reliable and timely data to 
study the trends in nutritional status even in the areas where the ICDS program is being 
implemented. There is a provision for a Management Information System (MIS) for all 
the ICDS blocks that is supposed to keep track of bottlenecks in the program and 
maintain regular records of the nutritional status, immunization rates, and participation 
rates. While this is a good idea, it must be ensured that the data is more accessible for 
research purposes.  
xii 
The study also finds that most evaluations have assessed impact on 
anthropometric indicators, rather than aspects like improvements in cognitive 
development, school achievement of the child or poverty status of the household. 
Information on these aspects will go a long way in convincing (a) the policy makers 
about the need for such programs and their efficient management, and (b) the participants 
about the impacts in order to encourage greater community participation, which would 
result in more effective outcomes. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
By providing a detailed analysis of some of the major government-operated 
programs in place today, the hope is that there will be a better understanding of the 
specific areas where the government needs to focus its attention and resources in order to 
achieve better targeting and greater cost-efficiency. In this way the reforms can be 
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1.  FOOD SECURITY IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
 
1. 1  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Food security can be assessed both at the national and household level. At the 
national level, in the context of an open economy, as long as the country has sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves, it is considered to be safe with regard to food security even if 
it is not self sufficient in food grain production. With this logic, food security is not a 
problem in India at the national level as the foreign exchange reserves in India have now 
crossed the mark of $100 billion (as of the end of 2003) as against the level of $1.5 
billion in July 1991 at the time when the economic crisis occurred. Additionally, India￿s 
stock of food grains with the public sector agencies stood at a record level of 63 million 
MT as of July 2002, thereby placing the country in an extremely comfortable position 
with regard to food security.  However, at the household level, approximately 26 percent 
of the population remains below the poverty line, and therefore household food security 
is still a critical issue in the Indian context. The main problem at the household level is 
the lack of economic access among the poor. Therefore, (i) generating employment 
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opportunities to increase purchasing power (through overall economic growth and 
specific poverty alleviation programs), and (ii) supplying food grains at subsidized prices 
to the poor, can help ensure food security. This study examines the problem of household 
food security in India against the background of economic reforms initiated since the 
early nineties.  
1.2   FOOD SECURITY IN THE ERA OF REFORMS 
During the last five decades there have been highly interventionist trade policies 
in India that have discriminated against agriculture, particularly in the category of basic 
foods such as cereals. International trade in cereals by the private sector was practically 
banned during the period 1950-1995, with the exception of Basmati rice exports and 
maize imports for the poultry sector. On the domestic front, there have been substantial 
controls over pricing, procurement, stocking, marketing and transport of food grains.  
These domestic and international trade policies resulted in a considerable wedge 
between the domestic and international prices of wheat and rice, as observed by Gulati 
and Kelly (1999). The authors calculate the price wedge as approximately 61% for rice 
and 6% for wheat under the Exportable Scenario and as much as 100% for rice and 78% 
for wheat in the Importable Scenario, for the base years of the triennium ending 1993-
94.6  Moreover, as can be seen from the NPC values in Figures 1 and 2, domestic prices 
have consistently remained below the export parity levels for both rice and wheat, with 
the exception of a few years in between. (Gulati and Mullen, 2003). Due to the 
historically lower domestic prices relative to the international prices, it was expected that 
with liberalization (i) the volume of exports of rice and wheat would increase and (ii) the 
domestic prices of rice and wheat would rise.   
                                                 
6 The NPC is defined as Domestic price/Reference price, where the reference price is either the export 
parity price or the import parity price, depending on whether the commodity is an exportable or importable 
respectively. In order to determine whether the commodity is an exportable or importable, one can simply 
look at whether it is currently exported or imported. However, if the commodity is not currently traded, one 
must make a judgment as to whether it can be exported or imported when trade is opened up, by comparing 
the domestic price with the export and import parity prices. Both wheat and rice were considered 
exportables for India, due to the domestic price being far below the international prices.   
3 
As expected, when India opened up exports of common rice in 1994-95, the 
volume of exports surged from 1 million to nearly 5 million MT, making the country the 
second largest exporter of rice that year (Gulati and Mullen, 2003). Encouraged by the 
experience with rice exports, wheat was also liberalized soon after, resulting in the level 
of exports rising to almost two million MT or three percent of the production in 1996 
(Hoda and Sekhar, 2003). However, with regard to domestic retail prices, while the retail 
price of wheat increased between 1995-98 quite sharply for wheat, it was actually found 
to decline in the same period for rice. The retail prices for rice and wheat are shown in 
Figures 3 and 4 respectively.   
It is important to note, however, that the increase in retail prices in the case of 
wheat is also argued to be a consequence of the policy followed by the government with 
respect to the Minimum Support Price (MSP).  The Minimum Support Price is the price 
at which the government procures food grains from the farmers, and it is meant to protect 
farm incomes against price fluctuations in order to provide them an incentive to invest 
and produce7.  In the nineties, the government has consistently and sharply increased the 
MSP every year in the case of wheat, and to a lesser extent in the case of rice also 
(Figures 3 and 4). This has translated into a higher PDS price, due to attempts by the 
government to reduce the aggregate food subsidy bill. It has also resulted in a higher open 
market retail price, through the diversion of grain from the open market to the public 
sector (Persaud and Rosen, 2003). The high degree of correlation of support prices, open 
market farm prices and retail prices is evident from figures 3 and 4, and is particularly 
noteworthy in the case of wheat.   
                                                 
7 The MSP determined by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) by taking into 
account several factors such as the costs of production, changes in input prices, trends in domestic and 
international prices, the estimated effect of changes in the support price on the industrial cost structure, etc.  
It is, however, unclear exactly how the commission assesses the relative weights of each of these factors in 
its calculation. The Food Corporation of India guarantees to buy all food grains from farmers at the support 
price, which is normally less than the open-market farm price. Therefore the farm support price acts as the 
floor price, while the ceiling is determined by the forces of demand and supply.   
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1.3  LIBERALIZATION IN THE CASE OF WHEAT: A STORY OF REVERSALS 
 The situation in the case of wheat became one where stocks were piling up due to 
the high MSPs on one hand and distribution from the PDS was declining due to the 
increase in issue prices on the other. Therefore in 1996, the government decided to 
impose a 50% tariff on imports of wheat, while exports were allowed to continue as a 
means to offload the built up stocks. 
In fact in October 2000, the government decided to export 2 MT of wheat at 4,150 
rupees/tonne, to further reduce domestic stocks, even though this price is 30% below the 
MSP and 50% below the government￿s cost of acquisition, which is in violation of WTO 
commitments
8. However, export of subsidized wheat by private traders was still not 
allowed, as the government feared that they would re-sell the wheat in the domestic 
market at a premium. The volume of exports from the central pool increased to 3.9 
million MT in 2001-2002 and 6.7 million MT in 2002-03. 
 
Figure 1￿Rice Trade and Protection in India 1980-2002 
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Net Exports (in million tonnes) Importable Hypothesis Exportable Hypothesis
  Source: Trade data is from FAO 
Source of Figure 1: Gulati and Mullen (2003) 
 
                                                 
8 http://www.agr.gc.ca/mad-dam/e/bulletine/v14e/v14n18e.htm.  
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Figure 2￿Wheat Trade and Protection in India1980-2002 
 
Source: Trade data is from FAO 
Source of Figure 2: Gulati and Mullen (2003)\ 
 
 

































































































































































Exports (in ’000 tonnes) Imports (in ’000 tonnes) Importable Hypothesis Exportable Hypothesis 
6 
Figure 4￿Key Wheat Prices 
 
 
1.4 IMPACTS  OF  LIBERALIZATION:  THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE POOR 
Studies that evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on food security and 
poverty appear to produce different results. Parikh et al (1997) have systematically 
analyzed the potential effects of agricultural trade liberalization on food security, poverty 
and welfare, using a computable general equilibrium model (CGE). The results show that 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization (ATL), even without liberalization in the other sectors, 
leads to a decrease in poverty, by making the rural poor better off and the rural rich worse 
off in terms of average equivalent income. The consumer price index (CPI) is also found 
to move more favorably for the poorer classes compared to the richer classes. Another 
important finding is that, on the whole, the rural population appears to gain whereas the 
urban population loses. While the above study may seem to suggest that there is little to 
worry about, other studies point out that the current mix of liberalization and 
simultaneous increases in the domestic Minimum Support Price (MSP), is producing 
disastrous consequences.   
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Parikh et al (2003) examine the consequences of increasing the MSP of wheat and 
rice by ten percent, within an applied general equilibrium model of India, using 65 
sectors, and five rural and urban expenditure classes. From a macro perspective, the 
results indicate that the policy to hike procurement prices of rice and wheat has had an 
adverse impact on overall growth, raised the level of inflation in the economy, and 
reduced real incomes and demand. The decline in total private consumption of rice and 
wheat is estimated to be between 3 and 3.5 percent.  
Yet another important finding is that the increasing MSPs have had a worsening 
effect on the welfare of 80% of the rural population and also the entire urban population. 
Further, the welfare loss in general is larger for the urban population than for the rural 
population, across classes and over time, and it is also regressive overall. The findings 
from our study, however, seem to suggest that the impact on the consumption of the poor 
(in particular, the bottom 30% of the population) has been neutral rather than bad, since 
the per capita cereal consumption of this expenditure class has not fallen over time. It 
does appear, however, that the cereal consumption per capita, in the case of the middle 
and upper income brackets has gone down, although this decline can presumably be 
interpreted as the income effect. 
Nevertheless, given the mixed evidence on the potential impacts of the reforms on 
the poor, the government must be prepared for the worst-case scenario. It is imperative, 
therefore, that adequate safety nets are in place in the country to guard against any 
potential negative impacts on the vulnerable groups in society.  
1.5.   OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Against this background, the broad objectives of this study are: 
1.  To determine whether the safety nets in place in India at present are 
effective in terms of how well they target the poor and vulnerable sections 
of society.  
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2.  To analyze how cost effective the existing safety nets are and to 
investigate possible alternatives or options for reform.   
Given the focus on food security, Chapter 2 begins with a background on 
consumption trends in India over the past 30 years, across income groups and in the rural 
and urban areas. The subsequent chapter investigates the efficacy of the Public 
Distribution System in India, the generic name for the network of Fair Price Shops 
through which food and other essential commodities are sold to the poor sections of 
society at subsidized prices. Chapter 4 evaluates the contribution of the Public Works 
Programs - the various employment schemes operated by the government that are 
intended to create assets and simultaneously generate income ￿ toward achieving food 
security and reducing poverty. Finally, the fifth chapter explores the effectiveness of two 
direct food-based intervention programs in achieving the same goals.  
As can be seen, the importance of assessing the efficiency and sustainability of 
social safety￿nets in India today, in the context of the possible adverse impacts of trade 
liberalization, cannot be over-emphasized. Although the likelihood of undesirable 
outcomes is uncertain and disputed, when dealing with issues that are as serious as food 
security and poverty, even potentially small risks cannot be ignored. Therefore, the 
findings of this study are crucial, as they will bring to light the existing capabilities in the 
country by way of social safety nets and provide recommendations on how they can be 
expanded and strengthened. By addressing these challenges, India can undertake the 
process of liberalization with greater confidence and reap the benefits with no sacrifice to 
the basic welfare objectives. 
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2.  FOOD CONSUMPTION IN INDIA: PATTERNS AND TRENDS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section focuses on the analysis of food consumption patterns for India.  We 
address the following issues:  
(i)  What are the trends in the consumption of important items of food? 
(ii)  Are there any significant differences in these patterns across different 
income groups and between rural and urban areas? 
(iii)  What are the factors responsible for these changes?  
Having examined the above issues, we estimate a complete demand system duly 
incorporating the taste factor, which seems to be a significant factor in explaining the 
consumer behavior in India. Based on the parameter estimates a simulation exercise is 
carried out to assess the impact of prices on food consumption.  
2.2  CONSUMPTION AND PRICE DATA  
Consumption Data: The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 
periodically conducts sample surveys on consumer expenditure among several other 
topics. Each survey is called a round. In general each of these surveys is conducted in the 
period July to June, which is the agricultural year in India. However, a few rounds are 
spread over calendar year (January-December). Also because of various reasons, a few 
rounds cover only six-month period. The schedule designed for the consumer expenditure 
surveys elicits information regarding the expenditure on several items of consumption 
from the respondents by recall. The reference period for consumption is ￿last 30 days￿ for   
10 
items of frequent purchases and ￿last one year￿ for others
9. These surveys were conducted 
on regular basis over large samples till 1973-74. From 1986-87 the regular ￿large￿ sample 
surveys were replaced by annual ￿thin sample series￿ with a large sample survey once in 
about five years. The published data contains expenditures on about 20 broad groups of 
consumption items by 12-10 monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) classes, separately 
for rural and urban. The consumption data for the present analysis have been compiled 
from the published reports.  We cover 16 periods of the survey data spread over the last 
three decades
10. For some rounds, the published results also give the nutritional intakes 
estimated from the consumption data.  We use this data for examining the nutritional 
consequences of changing food consumption patterns.  
Prices Data: In India Consumer price indices are not compiled separately for 
rural and urban areas
11. What we have are price indices compiled for different section of 
people like agricultural labor, industrial workers and urban non-manual employees. Even 
these indices are not available at the disaggregated commodity level. On the other hand, 
the Economic Advisor￿s wholesale price indices are compiled for the country as a whole 
and also their weighing diagram is production based. Therefore the existing price data 
cannot serve for consumption analysis. In order to overcome this, a separate price index 
series was constructed following the procedure of Radhakrishna et al (1979). Broadly this 
procedure is as follows 
The Economic Advisor￿s Wholesale Price Indices Series give monthly item-wise 
average price relatives. For every NSSO round the monthly item-wise price relatives 
were averaged over the corresponding survey period. The item-wise NSS-period-average 
price relatives form the basic data for constructing the consumer price indices separately 
                                                 
9 During the recent surveys the NSSO experimented with the reference periods. In the last large sample 
survey (1999-2000), 30 day and 7day references were used simultaneously. This resulted in a controversy 
over the comparability of results of this survey to those of earlier surveys. See Deaton and Dreze(2003), 
Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003). In the present analysis we use results of 1999-2000 survey based on 30-
day period and assume that they are comparable to those of earlier survey. 
10 Surveys with six  months duration have not been considered. 
11 Attempts to compile separate consumer price indices were made by Minhas, et al (1988,1991). 
Recently, Deaton(2000) constructed price indices for rural India using prices estimates from NSS 
consumer expenditure survey data.  
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for rural and urban areas. Using the mean level item-wise expenditure data of the 32
nd 
round (1977-78) we formed the weighting diagram separately for rural and urban areas. 
The round-wise average relatives are then aggregated according to commodity scheme 
followed. These indices were constructed for 16 years for which we have the expenditure 
data. For examining the trends in the relative prices, separate price indices were 
constructed using annual average (April-March) price relatives and NSSO weighting 
diagram for rural and urban.   
2.3 CONSUMPTION  PATTERNS 
The trends in consumption patterns have been examined for three broad income 
groups, viz., bottom thirty percent, middle forty percent and top thirty percent. 
Consumption estimates for each group is made using linear interpolation method from 
MPCE class-wise data. The consumption data were aggregated to 9 broad groups, viz. 1) 
Cereals, 2) Milk and milk products, 3) Edible oils, 4) Meat, fish and eggs, 5) Sugar and 
gur, 6) Pulses, 7) Fruits and vegetables, 8) Other food, 9) All non-food. All the 
expenditures were expressed in terms of 1999-2000 prices. For this we used the round-
specific commodity price indices by shifting their base to 1999-2000. For presenting the 
broad trends, the commodity groups were then further aggregated into three broad groups 
viz. Cereals, non-cereal food (milk, edible oils, meat, fish and eggs, sugar, pulses, fruits 
and vegetables and other food) and non-food. Growth rates for the periods 1970-90 and 
1990-2000 are estimated following trend method. Trends for the items of non-cereal food 
are presented separately for the last six large sample rounds. 
2.4 CEREALS   
The per capita monthly real expenditures on cereals over the years 1970-2000 are 
presented in table 1 and figure 5. As can be seen, there are significant differences in the 
consumption patterns of cereals between rural and urban areas. In rural areas the cereal 
consumption declined consistently among all the income groups, while in urban areas it 
exhibited mixed trends. At mean level, the cereal consumption in rural areas declined at  
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1.1%pa during the seventies and eighties, while in the nineties it declined at 2.2% pa. In 
the urban areas it was almost stagnant in the first period while in the second period it 
declined at about 0.4% pa. In other words the cereal demand declined faster in the 
nineties compared to the seventies and eighties in India, especially in the rural areas. In 
both rural and urban areas, the cereal consumption of the poorest 30% started declining 
during the nineties.  
It can be seen that the rate of decline increases as one moves from the poor to 
richer groups in rural areas. For the poorest 30%, the rate of decline in the cereal 
consumption was about 1.4% pa while for the top 30% it was 2.1%. On the other hand in 
the urban areas the decline is slower among the richer groups- in fact the cereal 
consumption of the urban non-poor appears to be almost stagnant. To examine the 
regional patterns, we have presented the mean level per capita cereal consumption (in 
quantity terms) across major states of India for the last three large sample rounds of 
NSSO in rural areas (Table 2). Across all the states, the cereal consumption has declined 
between 1993-94 and 1999-2000. It can be seen that even in those states where the cereal 
consumption increased in the eighties have registered decline in the nineties.  
Table 3 and figure 6 presents the consumption of rice, wheat and other cereals 
(coarse) in rural areas of India in quantity terms for the six NSSO rounds by the three 
broad income groups. The data show that the consumption of other cereals is rapidly 
shrinking for all the income groups, while that of rice and wheat is increasing. Between 
1972-73 and 1999-2000, the decline in coarse cereals was as much as 3.4 kg at mean 
level. The consumption of rice and wheat show increasing trend, though it seems to have 
tapered off in the recent periods. However, the increase in the consumption of so-called 
superior cereals is not commensurate with the decline in the coarse cereals in quantity 
terms. This resulted in the decline in intake of total cereals over time.   
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Table 1￿Trends in Per Capita Cereal Consumption ( at 1999-2000 prices) 
 
RURAL URBAN  YEAR 
B 30%  M 40%  T 30%  All  B 30%  M 40%  T 30%  All 
1970-71 102.2  144.2  183.2  143.3  97.71  124.77  134.30  119.51 
1972-73 101.9  145.5  185.0  144.3  100.80  127.84  135.82  122.12 
1973-74 106.6  151.4  195.0  151.1  101.15  131.76  145.58  126.72 
1977-78 103.4  143.1  165.4  137.9  100.19  125.15  138.11  121.55 
1983 102.0  139.1  170.3  137.3  97.85  122.31  137.68  119.58 
1986-87 100.4  136.6  164.1  134.0  98.58  121.28  135.87  118.84 
1987-88 104.7  134.0  158.0  132.4  101.13  118.79  134.95  118.34 
1988-89 103.7  134.5  156.4  131.9  99.78  121.69  133.83  118.76 
1989-90 109.7  132.5  146.3  129.8  104.31  122.60  132.40  120.05 
1990-91 104.2  132.4  148.7  128.8         
1992 96.9  125.8  143.9  122.5  96.77  115.23  129.20  113.88 
1993-94 97.3  123.0  138.6  120.0  94.83  112.98  125.90  111.41 
1994-95 96.6  118.1  135.8  117.0  95.44  117.27  133.69  115.64 
1995-96 91.4  109.9  122.4  108.1  92.59  109.59  122.10  108.24 
1997 92.6  113.7  127.2  111.4  93.21  112.61  128.06  111.43 
1999-2000 91.0 109.9  124.9  108.7  90.35  106.93  123.29  106.86 
Growth Rates                     
1970-90 0.10  -0.55  -0.55  -1.10  0.25  -0.15  0.00  0.00 
1990-2000 -1.38  -2.15 -2.15  -2.17  -0.65  -0.60 0.03 -0.39 
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Figure 5￿Trends in Cereal Consumption-All India Rural 
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Table 2￿Trends in Cereal Consumption in Major states of India (Rural) 
 
                                                                                                                                                    Kg/Month 
Per Capita Consumption (kg/Month)  Annual Growth Rate 
States  1983  1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 1987-88  1993-94  1999-00 
Andhra Pradesh  15.37   14.35   13.27   12.66   -1.36   -1.30   -0.79  
Assam  14.23   14.23   13.17   12.63   0.00   -1.28   -0.69  
Bihar  15.77   15.39   14.31   13.76   -0.49   -1.21   -0.65  
Gujarat  12.56   12.00   10.66   10.19   -0.91   -1.95   -0.75  
Haryana  14.54   15.02   12.92   11.38   0.65   -2.48   -2.09  
Karnataka  15.03   13.75   13.15   11.53   -1.76   -0.74   -2.17  
Kerala  10.01   10.36   10.11   9.89   0.69   -0.41   -0.37  
Madhya Pradesh 15.83   15.39   14.20   12.93   -0.56   -1.33   -1.55  
Maharashtra  13.79   13.03   11.39   11.32   -1.13   -2.22   -0.11  
Orissa  15.61   15.72   15.93   15.09   0.14   0.22   -0.90  
Punjab  13.52   12.41   10.78   10.58   -1.70   -2.32   -0.32  
Rajasthan  17.19   16.62   14.85   14.19   -0.67   -1.86   -0.75  
Tamil Nadu  13.05   12.24   11.72   10.66   -1.27   -0.72   -1.57  
Uttar Pradesh  15.47   15.32   13.91   13.66   -0.19   -1.60   -0.30  
West Bengal  14.28   15.12   14.96   13.59   1.15   -0.18   -1.59  
All India  14.80   14.47   13.40   12.72   -0.45   -1.27   -0.86  
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Table 3￿Trends Per Capita Consumption of Rice, Wheat, Other Cereals and Total 
Cereals in Rural India 
 
Rice (kg/month) 
Decile  Group  1972-73 1977-78 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1990-00 
Lowest  30% 4.82 5.17 4.44  5.74 6.10 6.60 
Middle  40% 6.91 7.57 7.01  7.42 7.54 7.02 
Top  30%  7.93 8.48 8.32  7.83 7.28 6.64 
All  6.59 7.12 6.63  7.04 7.02 6.78 
Wheat  (kg/month) 
Decile  Group  1972-73 1977-78 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1990-00 
Lowest  30% 2.09 2.33 3.40  3.71 3.38 3.44 
Middle  40% 3.58 3.73 4.18  4.70 4.17 4.47 
Top  30%  6.08 6.20 5.90  6.49 5.73 5.76 
All  3.88 4.05 4.46  4.94 4.40 4.55 
Other Cereals  (kg/month) 
Decile  Group  1972-73 1977-78 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1990-00 
Lowest  30% 4.45 3.92 4.11  2.82 2.28 1.41 
Middle  40% 4.83 3.94 3.61  2.44 1.90 1.45 
Top  30%  5.07 4.41 3.43  2.23 1.76 1.30 
All  4.79 4.08 3.71  2.49 1.98 1.39 
Total Cereals  (kg/month) 
Decile  Group  1972-73 1977-78 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1990-00 
Lowest  30%  11.36 11.42 11.95  12.27 11.76 11.44 
Middle  40%  15.32 15.24 14.80  14.56 13.61 12.95 
Top  30%  19.08 19.09 17.65  16.55 14.77 13.69 
All  15.26 15.25 14.80  14.47 13.40 12.72 
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Figure 6￿Per capital Monthly Rice Consumption (Kg) All India-Rural 





















































2.5   NON-CEREAL FOOD 
The expenditure on non-cereal items of food in rural and urban areas shows 
expansion during the entire period of three decades. However, the rate of expansion 
seems to have slowed down in the nineties (Table 4 and figure 7). The pattern is almost 
similar across all the income groups and between rural and urban areas. During the 
seventies and eighties, the growth rate of non-cereal consumption for the bottom 30% 
was 2.8% pa in rural areas but it declined to 1.3% pa in the nineties. For the middle 40% 
and top 30%, the growth rates dropped to 1.0 and 0.5% respectively in the nineties from 
about 2.2% in the first period. Similarly, in the urban areas, the growth rate declined from 
1.6 percent to .8 percent. 
In rural as well as urban, the rate growth declined with income in both the 
periods. To probe further, the non-cereal food is disaggregated into milk and milk 
products, Edible oils, Meat, fish and eggs, Sugar, Pulses and Fruits and vegetables and 
trends in their consumption are examined (Table 5 and 6). These trends show significant 
differences among income groups and between rural and urban areas.  
Consumption of milk and milk products increased throughout the entire period in 
both the rural and urban areas. However, between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 its expansion 
slowed down in the rural areas, especially for the poor, while for the urban poor 
continued to increase. Consumption of Edible oils is growing faster in rural compared to 
urban areas. For the rural poor its growth rate is higher than for the rest. Both in the rural 
and urban areas, the consumption of meat, fish and egg is declining at mean level, while 
it is almost stagnant among the poor in both the regions. The consumption of pulses is 
declining for the all income groups in rural and urban areas.  Fruits and vegetables is the 
only group, which registered consistently high growth throughout the period. Rural areas 
have higher growth in the consumption of fruits and vegetables compared to the urban. 
Between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 the consumption of fruits and vegetables increased at  
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the rate of 6.3% pa in rural and 4.8% pa in urban. Both in rural and urban areas, the poor 
have higher growth rates of its consumption compared to the richer groups. 
The rapid expansion of non-cereal food in the consumption basket in spite of 
declining cereal consumption resulted in increase in food consumption during earlier 
period. However during the nineties, the faster decline in the cereal consumption and near 
slow down in the growth of non-cereal food consumption together have resulted in 
almost stagnant levels of food consumption. 
On the other hand, the consumption of non-food is expanding faster for all the 
income groups in rural and urban areas throughout the last three decades (Table 7 and 
Figure 8). At mean level, the rural non-food consumption increased at the rate of 4.4% 
per annum in during both the periods. In the urban areas its growth rate increased from 4 
to almost 6% between the same periods. In the seventies and eighties, all the income 
groups had more or less the similar growth in the non-food consumption.  
In the nineties, the rate of expansion declined with income. For the bottom 30% of 
rural poor the growth of non-food was 5.8% pa and for the top 30% it was 3.7% pa. 
Corresponding growth rates for the urban are 6.2% and 5.8% pa. 
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Table 4￿Trends in Per Capita Non- Cereal Consumption (at 1999-2000 Prices) 
 
Rural Urban 
Year  B 30%  M 40%  T 30%  All  B 30%  M 40%  T 30%  All 
1970-71 50.2  105.3  219.9  123.1  89.97  178.64  429.56  227.31 
1972-73 47.0  89.4  188.6  106.5  89.45  175.04  411.22  220.22 
1973-74 51.0  99.0  189.3  111.7  86.78  161.60  376.24  203.55 
1977-78 50.9  100.4  193.8  113.6  89.00  175.75  382.15  211.64 
1983 60.7  118.4  249.9  140.6  103.32  202.85  418.49  237.68 
1986-87 72.4  134.7  272.4  157.3  123.99  233.93  462.54  269.53 
1987-88 71.8  132.2  273.3  156.4  119.29  223.97  469.09  266.10 
1988-89 77.7  137.7  274.6  160.8  126.68  237.06  453.49  268.87 
1989-90 83.6  151.3  299.4  175.4  128.81  236.86  469.55  274.25 
1990-91  78.4  146.7  286.4  168.1             
1992 76.9  142.0  267.3  160.0  127.93  244.35  471.22  277.48 
1993-94 81.7  148.0  281.5  168.2  133.02  246.57  485.44  284.16 
1994-95 76.9  135.6  253.9  153.5  121.81  229.87  476.38  271.41 
1995-96 80.0  139.3  242.5  152.5  134.82  242.38  441.88  269.96 
1997 83.3  155.5  281.3  171.6  134.38  248.72  457.36  277.01 
1999-2000 87.4 158.1  301.8  180.0  144.64  264.15  516.28  303.94 
Growth Rates                         
1970-90 2.79  2.23  2.20  2.29  2.38  2.09  1.05  1.57 




Figure 7￿Trends in  Per capita Non-Cereal Consumption-All India Rural and 
Urban 
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Table 5￿Per capita Consumption of Items of Non-Cereal Food in Rural Areas of 
India (at 1999-2000 Prices) 
Rs. 0.00/month 
Milk and milk products  Edible oils  Meat, fish and eggs 
Year  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All 
1973-74  5.22  17.95 49.22 23.51  4.84  8.76  14.28 9.24  7.68  14.69 26.98 16.27 
1977-78  5.60  19.65 58.12 26.98  5.30  9.64  15.27 10.03  7.57  15.05 25.48 15.93 
1983  7.25  22.93 64.70 30.76  6.39  11.02 20.12 12.36  6.83  14.52 31.97 17.45 
1987-88  8.74  25.95 74.46 35.34  7.33  12.01 20.96 13.29  7.77  15.66 31.75 18.12 
1993-94  10.89 31.85 82.49 40.75  9.54  14.79 22.71 15.59  7.52  15.36 28.41 16.92 
1999-2000 10.87 32.56 87.55 42.55  11.41 17.39 25.94 18.16  7.56  14.76 26.56 16.14 
Growth Rate                                     
1977-78  1.76 2.29 4.24 3.50  2.31 2.43 1.68 2.07  -0.36  0.60 -1.42  -0.53 
1983  4.81 2.84 1.97 2.41  3.47 2.46 5.14 3.88  -1.85  -0.65  4.21 1.66 
1987-88  4.24 2.78 3.17 3.13  3.10 1.93 0.91 1.62  2.91 1.69 -0.16  0.84 
1993-94  3.73 3.48 1.72 2.41  4.48 3.53 1.35 2.69  -0.54  -0.33  -1.83  -1.13 
1999-2000  -0.04  0.37 1.00 0.72  3.04 2.74 2.24 2.58  0.10 -0.66  -1.12  -0.79 
Sugar Pulses  Fruits  and  Vegetables 
Year  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All 
1973-74  3.41 7.48 14.65  8.41  10.42  19.30  31.30  20.24  7.23 11.92  20.13  12.98 
1977-78  4.00 7.94 16.31  9.27  9.28 16.70  26.08  17.29  7.33 12.34  20.24  13.21 
1983  5.19  10.25 22.07 12.28  10.87 17.96 29.88 19.41  9.53  15.10 28.92 17.58 
1987-88  6.19  11.68 23.58 13.60  14.03 21.51 30.62 22.00  9.81  16.60 28.24 18.05 
1993-94  5.31  9.51  17.43 10.62  12.61 18.12 26.64 19.02  15.45 24.35 40.62 26.56 
1999-2000 5.91  10.63 18.48 11.57  11.89 17.99 25.73 18.48  22.58 35.06 58.38 38.31 
Growth Rates                                     
1977-78  4.05 1.53 2.71 2.46  -2.87  -3.55  -4.46  -3.86  0.36 0.87 0.13 0.44 
1983  4.85 4.75 5.65 5.24  2.93 1.33 2.51 2.13  4.89 3.74 6.71 5.33 
1987-88  4.00 2.93 1.48 2.30  5.82 4.09 0.55 2.82  0.63 2.13 -0.53  0.60 
1993-94  -2.51 -3.37 -4.91 -4.03  -1.75 -2.82 -2.30 -2.39  7.87  6.59  6.24  6.64 
1999-2000  1.81 1.89 0.98 1.43  -0.98  -0.12  -0.57  -0.48  6.53 6.27 6.23 6.30  
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Table 6￿Per capita Consumption of Items of Non-Cereal Food in Urban Areas of 
India (at 1999-2000 prices) 
Rs 0.00/month 
Milk and milk products  Edible Oils  Meat, fish and eggs 
Year  30% 40% 30%  All  30% 40% 30% All  30% 40% 30%  All 
1973-74  12.43 32.36 82.34  41.38 8.97  16.38 29.04 17.96 11.77 21.63 48.00  26.59 
1977-78  14.26 40.50 102.79  51.32 9.78  18.55 32.11 19.98 12.07 24.04 49.94  28.22 
1983  17.24 45.89 104.89  55.00 11.04 20.49 34.00 21.71 12.43 25.15 51.00  29.09 
1987-88  20.62 51.23 118.21  62.14 11.57 20.35 34.90 22.08 14.01 25.16 51.15  29.61 
1993-94  23.26 58.64 125.22  68.00 14.60 24.00 36.79 25.01 13.52 24.71 44.06  27.16 
1999-2000  26.92 63.87 135.13  74.16 16.17 26.00 38.51 26.80 13.77 25.20 41.89  26.78 
                                      
1977-78  3.50 5.77 5.70  5.53 2.19 3.15 2.54 2.71 0.62 2.68 0.99  1.50 
1983  3.51 2.30 0.37  1.27 2.24 1.83 1.05 1.52 0.55 0.83 0.38  0.56 
1987-88  4.06 2.47 2.69  2.75 1.04 -0.15 0.58 0.38 2.69 0.00 0.06  0.39 
1993-94  2.03 2.28 0.97  1.51 3.95 2.79 0.88 2.10 -0.60  -0.30  -2.46  -1.43 
1999-2000 2.47 1.43 1.28  1.46 1.72 1.34 0.77 1.16 0.30 0.33 -0.84  -0.23 
  Sugar  Pulses  Fruits & Vegetables 
    30% 40% 30%  All  30% 40% 30% All  30% 40% 30%  All 
1973-74  6.02  10.60 17.76  11.37 14.28 23.85 35.86 24.58 11.11 20.20 45.52  25.07 
1977-78  6.61  11.67 19.84  12.61 13.70 23.02 34.33 23.62 12.36 22.95 49.63  27.78 
1983  8.03  13.44 20.65  13.98 15.63 25.06 36.93 25.79 15.21 28.36 57.31  33.10 
1987-88  8.55  14.25 21.64  14.75 15.93 24.74 36.27 25.55 17.81 32.76 67.57  38.72 
1993-94  8.89  14.07 19.15  14.04 16.22 24.29 33.16 24.53 23.92 41.85 82.81  48.76 
1999-2000  9.36  13.92 18.74  14.00 16.09 23.77 33.04 24.25 32.13 56.16 108.20  64.57 
                                      
1977-78  2.36 2.45 2.81  2.60 -1.04 -0.88 -1.08 -1.00 2.72 3.24 2.18  2.60 
1983  3.58 2.60 0.73  1.90 2.43 1.55 1.34 1.61 3.84 3.92 2.65  3.24 
1987-88  1.40 1.31 1.04  1.21 0.42 -0.29 -0.40 -0.21 3.56 3.26 3.73  3.54 
1993-94  0.66 -0.21  -2.01  -0.82  0.30 -0.30 -1.48 -0.68 5.04 4.16 3.45  3.92 
1999-2000 0.86 -0.18 -0.36  -0.05 -0.13 -0.36 -0.06 -0.19 5.05 5.03 4.56  4.79 
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Table 7￿Trends in Per Capita Non- Food Consumption at 1999-2000 Prices  
 
                                                                                                     Rs. 0.00/month 
Rural Urban 
Year  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00% All 
1970-71  23.5  48.6  138.4 68.0  41.20 90.41 307.99  140.92 
1972-73  25.4  49.1  137.6 68.5  43.90 95.09 336.69  152.22 
1973-74  28.4  53.9  145.4 73.7  45.57 92.14 307.48  142.77 
1977-78  32.1  63.2  155.4  81.5 55.26  122.57 354.17 171.85 
1983  43.1  83.9  249.0  121.2  72.82  160.74 511.77 239.67 
1986-87  46.0  87.2  259.6  126.5  77.07  175.40 604.25 274.56 
1987-88  52.4  95.2  282.5  138.5  79.82  168.33 568.10 261.71 
1988-89  54.6  101.1  297.8  146.1  79.51  175.05 551.60 259.35 
1989-90  56.2  109.5  283.2  145.6  83.46  180.83 632.78 287.21 
1990-91  54.7  100.3  260.2  134.6             
1992  54.1  103.0  318.7  153.1  89.32  199.72 698.17 316.14 
1993-94  64.2  115.5  325.8  163.2  102.31 217.50 710.24 330.77 
1994-95  62.3  115.3  357.5  172.1  97.94  209.93 783.51 348.41 
1995-96  64.6  122.6  360.2  176.5  107.88 240.02 911.25 401.75 
1997  71.9  137.1  411.1  199.7  117.02 267.12 899.69 411.86 
1999-2000  92.6  156.5  356.3  197.3  146.06 309.31 921.07 443.87 
Growth Rates                         
1970-90  4.53 4.23 4.47 4.41  3.91 4.00 4.08 4.04 
1990-2000  5.73 5.09 3.69 4.38  6.19 6.49 5.47 5.81  
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Figure 8￿Trends in Percapita Non-food Consumption-All India Rural 
Trends in Percapita Non-food Consumption- All India Rural

































































2.6   NUTRITIONAL INTAKES 
What are the implications of these trends on the levels of nutrition intake? Table 8 
(Figure 9) presents the calorie intake levels of the three income groups over 1972-73 and 
1999-2000 in rural areas. As can be seen the average calorie intake levels decline steadily 
over time. For poorest 30% the calorie intake levels increased till the early nineties but 
stagnated thereafter. For the middle and top groups it shows declining trend from late 
seventies. Table 9 presents the trends in mean level intake of calorie, protein and fat 
across major states of India (rural areas). It can be seen that except Punjab, Rajasthan and 
Uttar Pradesh, the calorie intake levels of all other states remained stagnant during the 
last decade. The protein intakes levels do not show considerable improvement in spite 
observed diversification to non-cereal food. This could be due to the fact that cereals 
form cheap source of proteins also (apart from calories) and the increases in non-cereals 
food intake is not commensurate with the loss due to reduced cereal intake. However, the 
content of other micronutrients in the food basket of all, especially of the poor might have 
improved considerably due to increased non-cereal food consumption. In contrast, the 
trends in fat intake levels show substantial improvement over time. In rural areas the fat 
intake increased from 24 gm per capita per day to 36 grams in the last three decades. 
During the same period in urban areas it increased from 36 grams to almost 50 grams. 
The reason for the increasing content of fats in the Indian food basket while energy and 
protein content is almost stagnant needs to be probed further. A possible reason is the 
high expenditure elasticity of edible oil, which is the basis for most Indian cooking.  
What are the factors responsible for these changes? Given tastes, the consumption 
levels respond to the changes in relative prices and income. It is also possible that the 
preferences of consumer change over time. Together, these factors influence the 
consumption patterns of an individual. At aggregate level, income distribution is another 
factor that affects the aggregate consumption level.  
However, this factor may not play significant role when we consider the 




Table 8￿Trends in Per Capita Daily Intake of Calories in Rural India 
  
Decile  Group  1972-73 1977-78 1983  1993-94 1990-00 
Lowest  30%  1504 1630 1620  1678 1696 
Middle  40%  2170 2296 2144  2119 2116 
Top  30% 3161 3190 2929  2672 2646 
All  2268 2364 2222  2152 2149 
 
Table 9￿Trends in Per capita Daily Intake of Calorie, Protein and Fat in Urban 
areas of India 
  
Calories (K.cal/day)  Proteins (gm/day)  Fat (gm/day) 
States  1972-73 1983 1993-94 1999-00 1972-73 1983 1993-94 1999-00 1972-73 1983 1993-94 1999-00
Andhra Pradesh   2143  2009  1992  2052  51.0  50.0  49.6  50.8  31.0  32.0  34.9  41.5 
Assam  2135  2043  2108  2174  56.0 52.0  53.5 56.5 25.0 25.0  30.8 38.7 
Bihar  2167  2131  2188  2171  61.0 61.0  61.4 61.0 25.0 26.0  32.7 34.2 
Gujarat  2172  2000  2027  2058  57.0 55.0  54.9 54.7 58.0 53.0  57.9 67.0 
Haryana  2404  2242  2140  2172  67.0 67.0  63.6 62.5 42.0 49.0  49.4 56.3 
Karnataka  1925  2124  2026  2046  46.0 55.0  53.1 53.5 32.0 36.0  37.6 45.1 
Kerala  1723  2049  1966  1995  44.0 51.0  52.4 55.2 27.0 38.0  37.0 42.9 
Madhya  Pradesh  2229  2137  2082  2132  61.0 62.0  59.8 60.6 34.0 36.0  40.3 43.5 
Maharashtra  1971  2028  1989  2039  55.0 56.0  55.5 55.9 41.0 45.0  47.9 52.6 
Orissa  2276  2219  2261  2298  55.0 56.0  57.2 57.8 23.0 24.0  28.1 27.4 
Punjab  2783  2100  2089  2197  70.0 63.0  61.8 64.8 52.0 49.0  53.7 57.9 
Rajasthan  2357  2255  2184  2335  70.0 69.0  66.5 70.4 47.0 47.0  51.6 61.5 
Tamil  Nadu  1841  2140  1922  2030  44.0 45.0  48.7 51.7 23.0 29.0  33.9 43.2 
Uttar  Pradesh  2161  2043  2114  2131  62.0 62.0  63.2 62.0 35.0 34.0  41.2 45.5 
West  Bengal  2080  2048  2131  2134  58.0 55.0  56.6 55.5 31.0 31.0  34.2 40.2 
All  India  2107  2089  2071  2156  56.0 57.0  57.2 58.5 36.0 37.0  42.0 49.6  
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Figure 9￿Per Capita Daily Calorie intake in Rural Areas of India (k. Cal) 
















2.7   INCOME AND PRICES 
Table10 and figure 10 presents the trends in the real total expenditures of the three 
broad income groups in rural and urban areas. The data show significant differences in 
the growth patterns between rural and urban areas. The growth rates in rural areas have 
always been higher than those in rural areas. During the seventies and eighties, the rural 
growth was about 1.8%pa but it dropped to 1.4% in the nineties. The decline is visible 
across all the income groups. For the bottom 30%, the growth rate dropped from 1.7% to 
1.5% between the two periods. For the top 30%, the drop in growth rate was from 2% to 
1.4% in the same period. Though the rural growth in the nineties is lower, it was uniform 
across the three income groups. On the other hand, in the urban areas the growth rate 
increased from 2.1% pa in the seventies and eighties to 3% in the nineties. Though, the 
growth rate in urban areas is higher during the nineties, it is inequitable within urban 
income groups. The growth rate for the top 30% of the urban is one percentage point 
more than that for the bottom 30%. With positive growth in real expenditures and with 
high expenditure elasticities the consumption of food items should have increased in the 
eighties and nineties unless the relative prices were adverse. We examine the trends in the 
relative prices.  
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Relative prices for the 9 broad groups of items have been worked out for the last 
three decades using the wholesale price relatives and NSSO weighting diagram 
separately for rural and urban areas. The relative prices are worked out as ratios of 
commodity price indices to the general index. Table 11 and figure 11 presents the relative 
prices in rural areas. During the seventies and eighties, the relative price of cereals 
showed declining trend. But in the nineties, it increased rapidly at almost 1% pa. The 
aggregated price non-cereal food items declined in the nineties relative to the general 
price. Meat, fish and eggs and Pulses are the only two commodity groups, whose price 
relatives increased in the nineties.  
Though the price movements of non-cereals are favorable, because of the 
increasing relative price of cereals, the overall food relative price showed an increasing 
trend in the nineties. It can be seen that in the eighties, the relative price of non-cereal 
food was responsible for the adverse trends in the food price.  
2.8 SHIFTS  IN  TASTES AND PREFERENCES 
The expenditure elasticity of cereals is known to be higher in rural areas 
compared to the urban areas. Also, in urban areas poor have higher expenditure elasticity 
compared to the richer groups. The adverse cereal price and the slow down of growth in 
rural and for urban poor in the nineties might have dampened the demand for cereals. 
However, with the positive growth in the income across all the income groups and 
favorable cereal price movements in the seventies and eighties, one expects an 
improvement in the cereal consumption of the poor. But no such improvement had taken 
place.  For explanation, one may have to consider exogenous factors, which affect food 
consumption. One possible explanation could be the changing tastes and preferences. The 
tastes and preferences of Indian consumers seem to be changing in favor of non-food 
items from food, within food in favor of non-cereal food from cereals. Within cereals the 
preference patterns seems to be moving in favor of rice and wheat from coarse cereals 
(Radhakrishna and Ravi 1992).  More recently, Rao (2000) observed that the decline has 
been sharper in the rural areas where improvements in rural infrastructure made other 
food and non-food items available to the rural households and hard manual work is  
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greatly reduced in agriculture due to farm mechanization.  Rao further observed that a 
reduction in the intake of food grain on this account should not be taken as deterioration 
in human welfare.  
In the next section we estimate a complete demand system keeping the shift in 
tastes and preferences as one of the factors and derive the complete set of elasticities. 
 
Table 10￿Trends in Per Capita Total Expenditure (at 1999-2000 Prices) 
 
Rs. 0.00/month  
Rural Urban 
Year  30.00% 40.00% 30.00%  All  30.00% 40.00% 30.00%  All 
1970-71  175.8 298.2 541.4 334.4  228.87  393.83  871.86  487.75 
1972-73  174.3 284.0 511.2 319.2  234.15  397.98  883.73  494.55 
1973-74  186.0 304.3 529.8 336.4  233.51  385.49  829.30  473.04 
1977-78  186.3 306.7 514.6 332.9  244.45  423.46  874.43  505.05 
1983  205.8 341.4 669.2 399.0  273.99  485.90  1067.94  596.94 
1986-87  218.8 358.5 696.1 417.9  299.64  530.61  1202.66  662.93 
1987-88  228.9 361.4 713.8 427.4  300.24  511.08  1172.13  646.15 
1988-89  236.0 373.3 728.8 438.8  305.98  533.80  1138.92  646.99 
1989-90  249.5 393.3 728.9 450.9  316.59  540.29  1234.73  681.51 
1990-91  237.2  379.4  695.3  431.5             
1992  227.9 370.7 729.9 435.6  314.02  559.29  1298.59  707.50 
1993-94  243.2 386.5 746.0 451.4  330.16  577.05  1321.58  726.34 
1994-95  235.8 369.1 747.2 442.5  315.19  557.07  1393.58  735.46 
1995-96  236.0 371.7 725.0 437.0  335.29  592.00  1475.23  779.95 
1997  247.8 406.3 819.6 482.8  344.61  628.45  1485.11  800.30 
1999-2000 271.1 424.5 783.1 486.0  381.05  680.39  1560.64  854.66 
Growth Rates                         
1970-90  1.73 1.48 2.02 1.78  1.92 2.02 2.22 2.11 
1990-2000  1.49 1.32 1.41 1.40  2.30 2.88 3.26 3.01 
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Figure 10￿Total Expenditure (1999-2000 prices) All India Rural 
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1969-70  98.8   101.9   75.9   64.9   75.0   68.7   94.3   91.5   92.7   99.2   101.4  
1970-71  97.7   104.0   83.5   67.3   72.4   73.6   118.7   96.8   97.2   98.8   102.2  
1971-72  98.7   105.0   73.2   69.6   95.1   83.6   96.6   102.3   93.6   97.3   104.8  
1972-73  101.7   101.9   76.1   71.5   112.8   92.7   101.6   90.7   95.1   100.0   100.1  
1973-74  105.6   106.9   95.5   74.7   111.3   88.2   117.4   80.7   101.3   103.3   94.0  
1974-75  109.0   96.9   89.6   71.0   82.3   86.0   92.8   91.4   94.2   105.9   89.3  
1975-76  108.5   105.4   65.7   74.3   88.0   74.1   87.6   100.4   94.3   101.7   97.0  
1976-77  97.4   101.9   75.8   77.8   92.0   71.6   94.2   123.3   96.5   97.7   104.2  
1977-78  93.6   96.8   92.1   81.3   75.1   98.7   112.6   131.6   105.7   100.6   98.9  
1978-79  93.9   103.0   82.9   91.0   63.7   113.8   96.9   114.0   102.8   98.7   102.4  
1979-80  99.5   99.0   90.9   94.0   84.6   101.6   102.3   115.0   99.7   97.9   103.8  
1980-81  100.4   94.8   99.0   94.1   118.5   103.5   108.6   102.6   100.4   99.7   100.5  
1981-82  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0  
1982-83  106.8   101.7   91.8   106.0   76.3   94.8   100.7   109.1   99.9   101.3   97.7  
1983-84  109.6   100.7   97.1   98.8   76.6   102.8   118.4   145.3   106.1   103.8   93.1  
1984-85  100.7   107.8   94.9   103.2   82.2   105.5   98.5   160.5   109.8   102.0   96.3  
1985-86  100.7   105.9   82.1   114.1   92.8   101.1   104.2   132.4   107.1   101.8   96.8  
1986-87  99.2   104.8   102.6   115.8   88.8   99.8   149.1   126.4   112.4   103.2   94.3  
1987-88  99.0   108.3   121.6   115.5   81.6   117.1   130.7   117.7   115.8   104.7   91.6  
1988-89  102.0   109.9   96.7   111.9   82.1   125.6   105.4   113.5   112.3   104.8   91.4  
1989-90  100.6   116.8   92.6   111.6   91.3   121.9   98.9   158.6   113.3   103.8   93.2  
1990-91  96.3   110.8   117.5   112.7   83.1   127.7   124.0   156.8   117.9   104.2   92.5  
1991-92  99.7   107.7   117.7   107.2   74.1   126.1   119.7   122.5   118.3   107.0   87.3  
1992-93  104.5   109.0   97.5   116.1   76.3   115.0   105.3   125.7   114.6   107.6   86.4  
1993-94  106.1   107.9   89.2   125.7   96.5   119.7   122.3   136.3   114.5   106.8   87.8  
1994-95  105.6   110.7   90.8   139.7   94.4   129.4   103.2   118.6   112.7   106.6   88.0  
1995-96  103.1   103.6   91.6   137.6   80.8   151.4   116.7   122.0   116.4   107.1   87.2  
1996-97  104.9   97.3   83.8   127.4   76.4   152.4   129.6   114.0   115.4   108.4   84.9  
1997-98  105.9   100.2   78.1   136.4   89.5   128.8   101.5   153.0   114.5   107.8   85.9  
1998-99  101.9   96.4   91.4   127.3   81.1   130.4   170.1   127.0   124.7   110.6   80.9  
1999-2000  113.4   99.0   75.0   123.3   77.3   129.4   88.6   120.2   111.0   110.3   81.4  
2000-2001  108.8   103.4   62.8   128.9   76.8   128.4   80.7   101.3   107.2   105.6   89.9  
20001-2002  109.7   105.4   68.9   135.0   77.1   131.3   125.1   94.7   113.4   108.1   85.4  
Growth Rates                                  
70s  -0.5   -0.5   1.0   3.5   -2.4   2.8   -0.9   3.4   0.8   -0.1   0.2  
80s  -0.3   1.8   0.4   2.0   -1.7   2.4   1.0   2.8   1.7   0.5   -1.0  
90s  0.9   -0.9   -4.8   1.4   -0.5   0.6   -1.0   -2.5   -0.4   0.2   -0.5  
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Figure 11￿Relative Price of cereals and Non-cereals food 
Relative Price of Cereals and Non-cereals food


































2.8.1 Demand  Model 
A complete demand system has been estimated to compute the complete set of 
price and expenditure elasticities of major consumption items. We used a hierarchic 
version of modified Linear Expenditure system (LES), where in the first stage a LES is 
specified for the broad groups of consumption items. In the second stage a model of 
Nasse￿s extended LES is specified to disaggregate one or more broad commodity groups 
of first stage. The combined model is then used to estimate the elasticities. For the first 
stage model the commodity grouping followed was 1) Cereals and cereal substitutes, 2) 
Milk and milk products 3) Edible oils, 4) Meat, fish and eggs, 5) Sugar and gur, 6) other 
food, and the last is 7) non-food. A separate sub models is specified for the commodity 
group ￿other food￿
12. The sub model disaggregates other food group into pulses, Fruits 
                                                 
12 A sub model cereal with break up of rice, wheat and other cereals also was tried. However, inclusion of 
cereal sub model led to violation of second order condition, which, results in unreliable elasticities. 
Therefore the cereal sub model was dropped and that of ￿other food￿ alone was use to form the combined 
model.   
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and vegetables and other food. It is important to note that the elasticities computed using 
this method vary significantly from those calculated by other authors. For example, 
P.Kumar et al. in their paper Changing Consumption Pattern In South Asia (2003) 
compute demand elasticity using the Food Characteristic Demand System (FCDS), 
following Bouis (1992) and their estimates are found to be significantly lower in the case 
of several commodities such as cereals, milk, meat, fruits and vegetables etc.  
Since its formulation by Stone (1954), LES has been extensively used for 
consumption analysis in various countries (Deaton, 1975, Lluch et al. 1977, 
Radhakrishna et al 1979, 1980, Radhakrishna and Ravi 1990). However, two limitations 
of LES, which restrict its application, arise out of linear income effects and inherent 
additivity of its utility function. The first limitation can be overcome by specifying the 
piece-wise LES. (Ludlow, 1988). The second limitation of additivity does not allow 
inferior goods. However for broad commodity groups the additive demand model may 
not be restrictive. For specifying the piece-wise LES, the population within rural and 
urban is divided into four income groups, very poor (those below 75% of the poverty 
line), moderately poor (below poverty line but above 75% of it), non-poor lower 
(between poverty line and 150% of it) and non-poor high (above 150% of the poverty 
line). The first and second stage models were estimated for each of these groups in rural 
and urban areas separately using cross section time-series data on consumption 
expenditure and prices. Commodity prices are assumed to be the same for all the 
expenditure groups. In order to capture the shifts in the consumption patterns the model 
specified with a dummy in marginal budget share parameter
13. We specify the LES as 
follows. 
               pitqit = cipit + (bi +  b
*
i D) (yt - Σ ck pkt) + uit                     
               i=1,2,￿n 
  Σi bi = 1 , Σi bi
* = 0 
               D = 0 for t= 1983 to 1986-87 
                                                 
13 Several alternative specifications are possible to isolate taste effects; a dummy in b parameter or in c 
parameter or in both with different periodisation or a time trend. However our results with these 
specifications indicate that the a dummy in ￿b￿ gives better results in terms of likelihood and also in terms of 
significant coefficients.   
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                =1 for t= 1987-88 to 1999-2000 
where, qi , pi and y are quantity and price of i th commodity consumed, y is total 
expenditure and b, b
* and c are parameters. The b parameter gives the marginal budget 
share. In above specification the c coefficient is assumed to be constant over the entire 
period but the marginal budget share of i th commodity takes the value bi in the first 
period i.e. 1983-1986-87 and bi + bi* for the second period covering 1988-00.  The 
expenditure and the price elasticities are given by 
ηyi = bi/wi
                                                                                              
ηij  = -δij + (δij ￿ bi) pjcj/piqi                         
where w is budget share of ith commodity and δij =1 if i=j and zero otherwise. 
The Nasse￿s extended version of LES is used as the second stage model. It allows 
inferior goods. The model is specified as, 
piqi = pici(p) + bi ( y - Σ pk ck(p)) 
where ci(p) = Σjcij(pi/pj)
1/2, 0<bi<1, Σbk = 1 and cij = cji for all i and j. The 
expenditure and price elasticities given by  
    ηyi = bi/wi , where wi = piqi/y 
    ηij =  -δij  + (δij ￿bi)pjcj(p)/piqi + [cij(pipj)
1/2 - δij ci(p) pi]/2piqi 
where w is budget share of ith commodity and δij =1 if i=j and zero otherwise. The model 
is specified without dummies using the data of the nineties (1987-88 to 199-2000) only.   
Table 12 and 13 give the parameter estimates of the LES and the Other food sub 
model for rural and urban areas.  As can be seen the LES fits well the data. The dummy 
coefficients indicate shifts in consumption patterns independent of price and income.  
The marginal budget shares for the period 1983-88 and for 1988-2000 are presented in 
table 14. Among all the income groups of rural areas, the dummy coefficients indicate 
significant decline in the marginal budget shares (MBS) of cereals and meat, fish and 
eggs and improvement in marginal budget share of non-food. Other commodity groups of 
food have generally declining MBS but are not significant. In urban areas the MBSs of 
food item show significant decline while that of non-food an increase. The results clearly  
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show that due to shifts in the preference structure, the consumers are moving away from 
the food to non-food. The MBS parameters vary significantly across income groups. In 
rural areas, the MBS of milk and milk products and edible oils increased with income, 
while that of cereals and other food items declined. In urban areas the MBS of all the 
food items decline with income, while that of non-food increased (Figure 12 and 13). The 
pattern of marginal budget shares clearly implies that changes in income distribution alter 
the demand for food.  
Given the expenditure on other food, the b parameters of the sub model give the 
marginal budget shares of the three items of other food (Table 13). For the two poor 
groups in rural and urban areas and the non-poor lower of rural areas, Fruits and 
vegetables has the highest MBS.  For the two non-poor groups in urban and the non-poor 
high in rural areas, ￿other food￿ has the highest marginal budget share.  
Uncompensated price and expenditures are computed using combined model. It 
may be noted that the combined model yields a Nasse￿s extended version of LES with cij 
parameters as zero for i,j ε G, where G is the other food group. For this we used the 
marginal budget shares of the second period, i.e. (bi +  b
*


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13￿Parameters of Other Food Sub model ￿ All India Rural 
 
 
Very Poor  Moderately Poor 
Commodity  Cij b  R
2 Cij  b  R
2 
Pulses  -3.6019 1.2967 2.9909 0.2731  0.9768  -4.9825 4.3121 2.3147 0.2513  0.9802 
  SE  (1.0225) 0.2157) (1.0157) (0.0197)    (1.7325) (1.4398) (1.6907) (0.0203)   
F&  Veg    -1.0903 0.6336 0.4478  0.9959    0.5140 -2.8484 0.4073  0.9973 
 SE    (0.1892)  (0.1903)  (0.0149)      (1.2335) (0.9972) (0.0150)   
O  food     -2.8000  0.2791  0.9882     2.3817  0.3413  0.9876 
  SE      (0.2144)  (0.0183)        (1.4425)  (0.0222)   
   Non-Poor, Lower  Non-poor, High 
Pulses  -3.2503 2.1958 3.9680 0.2110  0.9881  -6.5279 3.7604 8.5061 0.1328  0.9662 
  SE  (1.6118)  (1.0106)  (1.8786)  (0.0112)    (3.0343) (1.8407) (3.6683) (0.0076)   
F&  Veg    4.1895 -4.6318 0.4166  0.9928    6.8456 -7.7323 0.3766  0.9953 
  SE    (0.9198)  (1.3276)  (0.0160)      (1.6580) (2.0070) (0.0072)   
O  food     2.3168  0.3724  0.9768     -1.5461  0.4906  0.9892 
  SE      (1.0884)  (0.0225)        (2.1251)  (0.0124)   
 
Table 13￿Cont. Parameters of Other Food Sub model ￿ All India Urban 
Cij b  R
2  Cij b  R
2 
Commodity  Very Poor  Moderately Poor 
Pulses  -0.3541 0.8575 -0.0069 0.1906 0.9840 -0.3861 1.0757 0.6480 0.1399 0.9933 
  SE  (0.8011) (0.2428) (0.8874) (0.0091)    (0.7466) (0.3142) (0.7914) (0.0082)   
F&  Vega    -1.1164 0.2110 0.4320 0.9960    -1.2999 0.5219 0.4500 0.9969 
  SE    (0.3206)  (0.3561)  (0.0083)    (0.5518)  (0.3532)  (0.0114)  
O  food      0.4973 0.3773 0.9922      -0.1723 0.4101 0.9983 
    SE     (0.2614)  (0.0111)      (0.3311)  (0.0090)  
   Non-Poor Lower  Non-Poor, High 
Pulses  -0.9679 1.4319 1.7025 0.1012 0.9929 -2.1994 3.8667 2.7611 0.0420 0.9759 
    SE  (1.0574) (0.4129) (1.1128) (0.0069)    (1.8411 (0.8253) (2.1528) (0.0032)   
F&  Veg    -0.1321 -0.3020 0.4075 0.9925    8.5987 -7.3209 0.3293 0.9872 
  SE    (1.6443)  (1.6947)  (0.0162)    (3.2846)  (3.8396)  (0.0099)  
O  food      -1.9048 0.4913 0.9904      5.0369 0.6287 0.9926 
     (0.4722)  (0.0179)      (1.0676)  (0.0116)  
 
Note: SE- Standard Errors  
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Figure 12￿Marginal Budget Shares of cereals in Rural Areas for Period 1 and 2 













































Figure 13￿Marginal Budget Shares of Cereal in Urban areas of period 1 and 2 


















































P eriod 2 
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Table 14￿Marginal Budget Shares of LES  
 
Very Poor  Moderately Poor  Non-Poor Lower  Non-Poor, High 
Commodity Group  Period I  Period II Period I Period II Period I Period II  Period I  Period II
RURAL                         
Cereals  0.3833  0.3155 0.2455  0.1577 0.1578  0.0798 0.0526  0.0224 
Milk and milk products0.0659  0.0651  0.1577  0.1577  0.1816  0.1856  0.0995  0.1038 
Edible  oils  0.0452  0.0503 0.0469  0.0531 0.0400  0.0407 0.0264  0.0213 
Meat,  egg  and  fish  0.0410  0.0347 0.0570  0.0423 0.0511  0.0450 0.0278  0.0224 
Sugar  0.0277  0.0274 0.0387  0.0397 0.0378  0.0363 0.0240  0.0174 
Other  food  0.2005  0.1968 0.1880  0.1845 0.1666  0.1699 0.1246  0.1284 
Non-food  0.2364  0.3102 0.2662  0.3650 0.3652  0.4427 0.6451  0.6843 
URBAN                         
Cereals  0.1810  0.1586 0.0592  0.0382 0.0243  0.0103 0.0119  0.0089 
Milk and milk products0.1124  0.1047  0.1095  0.1014  0.1039  0.1006  0.0592  0.0554 
Edible  oils  0.0489  0.0450 0.0342  0.0280 0.0281  0.0224 0.0146  0.0096 
Meat,  egg  and  fish  0.0503  0.0469 0.0408  0.0372 0.0345  0.0298 0.0214  0.0146 
Sugar  0.0248  0.0232 0.0179  0.0145 0.0125  0.0099 0.0061  0.0035 
Other  food  0.2178  0.2125 0.2002  0.1939 0.1924  0.1835 0.1441  0.1397 
Non-food  0.3648  0.4091 0.5383  0.5868 0.6043  0.6435 0.7427  0.7683 
 
Table 15 and figure 14 presents the expenditure elasticities across the income 
groups in rural and urban areas.  In rural areas the expenditure elasticities of most of the 
food items increase between very poor and moderately poor and then decline for other 
income groups. For cereals and cereal substitutes, it declined from 0.80 for the rural very 
poor group to 0.14 for the non-poor high.  At mean level it is 0.30.  For milk the elasticity 
is as high as 1.64 for the very poor, increases further to 2.3 for the moderately poor and 
then declines to 0.97 for the non-poor, high. Milk and milk products, meat, fish and eggs, 
sugar and fruits and vegetables are elastic with respect to expenditure at aggregate level 
in rural India. In urban areas, the expenditure elasticities are lower compared to those of 
rural areas and they decline across expenditure groups. The elasticity of cereals declines 
from 0.53 for the very poor to 0.09 for the non-poor high. Most of food items show  
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similar declines, except other food, which fluctuated around 0.95.  At mean level, other 
food, Fruits and vegetables and Milk have higher elasticities (n that order) among the 
food items. 
The own price elasticities also exhibit similar trends (Table 16) In case of cereals, 
the own price elasticity in rural areas declines in absolute terms as one moves from the 
very poor to the non-poor high strata. Other food items increase between the first two 
income groups and then decline. Among the food items, pulse has the highest own price 
elasticity in both rural and urban areas. These elasticities clearly indicate that any price 
increase will have differential effects on the welfare levels of different sections. 
Using the elasticities, we have estimated separately the effect of a 10 percent 
increase of prices of cereals, non-cereals food, and non-food on the consumption of 9 
broad commodity groups. For assessing the price effect of non-cereal food we aggregated 
elasticities of the items of that constitute this group. The price effects are estimated for 
rural and urban areas at mean level. Table 19 presents the results of the simulation 
exercise. Given the total expenditure, a 10 percent increase of cereal price would result in 
a 2.5 and 1.0 percent of cereal consumption in rural and urban areas respectively.  
However, the impact of increased cereal price on the consumption of non-cereal food 
seems to be considerable, especially in rural areas. When the cereal price increases by 10 
percent in rural areas, the consumption of all non-cereal food items decline by 2 percent 
or more, except for edible oils, pulses and other food.  The decline in milk consumption 
is in fact more than that of cereals itself. In urban areas the price effects of cereal are 
considerably lower than in rural areas. When prices of all non-cereal food items increase 
by 10%, the impact on consumption of cereals is marginal. It declines by about 0.3 
percent in rural areas and almost remains unchanged in urban areas. The impact of this 
price rise on the consumption of milk in rural areas is highest at 11%, followed by fruits 
and vegetables (8.2%) and sugar (8%). Other food items decline between 6-8 percent. As 
in case of cereals, the prices of non-cereal food items have considerably lower effect on 
their consumption in urban areas. In rural areas the impact of non-food price on food 
consumption is marginal. However, urban areas, its effect on food items is positive.  
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When its price increases by 10 percent, the consumption of other-food increases by 2%, 
fruits and vegetables by 1.7% and milk by 1.4%.  Other food items increase by about 1 
percent. The simulation exercise clearly shows that the price of cereals is an important 
determinant of demand for food in rural areas. From the elasticities presented in tables 17 
and 18 it can be seen that it is more so for the poorer groups in both rural and urban areas.  
 

























1  CERL  0.8005 0.4568  0.2937 0.1377 0.3094 0.5286 0.1365  0.0439 0.0827 0.0913 
2  MILK  1.6465 2.3612  1.9578 0.9734 1.4474 1.6710 1.2151  0.9663 0.5673 0.6582 
3  EOIL  1.0303 1.1252  0.9368 0.6443 0.8500 0.8649 0.5422  0.4470 0.3145 0.3662 
4  MEAT  1.3512 1.3911  1.2843 0.6941 1.0161 1.4932 0.9656  0.7239 0.4615 0.5422 
5  SUGR  1.1385 1.4651  1.2880 0.7326 1.0552 0.7971 0.5092  0.3665 0.2293 0.2885 
6  PULS  1.3529 1.3971  0.6443 0.3301 0.5695 0.9332 0.6107  0.4321 0.2244 0.3026 
7  FVEG  1.0698 1.0376  1.2413 0.8882 1.0406 1.1357 1.0658  0.9047 0.7031 0.7599 
8  O  FD  0.8864 0.8071  0.8427 1.0131 0.9145 0.9688 0.9480  1.1143 0.9519 0.9738 
9  N  FD  1.0933 1.2184  1.3055 1.4461 1.3718 1.2875 1.9059  1.9133 1.4406 1.4956 
 
 

























1 CERL  -0.6683  -0.3377  -0.2404 -0.1366 -0.2558 -0.5355 -0.1495 -0.0509  -0.0883 -0.0977
2 MILK  -1.0562  -1.0883  -1.1332 -0.8442 -0.9694 -1.3724 -1.0268 -0.9136  -0.5744 -0.6478
3 EOIL  -0.6803  -0.5516  -0.5748 -0.5565 -0.5698 -0.7449 -0.4746 -0.4312  -0.3112 -0.3547
4 MEAT  -0.8745  -0.6656  -0.7739 -0.5983 -0.6809 -1.2528 -0.8251 -0.6868  -0.4550 -0.5221
5 SUGR  -0.7403  -0.6980  -0.7740 -0.6283 -0.6972 -0.6829 -0.4398 -0.3493  -0.2248 -0.2752
6 PULS  -2.3882  -2.5669  -1.1886 -1.2080 -1.3482 -1.0137 -0.8588 -0.8800  -0.8643 -0.8708
7 FVEG  -0.9994  -0.7322  -0.5272 -0.5544 -0.6009 -1.1077 -1.0650 -0.9425  -0.5942 -0.6826
8 O FD  -1.4211  -0.4306  -0.5691 -1.0317 -0.7885 -0.8594 -0.9339 -1.1588  -0.8352 -0.8817
9 N FD  -0.7958  -0.7270  -0.8751 -1.0718 -0.9725 -1.0537 -1.2542 -1.2816  -1.0916 -1.1134
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Figure 14￿Expenditure Elasticities in Rural Areas 













































































Table 17￿Uncompensated Own, Cross Price and Expenditure Elasticities 
 
All India Rural ￿ Very Poor 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL4 MEAT5 SUGR6 PULS7 FVEG8 O FD 9 N FD Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.6683  0.0019  -0.0132 -0.0027  -0.0051 -0.0041 -0.0205 -0.0213  -0.0673  0.8005 
2 MILK  -0.3145  -1.0562  -0.0271 -0.0055  -0.0106 -0.0084 -0.0422 -0.0438  -0.1383  1.6465 
3 EOIL  -0.1968  0.0025  -0.6803 -0.0034  -0.0066 -0.0053 -0.0264 -0.0274  -0.0866  1.0303 
4 MEAT  -0.2581  0.0032  -0.0222 -0.8745  -0.0087 -0.0069 -0.0346 -0.0359  -0.1135  1.3512 
5 SUGR  -0.2174  0.0027  -0.0187 -0.0038  -0.7403 -0.0058 -0.0292 -0.0303  -0.0956  1.1385 
6 PULS  -0.2584  0.0032  -0.0222 -0.0045  -0.0087 -2.3882 0.3698  1.0697 -0.1137  1.3529 
7  FVEG  -0.2043 0.0025  -0.0176 -0.0036  -0.0069 0.1898 -0.9994 0.0595 -0.0899  1.0698 
8  O  FD  -0.1693  0.0021 -0.0146 -0.0030 -0.0057  0.7054  0.0942 -1.4211  -0.0745  0.8864 
9 N FD  -0.2088  0.0026  -0.0180 -0.0037  -0.0070 -0.0056 -0.0280 -0.0291  -0.7958  1.0933 
 
All India Rural ￿ Moderately Poor 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL4 MEAT5 SUGR6 PULS7 FVEG8 O FD 9 N FD Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.3377  0.0032  -0.0102 -0.0049  -0.0039 -0.0053 -0.0170 -0.0222  -0.0588  0.4568 
2 MILK  -0.6410  -1.0883  -0.0528 -0.0251  -0.0201 -0.0272 -0.0881 -0.1147  -0.3041  2.3612 
3 EOIL  -0.3054  0.0079  -0.5516 -0.0120  -0.0096 -0.0129 -0.0420 -0.0547  -0.1449  1.1252 
4 MEAT  -0.3776  0.0097  -0.0311 -0.6656  -0.0119 -0.0160 -0.0519 -0.0676  -0.1792  1.3911 
5 SUGR  -0.3977  0.0103  -0.0327 -0.0156  -0.6980 -0.0169 -0.0546 -0.0712  -0.1887  1.4651 
6 PULS  -0.3793  0.0098  -0.0312 -0.0148  -0.0119 -2.5669 1.1074  0.6698 -0.1799  1.3971 
7  FVEG  -0.2817 0.0073  -0.0232 -0.0110  -0.0088 0.5194 -0.7322 -0.3737  -0.1336  1.0376 
8  O  FD  -0.2191 0.0057  -0.0180 -0.0086  -0.0069 0.3046 -0.3302 -0.4306  -0.1040  0.8071 
9 N FD  -0.3307  0.0085  -0.0272 -0.0129  -0.0104 -0.0140 -0.0454 -0.0592  -0.7270  1.2184 
 
All India Rural ￿ Non-Poor Lower 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL4 MEAT5 SUGR6 PULS7 FVEG8 O FD 9 N FD Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.2404  0.0046  -0.0057 -0.0024  -0.0019 -0.0101 -0.0044 -0.0110  -0.0223  0.2937 
2 MILK  -0.4392  -1.1332  -0.0377 -0.0162  -0.0129 -0.0671 -0.0293 -0.0733  -0.1488  1.9578 
3 EOIL  -0.2101  0.0145  -0.5748 -0.0078  -0.0062 -0.0321 -0.0140 -0.0351  -0.0712  0.9368 
4 MEAT  -0.2881  0.0199  -0.0247 -0.7739  -0.0085 -0.0440 -0.0192 -0.0481  -0.0976  1.2843 
5 SUGR  -0.2889  0.0200  -0.0248 -0.0107  -0.7740 -0.0442 -0.0193 -0.0482  -0.0979  1.2880 
6 PULS  -0.1445  0.0100  -0.0124 -0.0053  -0.0043 -1.1886 0.2398  0.5101 -0.0490  0.6443 
7  FVEG  -0.2785 0.0192  -0.0239 -0.0103  -0.0082 0.2004 -0.5272 -0.5185  -0.0944  1.2413 
8  O  FD  -0.1890 0.0131  -0.0162 -0.0070  -0.0056 0.3669 -0.3716 -0.5691  -0.0641  0.8427 
9 N FD  -0.2929  0.0202  -0.0251 -0.0108  -0.0086 -0.0448 -0.0195 -0.0489  -0.8751  1.3055 
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Table 17 ￿(contd.) Uncompensated Own, Cross Price and Expenditure Elasticities 
All India Rural ￿ Non-Poor high 
 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL  2 MILK  3 EOIL  4 MEAT5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD 9 N FD Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.1366  -0.0026  -0.0021  -0.0018  -0.0012  -0.0051  -0.0019  -0.0012 0.0148  0.1377 
2 MILK  -0.1399  -0.8442  -0.0146  -0.0129  -0.0088  -0.0363  -0.0131  -0.0085 0.1047  0.9734 
3 EOIL  -0.0926  -0.0119  -0.5565  -0.0085  -0.0058  -0.0240  -0.0086  -0.0056 0.0693  0.6443 
4 MEAT  -0.0997  -0.0129  -0.0104  -0.5983  -0.0062  -0.0259  -0.0093  -0.0061 0.0747  0.6941 
5 SUGR  -0.1053  -0.0136  -0.0110  -0.0097  -0.6283  -0.0273  -0.0098  -0.0064 0.0788  0.7326 
6 PULS  -0.0474  -0.0061  -0.0050  -0.0044  -0.0030  -1.2080  0.2443  0.6639  0.0355  0.3301 
7 FVEG  -0.1276  -0.0165  -0.0133  -0.0118  -0.0080  0.2033  -0.5544  -0.4554 0.0956  0.8882 
8 O FD  -0.1456  -0.0188  -0.0152  -0.0134  -0.0091  0.5176  -0.4059  -1.0317 0.1090  1.0131 
9 N FD  -0.2078  -0.0268  -0.0217  -0.0192  -0.0130  -0.0539  -0.0194  -0.0126 -1.0718 1.4461 
 
All India Rural ￿ Aggregate 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.2558  0.0017  -0.0058 -0.0027  -0.0023  -0.0071  -0.0071  -0.0105  -0.0198  0.3094 
2 MILK  -0.2903  -0.9694  -0.0261 -0.0150  -0.0112  -0.0456  -0.0258  -0.0408  -0.0232  1.4474 
3 EOIL  -0.1753  0.0020  -0.5698 -0.0085  -0.0066  -0.0244  -0.0167  -0.0255  -0.0253  0.8500 
4 MEAT  -0.2070  0.0024  -0.0185 -0.6809  -0.0078  -0.0308  -0.0188  -0.0297  -0.0250  1.0161 
5 SUGR  -0.2176  0.0029  -0.0194 -0.0106  -0.6972  -0.0314  -0.0201  -0.0317  -0.0303  1.0552 
6  PULS  -0.1184  0.0016 -0.0105 -0.0056 -0.0044 -1.3482  0.3172 0.6179 -0.0191  0.5695 
7 FVEG  -0.2064  0.0003  -0.0186 -0.0106  -0.0081  0.2496  -0.6009  -0.4312  -0.0146  1.0406 
8 O FD  -0.1733  -0.0025  -0.0160 -0.0099  -0.0073  0.4384  -0.3618  -0.7885  0.0062  0.9145 




Table 18￿Uncompensated Own, Cross Price and Expenditure Elasticities 
 
All India -Very Poor 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT 5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure
1  CERL  -0.5355  0.0138 -0.0074  0.0044  -0.0050 -0.0048  -0.0016 -0.0078  0.0153  0.5286 
2  MILK  -0.2768 -1.3724 -0.0232 0.0139  -0.0158  -0.0152 -0.0051 -0.0248 0.0483  1.6710 
3  EOIL  -0.1433  0.0225 -0.7449  0.0072  -0.0082 -0.0079  -0.0026 -0.0128  0.0250  0.8649 
4  MEAT  -0.2473  0.0389 -0.0208  -1.2528 -0.0141 -0.0136  -0.0046 -0.0221  0.0431  1.4932 
5  SUGR  -0.1320  0.0208 -0.0111  0.0066  -0.6829 -0.0072  -0.0024 -0.0118  0.0230  0.7971 
6  PULS  -0.1546  0.0243 -0.0130  0.0078  -0.0088 -1.0137  0.2136 -0.0158  0.0270  0.9332 
7  FVEG  -0.1881  0.0296 -0.0158  0.0095  -0.0107 0.1059 -1.1077 0.0089 0.0328  1.1357 
8  O  FD  -0.1605  0.0253 -0.0135  0.0081  -0.0092 -0.0098  0.0222 -0.8594  0.0280  0.9688 
9  N  FD  -0.2133  0.0336 -0.0179  0.0107  -0.0122 -0.0117  -0.0039 -0.0191  -1.0537  1.2875 
 
All India ￿ Moderately Poor 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT 5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure
1  CERL  -0.1495  0.0003 -0.0038  -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0029  -0.0011 -0.0023  0.0259  0.1365 
2  MILK  -0.3007 -1.0268 -0.0339 -0.0085  -0.0197  -0.0260 -0.0096 -0.0200 0.2302  1.2151 
3  EOIL  -0.1342  0.0014 -0.4746  -0.0038 -0.0088 -0.0116  -0.0043 -0.0089  0.1027  0.5422 
4  MEAT  -0.2390  0.0024 -0.0270  -0.8251 -0.0156 -0.0207  -0.0077 -0.0159  0.1829  0.9656 
5  SUGR  -0.1260  0.0013 -0.0142  -0.0036 -0.4398 -0.0109  -0.0040 -0.0084  0.0965  0.5092 
6  PULS  -0.1511  0.0015 -0.0171  -0.0043 -0.0099 -0.8588  0.1921 0.1211 0.1157  0.6107 
7  FVEG  -0.2638  0.0027 -0.0298  -0.0075 -0.0173 0.0839 -1.0650 0.0290 0.2019  1.0658 
8  O  FD  -0.2346  0.0024 -0.0265  -0.0066 -0.0154 0.0491 0.0380 -0.9339  0.1796  0.9480 
9  N  FD  -0.4717  0.0048 -0.0532  -0.0133 -0.0309 -0.0408  -0.0151 -0.0314  -1.2542  1.9059 
 
All India Non-Poor, Lower 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT 5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure 
1 CERL  -0.0509  -0.0004  -0.0013  -0.0006  -0.0008  -0.0011  -0.0006  0.0002  0.0117  0.0439 
2 MILK  -0.2175  -0.9136  -0.0282  -0.0128  -0.0172  -0.0248  -0.0123  0.0033  0.2567  0.9663 
3 EOIL  -0.1006  -0.0045  -0.4312  -0.0059  -0.0079  -0.0115  -0.0057  0.0015  0.1187  0.4470 
4 MEAT  -0.1629  -0.0072  -0.0211  -0.6868  -0.0129  -0.0186  -0.0092  0.0025  0.1923  0.7239 
5 SUGR  -0.0825  -0.0037  -0.0107  -0.0049  -0.3493  -0.0094  -0.0047  0.0013  0.0973  0.3665 
6 PULS  -0.0973  -0.0043  -0.0126  -0.0057  -0.0077  -0.8800  0.1953  0.2655  0.1148  0.4321 
7  FVEG  -0.2036 -0.0091 -0.0264 -0.0120  -0.0161  0.0813  -0.9425 -0.0167 0.2403  0.9047 
8  O  FD  -0.2508 -0.0111 -0.0325 -0.0148  -0.0198  0.1120  -0.0344 -1.1588 0.2960  1.1143 
9 N FD  -0.4306  -0.0191  -0.0558  -0.0254  -0.0340  -0.0491  -0.0243  0.0066  -1.2816  1.9133 
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Table 18￿Cont. Uncompensated Own, Cross Price and Expenditure Elasticities 
All India ￿Non-Poor, High 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT 5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure
1  CERL  -0.0883 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0015  -0.0010  -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0006 0.0174  0.0827 
2  MILK  -0.0562 -0.5744 -0.0121 -0.0099  -0.0067  -0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0041 0.1196  0.5673 
3  EOIL  -0.0311 -0.0138 -0.3112 -0.0055  -0.0037  -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0023 0.0663  0.3145 
4  MEAT  -0.0457 -0.0203 -0.0098 -0.4550  -0.0055  -0.0095 -0.0096 -0.0033 0.0972  0.4615 
5  SUGR  -0.0227 -0.0101 -0.0049 -0.0040  -0.2248  -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0017 0.0483  0.2293 
6 PULS  -0.0222  -0.0099  -0.0048  -0.0039  -0.0027  -0.8643  0.3543  0.2818  0.0473  0.2244 
7  FVEG  -0.0696 -0.0309 -0.0149 -0.0123  -0.0084  0.1298  -0.5942 -0.2508 0.1482  0.7031 
8  O  FD  -0.0943 -0.0419 -0.0202 -0.0167  -0.0113  0.0612  -0.1941 -0.8352 0.2006  0.9519 
9  N  FD  -0.1427 -0.0634 -0.0306 -0.0252  -0.0171  -0.0297 -0.0301 -0.0104 -1.0916 1.4406 
 
All India - Aggregate 
Price Elasticities  Commodity 
Group  1 CERL 2 MILK 3 EOIL 4 MEAT 5 SUGR 6 PULS 7 FVEG 8 O FD  9 N FD  Expenditure
1 CERL  -0.0977  -0.0020  -0.0020  -0.0010  -0.0011  -0.0017  -0.0014  -0.0008  0.0164  0.0913 
2 MILK  -0.0902  -0.6478  -0.0153  -0.0101  -0.0088  -0.0142  -0.0118  -0.0035  0.1435  0.6582 
3 EOIL  -0.0534  -0.0103  -0.3547  -0.0052  -0.0050  -0.0078  -0.0062  -0.0020  0.0783  0.3662 
4 MEAT  -0.0769  -0.0163  -0.0126  -0.5221  -0.0073  -0.0116  -0.0094  -0.0030  0.1169  0.5422 
5 SUGR  -0.0441  -0.0073  -0.0068  -0.0039  -0.2752  -0.0062  -0.0047  -0.0016  0.0612  0.2885 
6 PULS  -0.0472  -0.0074  -0.0072  -0.0041  -0.0042  -0.8708  0.3093  0.2644  0.0645  0.3026 
7 FVEG  -0.1027  -0.0247  -0.0175  -0.0117  -0.0101  0.1190  -0.6826  -0.1941  0.1645  0.7599 
8 O FD  -0.1200  -0.0356  -0.0219  -0.0158  -0.0125  0.0667  -0.1633  -0.8817  0.2104  0.9738 
9 N FD  -0.1787  -0.0567  -0.0334  -0.0247  -0.0190  -0.0317  -0.0290  -0.0091  -1.1134  1.4956 
  
50 
Table 19￿Effect of 10% Increase in the Prices of Cereal, Non-cereal Food and Non-
food on the Consumption of 9 Broad Commodity Groups  
 
10% increase in the Price of 
Cereals Non-Cereals  Non-Food  Commodity 
Group  Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1 CERL  -2.56  -0.98  -0.34  -0.01  -0.20  0.16 
2 MILK  -2.90  -0.90  -11.34  -0.71  -0.23  1.43 
3 EOIL  -1.75  -0.53  -6.49  -0.39  -0.25  0.78 
4 MEAT  -2.07  -0.77  -7.84  -0.58  -0.25  1.17 
5 SUGR  -2.18  -0.44  -8.07  -0.31  -0.30  0.61 
6 PULS  -1.18  -0.47  -4.32  -0.32  -0.19  0.64 
7 FVEG  -2.06  -1.03  -8.20  -0.82  -0.15  1.65 
8 O FD  -1.73  -1.20  -7.47  -1.06  0.06  2.10 
9 N FD  -2.44  -1.79  -1.55  -0.20  -9.73  -11.13 
 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
The consumption patterns of an average Indian are undergoing significant 
changes. In general there is an expansion of non-cereal food and non-food in the basket, 
while cereals is shrinking. However, the total food consumption is stagnating in the 
recent periods. The substitution of non-cereal food in place of cereal food is resulting in 
decline of calorie intakes and is not contributing substantially to protein intake. While the 
decline in the cereals consumption can be explained with the slow down in the growth 
and adverse prices, its decline in the seventies and eighties seem to be related to shifts in 
tastes and preferences. A demand model estimated isolating the taste effects 
The complete set of expenditure and own and cross price elasticities are estimated 
from the demand system. The parameters and the elasticities show that there are marked 
differences in consumption behavior among the income groups and between rural and 
urban areas.  The estimated price effects indicate the importance of cereal price, 
especially in rural areas. The simulation exercise indicates that the adverse relative price 
of cereals dampens the demand of not only cereals but also that of other food items. The 
adverse movements in the relative price of cereals together with lower growth in rural 
areas may have resulted in the stagnant food consumption in rural areas.  It is important  
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to note, however, that for the bottom 30% of the population cereal consumption per 
capita has not come down. 
 
 
3.  PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS): PERFORMANCE AND 
OPTIONS FOR REFORMS
14 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the performance of PDS and provide 
suggestions for more cost effective and better-targeted alternatives. The performance of 
the PDS is analyzed by asking two basic questions: 
(a) Does the target group receive significant subsidy? 
(b) Are the subsidies provided efficiently (i.e. are they cost effective)?  
Other aspects of performance covered include coverage under the PDS, impact on 
consumption and nutrition, impact on poverty, extent of leakage and targeting errors 
within the system. The political economy of the PDS is also discussed. Targeting was 
introduced in the PDS for the first time at the all India level in late 1990s
15. Radhakrishna 
et al (1997) have examined the impact of PDS on consumption, nutrition and poverty 
using 1986-87 NSS data. In this chapter, we compare their results with the latest data. 
This is probably the first study to look at the impact of PDS on consumption and poverty 
after the introduction of targeting. 
 We have used three types of data bases: (a) The National Sample Survey that 
provides household level data (100,000 households) for 1986-87 and 1993-94 and 1999-
00 (b) Data collected from a micro study ￿ undertaken as part of the CESS-IFPRI 
collaborative project - in six villages in order to examine the performance of the PDS and 
the food coupon system. (c) Other existing studies on the PDS. 
                                                 
14 We thank Jos Mooij for comments on this chapter. 
15 There was already targeting in some states (e.g. Andhra Pradesh).  
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Before going into the performance of the PDS, we briefly look at the evolution of 
the PDS over time. 
The Public Distribution System (PDS) is one of the instruments for improving 
food security at the household level in India. The PDS ensures availability of essential 
commodities like rice, wheat, edible oils and kerosene to the consumers through a 
network of outlets or fair price shops. These are supplied at below market prices to 
consumers. The origins of the Indian PDS can be traced back to the Second World War 
and the Bengal Famine in 1943, when the colonial government felt the need to develop a 
food policy for the country. Over the years the system expanded enormously, in terms of 
area covered, quantity of foodgrains handled and in costs involved
16. With a network of 
more than 462,000 fair price shops (FPS) distributing commodities worth more than Rs. 
300 billion annually to about 160 million families, the PDS in India is perhaps the largest 
distribution network of its kind in the world. 
According to GOI (2002), historically, the objectives of the PDS have been the 
following: 
(a) Maintaining price stability 
(b) Raising the welfare of the poor 
(c) Rationing during situations of scarcity 
(d) Keeping a check on private trade 
The first two continue to be important while the last two objectives are redundant 
in the context of the shift away from a situation of food scarcity to one of food surpluses 
within the country. 
Access to the PDS until 1997 was universal. During the first few decades of its 
existence, the PDS did not operate as an anti-poverty programme but merely as an 
instrument of price stabilization and the main emphasis was to provide an alternative 
channel to private trade. Also, until the 1970s, operations were mainly restricted to urban 
                                                 
16 See Chopra, 1988; Bapna, 1990, Tyagi, 1990, Bhatia, 1991 and Mooij 1998).  
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areas and food deficit regions. Since the Sixth Five Year Plan, however, the welfare 
importance of the PDS has been recognized, and rural areas have been covered in many 
states from the 1980s onward. In the 1990s, the government decided to restructure the 
PDS in the form of the Revamped PDS (RPDS) and Targeted PDS (TPDS). Under the 
RPDS, introduced in 1992, the subsidy on foodgrains was increased for people in tribal, 
drought-prone and desert areas. The Targeted PDS (TPDS) was introduced in 1997 and 
under this scheme special cards were issued to families below poverty line (BPL) and 
foodgrains were distributed at a lower price for these families compared to those above 
the poverty line (known as APL families). Each poor BPL family under this scheme was 
originally entitled to 10kgs of foodgrains per month at a specially subsidized price but the 
government increased the allocation to 20kgs. at 50% of economic cost from April, 2000 
on. The allocation for APL was retained at the same level at the time of introduction of 
TPDS but the Central issue prices (CIP) for APL was fixed at 100% of economic cost 
from 2000 onward such that the entire consumer subsidy is directed for the benefit of 
BPL population. In order to reduce excess stocks lying with the FCI, the Government has 
initiated the following measures under TPDS from July 2001: 
(i)  The BPL allocation of foodgrains has been increased from 20kgs. to 25 kgs. per 
family per month with effect from July, 2001, and the CIP for BPL families has 
been fixed at Rs.4.15 per kg. for wheat and Rs.5.65 per kg. for rice, which is 48% 
of the economic cost.  
(ii)  The government has decided to allocate foodgrains to APL families at the 
discounted rate of 70% of the economic cost. The CIP of APL wheat was Rs.830 
per quintal, which has been reduced to Rs.610 per quintal, and the CIP of APL 
rice, which was at Rs.1130 per quintal, has been reduced to Rs.830 per quintal.  
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3.2   PERFORMANCE OF PDS 
3.2.1  Accumulation of Foodgrains and Increase in Food Subsidy  
In the last few years, public stocks of foodgrains have risen to a disturbingly high 
level of 62.55 million tons as of May 1, 2002. The reasons for the over accumulation are 
discussed here:  
(i) Increase in procurement prices: The continuous increase in the procurement 
prices/MSP has led to the accretion of stocks far above the levels required. The concept 
of MSPwas enlarged to take into account the full cost of production including some 
management cost 
17.  Due to pressures from the vocal farmers￿ lobby, all types of farm 
expenditure, incurred or imputed, were added to the cost of production for the purpose of 
fixing the MSP. This escalated the MSP, and it had to be increased each year. Another 
important reason for the increases in the MSP has been the trade policy reform that took 
place in the cereals sector in the mid-nineties. When India opened up rice exports in 
1994-95, the volume of exported rice increased from less than 1 million to about 5 
million tons, making India the second largest exporter of rice in the world that year. 
Encouraged by the impressive growth in rice exports the government also opened up the 
exports of wheat soon after. The reason for the surge in exports was that domestic prices 
had been historically kept artificially lower than the international price.
18. However, in 
order to give farmers an incentive to part with their marketable surplus and ensure that 
procurement continues, the government had to announce hikes in the procurement prices 
of rice and wheat. However, due to the upward pressure on domestic price of wheat 
                                                 
17 The definitions of various costs given by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices are as 
follows: Cost A1= All actual expenses in cash and kind incurred in production by owner; Cost A2 = Cost 
A1+rent paid for leased-in land; Cost B1= Cost A1+interest value of owned capital assets (excluding land); 
Cost C1 = Cost B1 + imputed value of family labor; cost C2 = Cost C1 + 10% of C1 to account for 
managerial remuneration for the farmer.  
18 This in turn was due to several factors such as an overall anti-export bias to the economy involving both 
export restrictions and an overvalued currency. On the domestic front, policies that controlled the pricing, 
movement, storage and distribution of foodgrains also kept the price at an artificially low level. 
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caused by opening up exports, the government decided to reverse the policy for wheat in 
1996. Nevertheless, the procurement price had to be increased periodically in response to 
the strong farmers￿ lobby and therefore continued to show an upward trend even after the 
closing of exports
19. A comparison of the increase in procurement and issue prices in the 
1990s with those in the 1980s is presented in Table 20.  
(ii) Private trade is discouraged: The higher levels of procurement and market 
prices seem to have discouraged private trade in recent years. Till the mid-1990s, private 
trade used to hold stocks of around thirty to forty percent of the marketable surplus 
(World Bank, 1999). It is possible that most of the stocks are with FCI as high 
procurement prices make private trade unprofitable (Rao, 2002a). 
 
Table 20￿Growth of Minimum Support Prices and Issue Prices 
 
  1980-81 to 1991-92  1992-93 to 1999-2000 
Annual Average Increase in MSP (%) 
     Rice 
     Wheat 
Average Annual Increase in Issue Price (%) 
     Rice  














Source: Economic Survey, 2000-2001, GOI. 
 (iii) Exports are uncompetitive: Exports of food grains have become 
uncompetitive because of high procurement prices. The government has been exporting 
rice and wheat at subsidized prices in order to reduce the high stocks.   
(iv) Consumption was reduced due to low purchasing power: In the 1990s, the 
relative prices of food grains were higher than those of the 1980s. This reduced the 
purchasing power of the population particularly of the poor. Some simulations on the 
                                                 
19 With regard to rice, the late nineties witnessed a crash in international prices. Together with the upward 
trend in procurement prices of rice in the country, India no longer had a competitive edge in the world 
market. In fact, in 1999-2000 and 2000-01, the country had to resort to a minor amount or rice imports. In 
the case of wheat, the ban on international trade combined with the continuous hikes in procurement price 
has led to a considerable build up of stocks, which the government has started to export since 1999 at a 
price equal to 50% of the subsidy. 
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demand for food grains were conducted for this study (see Appendix 3.1 for 
methodology). For growth-simulated demand we first projected, starting from 1990-91 
the total expenditure in each year (in 1990-91 prices) using the growth rate of eighties 
(1.7% pa in rural and 1.76% pa in urban)
20. For each year in the nineties, the percentage 
difference between the projected and actual expenditures were multiplied by the 
expenditure elasticity of cereals to arrive at the additional demand that would result if the 
￿eighties growth￿ persisted in the nineties.  The expenditure elasticity of cereals for rural 
and urban areas was assumed to be 0.31 and 0.10 respectively.  
As shown in figure 15, if relative prices in the 1990s were the same as those of the 
1980s, the demand would have been higher by 2.71 million tons in 1992. In subsequent 
years, the estimated annual additional demand would have been higher by 1.5 to 3.3 
million tons. Similarly, figure 15 also shows the estimated demand if the growth of 
consumption in the 1990s is similar to that of the 1980s. In some years in the 1990s, the 
growth effect was negative while in others it was positive. In 1998, the additional demand 
for foodgrains would have been around 5.22 million tons if the relative prices and growth 
pattern in the 1990s were the same as those for the 1980s. 
                                                 
20 The expenditure growth rates for the nineties were  1.5 and 3.1 percent pa in rural and urban respectively.  
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Figure 15￿Estimated Additional Demand in 1990s Assuming 1980s Prices and 




























Price Simulated 0.00 1.58 2.54 1.57 2.60 2.17 3.13 3.30 1.54 
Growth Simulated 0.00 -1.17 0.17 -0.26 0.60  0.97 -1.81 1.92 -1.02 
Total 0.00 0.41 2.71 1.31 3.20 3.14 1.31 5.22 0.53 





(v) Off-take declined under PDS:  The increase in procurement prices led to an 
increase in  issue prices for  PDS. This led to reductions in off-take of foodgrains under 
PDS, particularly for wheat. In 1991-92, the off-take of wheat was 86 percent of the 
quantity allocated for PDS while rice off-take was about 90 percent of the allocated 
quantity. However, in 2000-01, wheat off-take fell to 32 percent while for rice it fell to 48 
percent (GOI, 2002)
21.   
(vi) A Long Term Factor: Changing Consumption Patterns Apart from the above 
factors relating to procurement and issue prices, long term factors like changes in 
consumption patterns could also be responsible for the huge increase in stocks. It is now 
widely recognized that the food basket is more diversified and dramatic changes in food 
consumption patterns have taken place in India in the post-Green Revolution period. For 
                                                 
21 Off-take has partly also declined after 1998-99 on account of the introduction of Targeted PDS (TPDS), 
which made a distinction between the Above Poverty Line (APL) and Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
households.    
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example, at the national level, in rural areas, cereal consumption declined from 15.3 kg. 
per capita per month in 1972-73 to 13.4 kg. per capita per month in 1993-94
22. Recent 
National Statistical Survey data for 1999-2000 shows a further decline in the per capita 
consumption of cereals. This is true for all classes, rich and poor. The cereal shares have 
seen a dramatic decline of more than 10 percentage points between 1972-73 to 1993-94 
in most regions, in both rural and urban India. Similarly, the share of meat and milk 
products, and vegetables and fruits has increased over time. 
(vii) The Food Subsidy Increase: In the Late 1990s: Procurement increased 
significantly in the late 1990s from about 20 million tonnes in 1996-97 to 37 million 
tonnes in 2001-02 ￿ almost 20 per cent of foodgrains production (Table 21). Buffer stock 
increased 16 million tonnes to 60 million tonnes during the same period. As a result of 
the accumulation of food grains, the food subsidy increased significantly in the late 
1990s. Table 21 shows that the food subsidy at current prices increased from Rs. 24.1 
billion in 1990-91 to Rs.242 billion in 2002-03. As percent of GDP, the food subsidy 
increased from 0.43 in 1990-01 to 0.51 in 1999-00. It increased significantly to 0.84 
percent in 2001-02 and to 0.98 percent in 2002-03 (Figure 16). Similarly food subsidy as 
percent of total public expenditure also increased significantly from 2.3 percent in 1990-
91 to 6.0 percent in 2002-03 (Table 21). 
The related issue under food subsidy is that the producer subsidy has increased 
while the consumer subsidy has declined. Higher procurement with the reduced off-take 
resulted in the generation of larger stocks, which in turn led to higher carrying costs 
(comprised of freight, storage, interest charges etc.). In 1997-98, the buffer component of 
the food subsidy bill was only 13 percent. It increased to 42 percent in 2000-01 (figure 
17). 
The above discussion shows that buffer stock is becoming expensive and the 
share of consumer subsidy has declined over time.    
                                                 
22 For more details on changing consumption patterns, see Rao, CHH (2000).  
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1 2  3 4  5  6  7  8  9 10 
1990-1 176.39  22.81  15.81 14.50 1.31  2450  0.48  2.30  -- 
1991-2 168.38  16.99  11.07 14.50 -3.43  2850  0.48  2.52  -- 
1992-3 179.48  18.17  12.67 14.50 -1.83  2785  0.41  2.24  16.2 
1993-4 184.26  26.48  20.54 14.50 6.04  5537  0.70  3.35  22.5 
1994-5 191.50  25.27  26.80 14.50 12.30  4509  0.49  3.34  41.1 
1995-6 180.42  22.28  22.14 14.50 7.64  4960  0.46  2.94  28.6 
1996-7 199.44  20.38  16.41 14.50 1.91  5166  0.52  3.00  14.8 
1997-8 192.26  23.63  18.12 14.50 3.62  7500  0.54  3.36  12.5 
1998-9 203.60  24.49  21.82 15.80 6.02  8700  0.53  3.23  18.3 
1999-0 209.80  31.41  28.91 15.80 13.11  9200  0.51  3.11  20.6 
2000-1 195.90  35.45  44.70 15.80 28.90  12060  0.63  3.20  35.1 
2001-2 211.30  37.41  50.95 15.80 35.15  17612  0.84  4.83  41.5 
2002-3 --  --  -  -  -  24200  0.98  6.00  -- 
 
Source: Rakshit for cols. 2 to 6; Economic Survey, 2002-03 and Budget 2003-04 for cols 7 and 10; 
Authors￿ estimates for 8 and 9. 
 

















































Buffer Stocking 9.37 15.52 17.54 42.33 56.8
Others 65.63 71.48 74.46 77.77 79.9
1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 (BE)
 
3.2.2  Coverage under PDS 
There are about 460 thousand fair price shops covering most part of the country. 
In 1999, BPL ration cards were 73 million while APL cards were 118.6 million. Even in 
poorer states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, the ration shops are widespread except 
in some remote areas. Till the introduction of TPDS, the criteria of allocations were not 
explicitly stated. A number of considerations determined the state-wise allocations of 
grains by the Central Government from the Central pool, including the historical 
allocation patterns, foodgrain availability and prices in various states. There was no 
correlation between incidence of poverty and allocation and off-take of grains. The 
transition to TPDS in 1997 contributed to some improvement in targeting foodgrain 
allocations towards states with higher poverty rates. Three states that significantly 
benefited from a sharp increase in food grain allocation are Assam, Bihar and UP ￿states 
with some of the highest poverty rates in the country. Gujarat, Karnataka and West 
Bengal had their allocations cut considerably. Gujarat, Karnataka and West Bengal had 
their allocations cut considerably (World Bank, 2001). With the shift to the targeted PDS,  
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the offtake in foodgrains also increased significantly in states like Assam, Bihar, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh in 1998-99. However, offtake as percent of 
allotment declined considerably in 1999-00 and 2000-01 due to increase in issue prices 
and lack of subsidy for APL population.  
Access to PDS 
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) in its 55th round in 1999-2000 
collected information on purchases of rice, wheat, sugar and kerosene made in fair price 
shops. These data have been analyzed to examine the utilization of PDS (Table 22). 
According to the 1999-2000 data, the PDS is accessible (Percentage of households 
purchases in Fair Price Shops) to about 30 percent of Indian rural households for rice and 
only 17 percent for wheat. The corresponding figures for states show large variations ￿ 
from 75 percent for Tamil Nadu to 17 percent in West Bengal (barring other Wheat 
eating States) in case of rice and 34 percent in Gujarat to 0.21 percent in Punjab (barring 
Rice eating states) in case of wheat. For both rice and wheat some people may not depend 
on market (including PDS) as they consume food produced in their own farms. 
Therefore, the low percentages of access to PDS in rice and wheat could be partly due to 
this reason.   
Purchase of Rice and Wheat under PDS 
At the all India level, per capita monthly consumption of rice and wheat in rural 
areas was 0.86 kg in 1986-87 (Table 23). The consumption increased to 1.03 kg in 1999-
00. The increase was mainly due to increase in rice consumption. On the other hand, the 
cereal consumption declined for urban areas in 1999-00 as compared to 80s. At the state 
level, states like Bihar, J&k, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa and Tamil Nadu gained in 
terms of rice consumption. In the case of urban areas, only in Orissa and Tamil Nadu the 
cereal consumption increased.  
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Table 22￿Percentage of Household Accessing PDS: 1999-00 
 
States Rural  Urban 
 Rice  Wheat  Rice  wheat 
1 2  3  5  6 
Andhra Pradesh  62.93  1.84  29.34  15.86 
      Assam  37.22  1.74  22.28  1.25 
      Bihar  5.40  8.98  2.30  4.66 
      Gujarat  43.98  34.32  17.54  12.78 
      Haryana  0.72  2.16  0.35  1.34 
      Himachal Pr.  34.90  20.08  17.23  10.98 
      J&K  36.55  21.44  42.89  26.13 
      Karnataka  68.24  61.96  40.19  37.49 
      Kerala  68.52  37.08  59.99  39.88 
Madhya Pradesh  16.10  10.90  6.81  3.45 
      Maharashtra  44.26  43.43  15.17  14.75 
Orissa 51.38  4.98  29.76  17.72 
Punjab 0.24  0.21  0.14  0.10 
Rajasthan 0.61  5.46  0.28  2.41 
Tamil Nadu  75.21  15.09  52.59  30.32 
Uttar Pradesh  8.07  7.34  3.29  2.93 
West Bengal  17.49  16.06  6.87  18.36 
All India  32.38  16.59  20.28  15.12 
 
Source: Estimated from NSSO 1999-2000 consumer expenditure data access  




Table 23￿Per capita Monthly Purchases of Rice and Wheat from PDS 
                                (Kg/Person/Month) 
Rural Urban 
State/Year  Rice Wheat  Cereals Rice Wheat  Cereals 
Andhra  Pradesh             
1986-87 2.51 0.00 2.51 2.13 0.30  2.43
1999-2000 2.32 0.01 2.33 1.22 0.40  1.62
Assam             
1986-87 0.67 0.03 0.70 1.26 0.00  1.26
1999-2000 0.70 0.04 0.74 0.60 0.01  0.61
Bihar             
1986-87 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.25  0.26
1999-2000 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.04 0.07  0.11
Gujarath             
1986-87 0.49 0.63 1.12 0.32 0.58  0.90
1999-2000 0.38 0.56 0.94 0.19 0.27  0.46
Haryana             
1986-87 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00  0.08
1999-2000 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.03  0.03
Himachal  Pradesh             
1986-87 - - - - -  -
1999-2000 1.67 1.26 2.93 0.80 0.80  1.60
Jammu & Kashmir              
1986-87 1.64 0.25 1.89 6.24 0.55  6.79
1999-2000 2.40 0.71 3.11 4.38 1.01  5.39
Karnataka             
1986-87 0.75 0.22 0.97 1.29 0.39  1.68
1999-2000 1.20 0.30 1.50 0.83 0.30  1.13
Kerala             
1986-87 4.07 0.39 4.46 3.68 0.56  4.24
1999-2000 4.18 0.45 4.63 3.58 0.58  4.16
Madhya  Pradesh             
1986-87 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.25 0.27  0.52
1999-2000 0.22 0.15 0.37 0.08 0.10  0.18
Maharashtra             
1986-87 0.39 0.67 1.06 0.67 0.81  1.48
1999-2000 0.47 0.66 1.13 0.26 0.30  0.56
Orissa             
1986-87 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.31  0.34
1999-2000 1.53 0.05 1.58 0.92 0.34  1.26
Punjab             
1986-87 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00  0.04
1999-2000 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00
Rajasthan             
1986-87 0.01 0.82 0.83 0.03 0.22  0.25
1999-2000 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.15  0.15 
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Table 23￿Cont. Per capita Monthly Purchases of Rice and Wheat from PDS 
 
Rural Urban   
State/Year  Rice Wheat  Cerals Rice Wheat  Cerals 
Tamil  Nadu           
1986-87  1.18 0.11  1.29  0.93 0.25  1.18 
1999-2000  3.18 0.16  3.34  2.14 0.36  2.50 
Uttar Pradesh                   
1986-87  0.12 0.10  0.22  0.14 0.17  0.31 
1999-2000  0.11 0.14  0.25  0.09 0.09  0.18 
West Bengal                   
1986-87  0.50 0.44  0.94  1.53 1.78  3.31 
1999-2000  0.19 0.14  0.33  0.13 0.37  0.50 
All India                   
1986-87  0.62 0.24  0.86  0.84 0.48  1.32 
1999-2000  0.82 0.21  1.03  0.64 0.27  0.91 
 
      Source: NSS data 
      Share of Consumption obtained from PDS  
 
The percentage of consumption obtained from PDS to total consumption provides 
some idea about the role of PDS in catering to the needs of the population. At all India 
level the share of rice consumption due to PDS in rural areas was 9 per cent in 1993-94 
(Table 24). The corresponding numbers for rural wheat, urban rice and urban wheat were 
5.6%, 14.2% and 9.2% respectively. The shares were higher for Kerala, Gujarat, A.P. and 
Tamil Nadu. The share of PDS for rice in rural areas increased from 9.4 per cent in 1993-
94 to 12.1 percent in 1999-00. The shares increased significantly for Orissa, Tamil Nadu 
and J&K. In the case of rural wheat, rice and wheat in urban areas, the shares have not 
increased at all India level.  
65 
Table 24￿Share of Consumption from PDS in Total Consumption: 1993-94 and 
1999-00 (%) 
 
  Rural Urban 
  Rice Wheat Rice Wheat 
  1993-4 1999-0 1993-4 1999-0 1993-4 1999-0 1993-4  1999-0 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 
Andhra  Pradesh 22.4  19.7  25.0 8.3  15.0 12.3 41.8 44.3 
     Assam  3.3  6.1  12.9  6.6  10.3  5.4  3.8  5.0 
     Bihar  0.3  0.9  1.8  2.9  0.2  1.1  2.4  2.7 
     Gujarat  25.9  19.6  14.4  15.3  19.5  10.2  7.8  5.7 
     Haryana  4.1  1.0  0.8  0.8  3.9  0.0  0.8  0.8 
     Himachal Pr.  34.2  36.5  22.7 19.8 35.1 17.8 18.2 11.7 
     J&K  4.3  27.1  5.1  15.3  27.0  47.0  50.1  30.7 
     Karnataka  13.3  22.9  46.9 41.1 19.8 14.1 29.1 26.5 
     Kerala  45.6  46.6  55.4 62.9 46.5 43.8 60.3 61.4 
Madhya  Pradesh  3.4  4.0  2.6 2.6 5.7 2.7 3.8 2.1 
      Maharashtra  13.4  15.3  16.3  19.8  15.9  7.2  8.3  7.1 
Orissa  0.8  11.2 8.8 9.3 0.5 11.5  24.7  17.6 
Punjab  1.4  1.3  0.6 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.4 
Rajasthan  8.7  4.3  11.5  2.0 5.2 0.0 8.6 1.7 
Tamil  Nadu  18.1  32.2  70.8 70.0 17.1 24.7 62.3 60.7 
Uttar  Pradesh  3.3  2.6  2.0 2.0 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.5 
West  Bengal  0.7 2.0  12.4 14.4 8.6  2.9  33.7 15.5 
All  India  9.4  12.1 5.6 4.9 14.2  12.9  9.2 7.0 
 
Source: Estimated from NSSO 1993-94 and 1999-2000 consumer expenditure data 
Access indicates the percentage of households reporting purchases from PDS. 
 
We now examine whether the interstate variations in the share of PDS are related 
to the levels of poverty. The correlation coefficient of the share of PDS in total 
consumption (rice and wheat) with the poverty ratio23 in 1999-00 is -0.24 and ￿0.37 in 
rural and urban areas
24.  
It seems the consumer support of PDS as reflected in the share of PDS in total 
consumption is weak in the poorer states compared to the relatively richer states. The 
distortion gets sharper if we exclude foodgrain rich states like Punjab and Haryana from 
analysis.  
                                                 
23 Poverty ratios are taken from the alternative estimates developed by Deaton and Dreze (2002). 
24 Share of PDS here refers to both rice wheat together.  
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3.2.3  Impact on Consumption and Poverty 
1986-87 NSS data 
Using NSS 1986-87 household level data, Radhakrishna et al (1997) estimate the 
extent of income transfer through PDS to the poor, and the consequent reduction in 
poverty in terms of percentage and severity. They also assess the nutritional impact of 
PDS on the poor as well as the cost per rupee of income transferred to the poor. The main 
findings of their study are the following.   
(a) Welfare gains due to PDS are negligible. The per capita income gain to the 
poor from all consumer subsidies was no more than Rs.2.01 per month, or 2.7 per cent of 
their per capita expenditure, in rural areas and Rs.3.4 per month (or 3.2 per cent of per 
capita expenditure) in urban areas. The overall transfer gains were very meager although 
there were differences in income transfers between the commodities and across states. 
The income transfers due to PDS (food and non-food) in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala  
67 
were much higher than Orissa and U.P. The study also shows that the transfers are 
regressive i.e. non-poor are getting higher benefits
25.  
(b) Another finding is that there has been minimal impact of PDS on poverty. 
With the exception of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, the impacts on poverty are negligible. 
If we consider the country as a whole, there would have been a decline of barely 2 
percentage points in the poverty ratio due to combined incidence (income gains) of food 
and non-food consumer subsidies. In the cases of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, however, 
there would have been a decline of 4.64 and 5.49 percentage points respectively in the 
rural poverty ratio. 
Impact on Food consumption using 1994 NCAER data 
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) collected data on 
various aspects of consumption from 34000 rural households. The survey asked 
respondents whether the household had bought any cereal from the PDS in the month 
before the survey. It then asked what quantities of a few basic foods were bought from 
the PDS. Using this data, Bhalotra (2001) examined the impact of PDS subsidy on 
consumption. The study uses a wealth of socio-economic data available for both 
participating and non-participating households in a multivariate analysis that permits 
estimation of conditional effects of policy interest. From the NCAER data one can 
estimate the rise in food expenditures (encompassing quantity and quality increases) in 
response to the food subsidy. The results show that the mean predicted food-share of PDS 
users is 50.9%. It turns out that this is not significantly different from the actual mean 
food share of this group, which is 50.5%. For the poor (bottom 40% of the population), 
the actual and predicted food share is 67%. This can be interpreted as, if the average 
subsidy for the average household from the PDS is 23%, the PDS using household buys 
23% more food than the all - India average. But this result varies across states. In the case 
of Andhra Pradesh, for example, a unit subsidy of 26 per cent stimulates a 16 per cent 
                                                 
25 Also, see Parikh (1994) 1986-87for income gains due to PDS.  
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increases in food purchases. The study shows that, in every state, PDS use is associated 
with a positive increase in food purchased.  
Bhalotra￿s study also examines whether additional spending on food can be 
distributed equally amongst boys and girls. The results show that any additional spending 
on food is distributed equally amongst boys and girls. This result is unchanged when the 
sample is restricted to the poorest 40% of households. Both boys and girls get a slightly 
larger share of food amongst households that use the PDS but the difference is not 
significant.   
Comparison of 1986-87 and 1999-00  
In order to get the impact of PDS in recent years and to compare with 1986-87 
data, we examined the income gain for the poor at all India and state levels by using 
NSSO 55th Round (1999-00) data on PDS. All computations are made using the 
household level data. Table 25 and 26 provide income gains for all commodities under 
PDS for 1986-87 and 1999-00 at all India level and states respectively.  
Income gain for the consumer is the difference between the value of the quantity 
of goods purchased in PDS when evaluated at market prices and the actual value of PDS 
purchases. The NSSO data gives the purchases made in PDS and open market in both 
quantity and value terms. Prices implicit in these data are used to derive the income 
gain.26 The income gains vary with quantities purchased in PDS, open market prices and 
PDS price. Though the central issue price is the same for all states, the income gains can 
be higher for some states on account of lower PDS prices due to additional state 
subsidies.  
Following are the findings on income gains and poverty.  
                                                 
26 It is important to note that the assumption here is that there is no quality difference between PDS and 
open market grains. If in fact the grains bought in the open market were of a superior quality and this were 
factored into our analysis then the income gain from the PDS would be even lower.  
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(a) The income gains through PDS formed about 1 percent of the total monthly 
per capita expenditure of the same income category in rural areas and 0.65 percent in 
urban areas at the all India level in 1999-00 (Table 25). As compared to 1986-87, the 
income gain to the rural poor in 1999-00 was higher by about one percentage point. On 
the other hand, there was marginal reduction in income gain for urban poor. 
(b) Income as % of total monthly per capita expenditure of the same income 
category increased for most of the states in rural areas. Income gain in 99-00 as compared 
to 86-87 was higher in Orissa and Tamil Nadu. If we look at 1999-00 data only, the 
highest income gain for the poor is in rural Tamil Nadu (7.70) followed by rural Andhra 
Pradesh  (5.49%) and  rural Kerala (5.42%) and rural Orissa (4.30%) (Table 26). 
Impact on Poverty 
It is interesting to see the impact of PDS on poverty. At the level of all India, rural 
poverty decline due to income transfer was 0.61 percentage points in 1986-87and it was 
found to have increased to 1.27 percentage points in 1999-00 (Table 27). The impact on 
poverty increased significantly between 1986-87 and 1999-00 for Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh and Orissa. In Karnataka it increased more than one percentage point. In states 
like Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh the increase was less 
than one percentage point. Similar conclusions can be seen for more sophisticated 
measures like poverty gap and the FGT Index.  
 
Table 25￿Income gain from PDS Foodgrain Distribution as % of consumer 
expenditure: All India: 1986-87 and 1999-00 
 
  Rural Urban 
  Poor Non-poor All  Poor  Non-poor All 
1986-87  0.97  0.51 0.60 1.31 0.49 0.65 
1999-00  1.98  0.53 0.73 1.29 0.45 0.49 
Source: Radhakrishna et al (1997) for 1986-87 and NSS 55 th Round for 1999-00. 
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Table 26￿Income gain from PDS Foodgrain Distribution as % of consumer 
expenditure, Major States: 1986-87 and 1999-00 
 
Rural Urban 
 State  Poor Non-poor  All  Poor Non-poor  All 
Andhra Pradesh                   
   1986-87  4.30  1.99 3.52  1.02  1.56 
   1999-2000  5.49  2.62  3.10 4.09  1.09  1.24 
Assam              
   1986-87  1.16  0.45  0.64 1.31  0.47  0.56 
   1999-2000  1.82  0.64  0.96 1.94  0.24  0.35 
Bihar              
   1986-87  0.04  0.03  0.03 0.05  0.06  0.06 
   1999-2000  0.31  0.22  0.25 0.36  0.05  0.09 
Gujarath              
   1986-87  1.07  0.42  0.52 1.10  0.28  0.49 
   1999-2000  1.74  0.74  0.87 0.94  0.23  0.25 
Haryana              
   1986-87  0.03  0.01  0.01 0.07  0.03  0.03 
   1999-2000  0.08  0.04  0.04 0.00  0.01  0.01 
Himachal Pradesh              
   1986-87  -  -  -  -  -  - 
   1999-2000  3.07  0.50  0.64 0.66  0.31  0.32 
Jammu & Kashmir              
   1986-87  1.92  0.62  0.81 5.27  3.07  3.29 
   1999-2000  1.20  0.80  0.79 0.11  1.92  1.90 
Karnataka              
   1986-87  1.76  0.89  1.06 1.72  0.99  1.16 
   1999-2000  2.79  1.70  1.96 1.29  0.56  0.60 
Kerala              
   1986-87  6.42  2.49  3.08 5.30  1.47  2.38 
   1999-2000  5.42  2.08  2.26 5.03  1.68  1.81 
Madhya Pradesh              
   1986-87  0.13  0.06  0.08 0.19  0.08  0.11 
   1999-2000  0.56  0.21  0.28 0.17  0.05  0.06 
Maharashtra              
   1986-87  0.67  0.34  0.43 1.25  0.48  0.63 
   1999-2000  1.79  0.73  0.93 0.59  0.26  0.28 
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Table 26￿Cont. Income gain from PDS Foodgrain Distribution as % of consumer 
expenditure, Major States: 1986-87 and 1999-00 
 
Orissa                   
   1986-87  0.00  0.02  0.02 0.07  0.06  0.06 
   1999-2000  4.30  1.64  2.38 2.97  0.91  1.06 
Punjab            
   1986-87  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.06  0.02  0.02 
   1999-2000  0.00  0.01  0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rajasthan            
   1986-87  0.71  0.16  0.24 0.05  0.04  0.04 
   1999-2000  0.26  0.09  0.10 0.26  0.05  0.06 
 
State Rural  Urban 
  Poor Non-poor  All  Poor Non-poor  All 
Tamil Nadu             
   1986-87  2.29  0.99  1.29 1.72  0.60  0.86 
   1999-2000  7.70  4.31  4.82 6.84  2.05  2.30 
Uttar Pradesh             
   1986-87  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.09  0.06  0.07 
   1999-2000  0.38  0.08  0.11 0.18  0.06  0.07 
West Bengal             
   1986-87  0.73  0.35  0.45 2.12  0.72  0.90 
   1999-2000  0.88  0.30  0.38 0.93  0.15  0.19 




Table 27￿Decline in Poverty Due to Income Transfers Through PDS Supply of 
Rice and Wheat 
  
Rural 
State/year  Poverty Poverty  Gap FGT 
Andhra Pradesh          
   1986-87  2.21  0.73  0.30 
   1999-2000  4.35  1.09  0.33 
Assam      
   1986-87  0.77  0.36  0.15 
   1999-2000  1.33  0.51  0.20 
Bihar      
   1986-87  0.04  0.02  0.01 
   1999-2000  0.37  0.12  0.05 
Gujarath      
   1986-87  1.18  0.43  0.19 
   1999-2000  1.11  0.27  0.08 
Haryana      
   1986-87  0.01  0.00  0.00 
   1999-2000  0.03  0.00  0.00 
Himachal Pradesh       
   1986-87  -  -  - 
   1999-2000  -0.24  0.20  0.07 
Jammu & Kashmir       
   1986-87  1.28  0.39  0.13 
   1999-2000  0.59  0.08  0.01 
Karnataka      
   1986-87  0.95  0.45  0.22 
   1999-2000  2.32  0.67  0.22 
Kerala      
   1986-87  4.08  1.55  0.67 
   1999-2000  2.23  0.47  0.10 
Madhya Pradesh       
   1986-87  0.08  0.04  0.02 
   1999-2000  0.43  0.12  0.03 
Maharashtra      
   1986-87  0.46  0.22  0.11 
   1999-2000  1.06  0.44  0.19 
Orissa      
   1986-87  0.01  0.00  0.00 
   1999-2000  2.29  1.42  0.68 
Punjab      
   1986-87  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   1999-2000  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Table 27￿Cont. Decline in Poverty Due to Income Transfers Through PDS Supply 
of Rice and Wheat  
 
Rural 
State/year  Poverty Poverty  Gap FGT 
Rajasthan        
   1986-87  0.30  0.15  0.07 
   1999-2000  0.16  0.04  0.00 
Tamil Nadu       
   1986-87  1.25  0.68  0.37 
   1999-2000  5.20  1.38  0.44 
Uttar Pradesh       
   1986-87  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   1999-2000  0.21  0.06  0.02 
West Bengal       
   1986-87  0.50  0.24  0.12 
   1999-2000  0.55  0.16  0.06 
Other States       
   1986-87       
   1999-2000  1.13  0.22  0.03 
All India       
   1986-87  0.61  0.25  0.12 
   1999-2000  1.27  0.41  0.14 
 
 3.2.4  Targeting Errors 
In the literature, targeting errors viz., Type 1 and Type 2 are discussed with 
reference to the PDS. Type I errors refer to the access of PDS by non-poor (inclusion 
error) while Type 2 errors refer to exclusion of the poor (exclusion error) under the PDS. 




PB is number of poor beneficiaries and N





P is total poor. 
A study by Dutta and Ramaswami (2001) estimate targeting errors in Andhra 
Pradesh (A.P.) and Maharashtra using NSS data for the year 1993-94. The estimates  
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given in Table 28 show Type 1 errors in rural and urban areas in both the states ￿ the 
errors being higher in rural areas of A.P. Type 2 errors are, however, lower for rural A.P. 
compared to urban A.P., and the rural and urban areas of Maharashtra. The Type 2 errors 
for the combined areas (rural + urban) are more than 50 per cent lower for A.P. as 
compared to Maharashtra. In both states, Type 2 errors are much higher than Type 1 
errors. 
Table 28￿Targeting Errors in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra   
 
  Andhra Pradesh  Maharashtra 
  Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
T1  22.35 4.29  14.35 11.30 4.12  6.92 
T2  20.42 36.40 22.29 49.90 51.34 49.61 
 
Source: Dutta and Ramaswami (2001) 
3.3  MICRO STUDY IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
As part of a micro level study conducted within the CESS-IFPRI collaborative 
project, we estimated targeting errors in six villages of Andhra Pradesh ￿ two each from 
three regions - Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra. Table 29 and Figure 19 
provide the targeting errors in these villages. The results of the exercise reveal that both 
types of errors are present in all the selected villages and that they are sizeable in 
magnitude. The Type 2 error in the selected villages other than Veerapuram, varied in the 
range of 25 to 30 percent. In other words, about 25 to 30 percent of the white cardholders 
do not deserve to be covered under rice subsidy scheme. In Veerapuram, the extent of 
type 2 error is relatively large (46 %). The magnitude of type 1 error is relatively larger 
than that of type 2 error. Barring KLpuram it varied in the range of 53 to 60 percent. This 
implies that more than half of the poor households are excluded from the subsidized rice 
scheme. Inter-village comparison reveals that type 2 and 1 errors were relatively large in 
Veerapuram while they were relatively small in KLpuram. In Pathrlagadda, type 1 error 
was large but many of the poor households were given pink cards meant for non-poor.  
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Therefore, they had some stake in the PDS. In Veerapuram, 60 % of poor households 
were denied white cards and only 7 % of them were compensated with pink cards. 
 




Note: Type 1 Error is proportion of card less among poor households; Type 2 Error is proportion  
           of non-poor included under poor.  
 
The fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh was done in the year 2002 when the TPDS was 
in operation. However, the field level results show that targeting errors continue to be 
quite high. This indicates the need for improving targeting in Andhra Pradesh. 
3.3.1 Leakages 
One of the problems of PDS has been the diversion of PDS commodities to the 
open market. A study done by the Tata Economic Consultancy Services shows that there 
is 36% diversion of wheat, 31 % diversion of rice and 23% diversion of sugar 
(Table30)
27. The diversion is more in the Northern and Eastern regions. It is relatively 
less in the southern and western regions. It is significant to note that less diversion is 
estimated in the case of sugar as compared to rice and wheat. In this connection, it has to 
be noted that sugar is a commodity where even the well-to-do section buy from the PDS 
outlets. 
                                                 
27 These are most likely estimates of diversion based on the sample survey conducted. Statistically at 90% 
confidence level, the actual diversion of wheat would fall in the range of 32-40% for wheat and 27-35% for 
rice and 20-26% for sugar (Planning Commission, 2001). There is a criticism that the sample size used in 
the study  was small and therefore was not truly representative. 
Slno  Village  Type 1 Error  Type 2 Error 
1 Gandhinagar    53.3  26.2 
2 Mamidigudem  53.4  27.8 
3 Veerapuram  60.9  46.1 
4 Kadapagunta  31.8  38.4 
5 Klpuram  43.9  25.3 
6 Patharlagadda  60.5  29.9 
7 All  50.2  32.1  
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Greater diversion in the case of rice and wheat (not generally purchased by the 
well-to-do section from PDS outlets) is perhaps an indication that large amount of the 
quota meant to be distributed among the well-to-do is actually diverted to the open 
market. This again strengthens the argument for excluding the population above the 
poverty line from the PDS (GOI, 2001). Using 1993-94 data, Datta and Ramaswamy 
(2001) estimated both the extent of leakage as well as the economic inefficiency of the 
public food procurement system relative to the open market. The study shows that 
leakages range from 15% to 28% of the subsidy while 16 to 26.5% of the subsidy is eaten 
up by the inefficiency of the government procurement and distribution system (FCI plus 
state level) relative to the market.  
3.3.2  Cost Effectiveness: Cost per One Rupee Transfer to the poor 
The food subsidy bill has been very high in recent years, and therefore it is 
necessary to look at cost effectiveness and opportunity costs of the money that is being so 
Estimated Diversion (%) 
State  Wheat Rice Sugar 
Andhra Pradesh  15 19 16 
Assam  61 64 52 
Bihar  44 64 47 
Gujarath  23 21 18 
Haryana  53 44 28 
Karnataka  30 18 19 
Kerala  28 23 25 
Madhya Pradesh  20 24 32 
Maharashtra  26 30 22 
Orissa  39 54 28 
Punjab  69 40 6 
Rajasthan  31 36 17 
Tamil Nadu  24 33 28 
Uttar Pradesh  46 49 36 
West Bengal  40 34 24 
All India  36 31 23  
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spent. In order to examine this, we compared the cost effectiveness in terms of one rupee 
reaching the poor for different targeted programmes. A comparison of some anti-poverty 
programmes in India
28 shows that Employment programmes fare better than food transfer 
programmes in terms of cost effectiveness, though ICDS appears to transfer income to 
the poor at a lower cost (Table 31). The public distribution system and Andhra’s rice 
subsidy emerge as very expensive.  
Table 31￿Cost Effectiveness: Cost per Re. 1 of Income transferred by various 
programmes 
 
Schemes 1999-00  (Rs.) 
PDS 6.68 
Andhra rice scheme  6.46 
JRY (public works)  2.28 
Maharashtra EGS (public works)  1.85 
ICDS (integrated child development services)  1.44 
 
Source: Estimated by the authors; See Appendix 3.2 for methodology on caculations of cost of one rupee  
              transferring to the poor. 
 
There are some estimates using the 1993-94 NSS data. According to Dutta and 
Ramaswami (2001), cost of providing one rupee food subsidy was Rs. 3.14 and Rs.5.81 
respectively for the bottom 40 per cent and bottom 20 per cent in Andhra Pradesh (Table 
32. In Maharashtra, the cost of providing one rupee food subsidy was Rs. 4.02 and 
Rs.9.05 respectively for the bottom 40 per cent and bottom 20 per cent. 
 
Table 32￿Cost of Providing one Rupee of Food Subsidy:  1993-94 
 
State/target group  Entire Population  Bottom 40 per cent  Bottom 30 per cent  Bottom 20 per cent 
Andhra  Pradesh  1.71 3.14 4.05 5.81 
Maharashtra  1.81 4.02 5.72 9.05 
 
Source: Dutta and Ramaswami (2001). 
 
                                                 
    28 See Radhakrishna et al (1997).  
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There are three principal reasons put forth regarding why the PDS does not 
deliver food subsidies efficiently (Ramaswami, 2002). These are: (a) targeting errors i.e. 
income transfer to non-target groups; (b) excessive costs of procurement, storage and 
distribution (relative to the private sector) and; (c) leakages or fraud, i.e. illegal diversions 
of subsidized grain to the open market. Table 33 shows how much of the expenditures on 
food subsidies go to the target group (col.6). It shows only 32 per cent and 25 per cent of 
the expenditures respectively in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra go to the bottom 40 per 
cent of the population.  
 


































Note: Figures in brackets are in percentages 
Source: Ramaswami (2002). The target group is defined as the bottom 40 per cent of the population ranked 
             by expenditure 
 
3.4  CONSTRAINTS: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PDS 
There are several actors who are interested in continuing with present policies on 
food subsidy. These are: farmers, FCI officials, bureaucrats, politicians, PDS dealers, 
local smugglers etc.   
3.4.1  Farmers and Politicians
29:  
The food subsidy exists because the expenses incurred by the government on 
foodgrain procurement, storage etc. are larger than the revenues through the sale of these 
                                                 
29 The discussion in this sub-section is taken from  Dev and Mooij (2002).  
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foodgrains. The system is the following. The government of India procures foodgrains 
(i.e. rice/paddy and wheat) at fixed prices, set by the Government. The Commission on 
Agricultural Costs and Prices recommends a certain price (called minimum support price 
or MSP) on the basis of costs of production along with several other factors. The Cabinet 
then decides at what price level it will procure. This price is most often higher than the 
recommended MSP.
30 The foodgrains are then stored and distributed in the various States 
through Fair Price Shops to consumers who possess ration cards. 
The rise in food subsidy is sometimes interpreted as a logical consequence of the 
desire to satisfy different constituencies simultaneously: producers (who demand a high 
procurement price) and consumers (who are interested in low consumer prices). But this 
is not what happened in the 1990s. In fact, the large subsidy in the 1990s (especially after 
1997) was the consequence of raising the consumer prices more or less on par with 
procurement prices. The result of this policy was a lower offtake from the Fair Price 
Shops because the prices were relatively high as compared to the poor quality of the 
foodgrains. Since the Food Corporation of India, the main procuring agent, has to buy 
whatever is offered, the foodstock continues to rise, and so does the subsidy.  
Procurement prices have experienced steep increases in the 1990s, and they are 
consistently higher than the prices recommended by the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP), even though there is no need to continue procurement as far as 
the stock level is concerned. Attempts to reduce the subsidy have been half-hearted (and 
counter-productive) as also attempts to restructure the distribution side of the PDS. The 
obvious question is why nothing has been done about this procurement (price) policy and 
in order to understand this one has to look at the process and politics involved in setting 
procurement prices.  
Minimum support prices are advised by the CACP. Nowadays, the CACP is 
composed of seven members: a chairman, a member-secretary, three non-official 
members and two official members. The two official members are usually retired civil 
                                                 
30 See also Rao (2001).  
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servants, academics or other experts, while the non-official members are supposed to be 
representatives of the farmer community. However, this has not always been the case. 
When the Agricultural Price Committee (APC), the predecessor of the CACP, was 
established in 1965, there were no farmer-members. Representatives of the farm 
community often aggressively favor higher prices but there are also those who are more 
accustomed to dealing with the bureaucracy, and have moderate demands.  
The real upward push on the prices seems to happen, however, after the CACP 
makes its recommendation.
31 The Ministry of Agriculture prepares a Cabinet note, and 
the Cabinet decides about the price level. According to several people we interviewed, 
there is direct pressure on the Prime Minister from the Chief Ministers of the main 
procuring States to set the procurement price at a higher level. These States are Punjab, 
Haryana and Andhra Pradesh.
32 There are several reasons why high prices are important 
for these States and their Chief Ministers. First, for these Chief Ministers it is a very 
cheap way of pleasing a large part of their constituency. Especially in Punjab, whose 
economy depends to a large extent on agriculture and where foodgrain production is 
mainly for the FCI, the level of the procurement price is of immediate interest to the 
farmers. In all these States the political leaders have their major support base among the 
wealthy foodgrain-producing farmers. Second, these States levy a statutory tax on FCI 
purchases, which means that, on top of the procurement price for the farmers, the FCI has 
to pay about 10 per cent statutory levy to the State Treasury.  
There are also several reasons why the Prime Minister and the Union Cabinet 
cannot afford not to give in to this pressure. First, the central government cannot afford to 
antagonize the chief ministers of Haryana and Andhra Pradesh as they represent political 
parties that contribute to the National Democratic Alliance, and the latter is crucial for the 
                                                 
31Actually, between 1999 and 2001, the CACP has not recommended a MSP for wheat, following a 
disagreement between the CACP and the GoI regarding the MSP and the extra bonus on top of the MSP. 
32 These States contribute most foodgrains to the Central pool. In 1994/95, 50 per cent of the FCI wheat 
purchase and almost 40 per cent of the paddy/rice purchase was done in Punjab; 25 per cent of the FCI 
wheat and 12 per cent of the paddy/rice came from Haryana and 30 per cent of the paddy/rice came from 
Andhra Pradesh. (World Bank, 1999: Annex Table 1.11). 
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survival of the central government. While this is the current situation, the same type of 
reasons also held true during the first half of the 1990s, when the ruling Congress (I) 
government wanted the Congress in Punjab to win the Assembly elections in 1992. 
Second, there are important farmers lobbies with members in almost all political parties 
and no political party would want to antagonize them. Third, although there is no strong 
separatist movement in Punjab at the moment, there is still a fear of potential political 
instability.  
The other reason for the rise in MSP is related to the important trade reforms that 
have taken place in the cereal sector in the mid-nineties. With the opening up of exports 
of rice and wheat in 1994-95, the volume of exports of both commodities surged due to 
the large wedge between international and Indian prices of rice and wheat prevailing at 
the time. In order to ensure that domestic procurement is not harmed, however, the 
government began to announce hikes in the procurement prices also. Due to the rise in 
the domestic prices of these food grains the government decided to revert the 
liberalization policy in the case of wheat in 1996 by closing exports once again. 
Nevertheless procurement prices continued to increase in the case of wheat, as with rice, 
in the following years. In fact, when the world price of rice crashed in the late nineties, 
India lost her competitive edge in the world markets due to the high domestic price. As a 
result the country had to resort to a small amount of imports in 1999 and 2000.  
3.4.2  FCI officials and Civil Supplies Departments 
It is reported that some of the FCI officials have become millionaires because of 
procurement and distribution. They have dealings with politicians, traders and ration shop 
dealers in diverting the foodgrains meant for the poor. Removal of PDS system and 
introduction of food stamps or any other alternative will be opposed by the FCI officials. 
Food and Civil Supplies Departments in different states also have vested interested in 
keeping the present status of PDS because of leakages in the system.   
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3.4.3 PDS  dealers 
There is a demand to obtain licenses for PDS dealership because of many 
associated benefits.  The commission on the sale of PDS commodities is not more than 
Rs.400-600 per month, which is equal to the earnings of a landless labourer (Mooij, 
1998). However, according to the study by Mooij, people are willing to pay large 
amounts of money for PDS dealership because they can make money in two ways. One is 
to issue bogus cards that do not belong to any family. The commodities purchased against 
these bogus cards are sold in the open market at a profit. A second way is to divert part of 
the commodities meant for real cardholders to the open market. The above reasons, 
however, may not be true in the case of certain other states. For example, in Andhra 
Pradesh PDS dealership is seen as an opportunity to have better contact with the villagers 
and improve their public image (Indrakant, 1996).   
3.4.4 Politicians 
As compared to South India, there is little interest for politicians in some of the 
Northern and Eastern states in proper working of PDS. They are interested only in getting 
the licenses for their party workers and share in money collected through diversions. On 
the basis of her study on Bihar Mooij (2001) formulated four hypotheses that could 
explain why politicians in Bihar do not regard the PDS in that way. 
(a) Politicians in Bihar do not require food to increase their popularity. They 
pursue other strategies to attract votes. 
(b) Politicians in Bihar are not capable of making the PDS delivery system 
function such that they can get political mileage out of it. They do not have sufficient 
control over the (food) bureaucracy in order to force it to deliver the goods to the people, 
and neither do they have adequate control over the local level vested interests (PDS 
dealers, local politicians etc).  
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(c) The present system in which about 85 per cent of the commodities are diverted 
to the black market offers the Bihari politicians a system that would benefit the 
consumers/cardholders. 
(d) Politicians in Bihar are faced with a different situation than in South India. 
The poor in Bihar are too poor for the PDS. Households that are permanently indebted 
cannot be helped through special schemes or proper implementation alone.  
Mooij found that the first and third hypotheses contain some truth. The fourth also 
may be true although people do value PDS ration cards. According to the above study, 
there are three reasons why this is so: (a) First, the system offers politicians a possibility 
to offer lucrative posts to fellow caste people or political followers (e.g. licenses to run 
PDS shops); (b) Second, there is a possibility to extort money from the PDS dealers; (c) 
Third, the payments for transfers of people working within the food bureaucracy is a 
source of money for the concerned minister. These payments require diversion of 
foodgrains to generate money. Apart from politicians, the local mafia is also involved in 
diverting foodgrains to the open market and collecting funds during rallies and election 
times.   
3.5  OPTIONS FOR REFORMS  
Our evaluation of PDS above shows that all is not well with the food policy of the 
Government. A review of past experience raises a number of questions about the working 
of the PDS and the associated policies. At the macro level, these questions refer to the 
fixing of the support and issue prices, the quantities to be procured and distributed, the 
manner in which stocks should be managed etc. At the micro level, there are the obvious 
problems of extending the coverage of the PDS, ways of targeting, managing the fair 
price shops to prevent ￿leakages￿ etc.  
Higher procurement prices invariably edge out private trade thus causing the FCI 
to procure more than what is required for food security. Low volumes of foodgrains 
available with private trade generally lead to higher market price during lean season due  
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to inadequate supply in the market while FCI is having huge unutilized stocks in 
godowns.  The food security system has become expensive and unsustainable. There is a 
need to have better options in terms of cost effectiveness, reaching to targeted population 
and financial sustainability.   
 
Three Options for Reforms 
We can think of three options for reforms in PDS
33. They are: (1) Strengthening 
the present system of PDS with better targeting and improving the delivery systems; (2) 
Shifting to food stamps system and; (3) Replacing it with better cost effective 
programmes like Employment Guarantee Scheme at All India level  
We discuss three options in detail below.  
3.5.1  Strengthening the present system of PDS 
This can be done through better targeting and improving the delivery systems. 
The present targeted PDS is based on income criterion. It is well known that it is difficult 
to identify the poor based on income criterion. Indicator targeting may be better to 
identify the poor.  
(a)   Geographical targeting 
As mentioned above, there is a need to have innovative programmes to minimize 
the errors of targeting. In this context, some studies have shown geographical targeting is 
                                                 
33 High Level Committee on Long Term Grain Policy (GOI, 2002) has given short term and long term 
recommendations. On PDS, The committee recommends that a system of universal PDS be introduced with 
uniform Central Issue Prices (CIP), one each for rice and wheat respectively, for all consumers in all parts 
of the country. In this: (a) There should be a single prices for rice, and no distinction between varieties;  
(b) The uniform CIPs should be the FCIs all India average acuisition cost at MSP of the relevant gain and 
(c) At these uniform prices, the Centre should allocate grain to states based on population and a monthly 
per capita quota to be specified from time to time. Actual lifting will be less than allocation, and past lifting 
should be the basis for decisions regarding grain movement. In the long run, as markets get better 
integrated, the PDS function need not remain restricted to designated fair price shops, and a food coupon 
system valid even outside PDS outlets may become possible. If decentralization has to proceed to its logical 
conclusion in the long term, the entire subsidy in the PDS has to be devolved to the states. The Committee 
also recommends on issues relating to minimum support prices and procurement, open market sales, 
exports and imports, encouraging private trade and , FCI related issues (see GOI, 2002). 
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better than income based targeting
34. Jha and Srinivasan (2001) have shown that if district 
is taken as a unit for geographical targeting, inclusion and exclusion errors are low. They 
suggest that universal provision of subsidies is desirable for poorer states such as Bihar, 
Orissa, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh since most of the districts in these states belong to 
the ￿poor￿ and very ￿poor￿ categories. In other states, universal subsidies can be provided 
to poorer districts. In fact, the limited evidence on RPDS (revamped PDS) in Andhra 
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh suggest that the performance of PDS in RPDS villages was 
much better than that in non-RPDS villages with similar socio-economic characteristics. 
Geographical targeting is supposed to reach the poor more effectively and is more cost 
effective. However, politically it may be difficult to implement because all the states 
want PDS in all the districts and they do not want to limit to poorer districts in their 
respective states. 
(b)   Self-targeted commodities 
In the self targeted programmes, the relatively rich voluntarily opt out of the 
programme. Self targeting in food subsidies may work if subsidies are given to 
commodities consumed primarily by poor. Rice and wheat are the main commodities 
given under PDS. One way is to give coarse variety of rice under the scheme. Another 
way is to distribute coarse cereals like sorghum, pearl millet and maize. However, these 
commodities are consumed only certain regions such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan 
and Karnataka. In these regions, one can explore the possibility of distributing coarse 
cereals.  
(c)   Decentralized procurement 
 The Union Budget 2001-02 indicated enlarged role for the state governments in 
both procurement and distribution of foodgrains for PDS in an attempt to economize on 
procurement costs. It proposed that instead of giving subsidized foodgrains, funds would 
be provided to the state governments to enable them to procure and distribute foodgrains. 
Decentralized procurement already started in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and West 
                                                 
34 Bigman and Srinivasan (2001) Jha and Srinivasan (2001).  
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Bengal. Decentralised procurement of foodgrains is intended to benefit both the farmers 
and consumers while simultaneously improving the financial position of the Government. 
The High Level Committee on Long term food grain policy also recommended for 
decentralized procurement and distribution. However, state governments such as Punjab, 
Haryana, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala opposed the decentralized procurement because of 
the lack of infrastructure and resources with the states. These problems have to be solved 
before implementing the decentralized procurement. 
(d)  Involvement of PRIs for better targeting and delivery systems 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) are in a better position to identify the poor 
households. Therefore, it is better to give responsibility of identifying the target 
households and issuing ration cards to PRIs. This would likely to improve targeting and 
also minimize leakages to open market. According to Central Government directive, the 
state governments are supposed to involve PRIs in the functioning of PDS. But, in pactice 
they are not being involved. 
3.5.2  Shifting to Food Stamps   
The second and better option is to move towards food stamps or food credit card 
system. Main feature of India￿s food subsidy programme has been the involvement of the 
government and its agencies in physically handling the grain. The government procures, 
stores and transport it to different states/union territories in the country and state 
governments distribute the commodities to ration dealers. It may be more efficient to 
move towards a new system of providing food subsidy through the normal food supply 
shops that exist throughout the length and breadth of the country, supplemented by Fair 
price shops in remote and inaccessible regions where such shops may be absent. This 
could be achieved through the introduction of food stamps or food credit card system.  
A food stamp is a cash voucher, which can be exchanged by the beneficiary for 
only food. GOI (2001) suggests a subsidy entitlement card (SEC) for food stamps. The 
SEC should show the number of members in a poor family, their age etc. and indicate  
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their entitlement level for food stamps. The members of a family would produce their 
SEC and collect their monthly quota of food stamps from prescribed distribution centers 
such as the local post-office, for example, since there already exists a wide network  of 
post offices throughout most of India. By using these food stamps in any food supply 
shop the poor should be able to purchase foodgrains at a price below the market price. 
The retailer who sells food to the stamp holder could accumulate these food stamps 
issued by the state governments and claim money from the state government.      
 
Is the food stamp system more cost effective compared to the PDS?  
We mentioned above that main problems with PDS are: targeting errors, leakages, 
excess costs. Regarding targeting errors, food stamps also face the same problem of 
identifying the target group. There is no problem of excess costs, which constitute a 
significant part of government subsidies, as these cannot arise in a food stamp 
programme since the grain is transacted through private markets. This is sited as a major 
gain from a switch to food stamps from PDS (Ramasamy, 2002). However, there can be 
other types of fraud such as counterfeiting of stamps and currency and intermediaries 
diverting the stamps meant for the poor to non-target groups. The cost-effectiveness of 
food stamps depends on its administrative costs and the efficiency of the private sector. 
Where food markets are more developed (e.g. urban areas), food stamps may be more 
effective. 
(a) Involvement of private sector: FCI inefficiency also led to an increase in 
economic costs of buffer stocks, which in turn led to an increase in issue prices. There is 
a need to involve the private sector in storage and distribution of foodgrains since the 
inefficiency of FCI is has been well established
35. The latter has also been responsible for 
increasing the burden of the food subsidy bill on the government. Private sector 
participation might be particularly useful in the storage and distribution of distribution of 
                                                 
35 see Gulati et al (1996).  
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food grains
36 since studies have shown that private costs are lower than those of FCI in 
handling the grains. 
 
Box 1￿Food Coupons: The Andhra Pradesh Experiment 
 
A food coupon system for the distribution of rice and kerosene through the public distribution 
system (PDS) was introduced in Andhra Pradesh during 1998-99 in order to improve the delivery system 
for these two commodities. Under the scheme, mere possession of the card is not enough to draw PDS rice, 
wheat or kerosene. The cardholder, whose photo is affixed on the card has to be physically present when 
obtaining the coupons. Coupons are issued once a year and coupon holders are entitled to draw rice and 
kerosene on a monthly basis. To help the coupon holder draw rice and kerosene in easy installments in a 
month, coupons are denominated in smaller quantities like 4 kg, 8 kg etc. The coupon holder/beneficiary is 
aware of his entitlement. The state government feels that this system has largely eliminated the scope of 
cheating by dealers by giving beneficiaries less than their entitlement. The coupon guarantees the 
stakeholder his right to draw a specific quantity every month. Rice or kerosene is not released unless the 
coupon is produced. This facilitates proper accounting of the actual quantity distributed in the month as it is 
calculated on the basis of the quantity covered by coupons produced by the beneficiaries. Quantity 
distributed vis-￿-vis the coupons produced could be verified every month by the officials of the Civil 
Supplies/Revenue Department. Introduction of the coupon system has also reduced in saving about 20,000 
tonnes of rice and 7,100 kilo litres of kerosene every month. In financial terms, the exchequer has saved Rs. 
90 million per month on rice and Rs.56.7 million per month on kerosene as subsidy. The coupon system 
can be made more effective if the list of beneficiaries is computerized on the basis of FPS (fair price shops) 
so that duplicate names, if any, could be identified and eliminated. This step would also reduce the cost of 
PDS substantially. However, steps should be taken to prevent counterfeiting of coupons by ensuring that 
legal consequences for such offences are duly enforced. Regular and staggered distribution of coupons 
could also be used to reduce the incidence of malpractices. 
 
Source: GOI (2003). 
 
 (b) Buffer stock levels: The FCI￿s role should be restricted to the maintenance of 
emergency stocks to be used in situations such as crop failure, and PDS operations may 
be left to states. Also the FCI should procure only the required amounts in the open 
market. Various committees have also provided recommendations regarding the size of 
buffer stock, which varies from 15 to 25 million tonnes (inclusive of PDS supplies) 
depending on the season in a year. The Expenditure Reforms commission recommended 
17 million tonnes as the total average stocks to be maintained for distribution and buffer 
stock.  
                                                 
36 See World Bank, 1999 for some suggestions.  
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(c) Food coupon system or food credit card system could also be tried. A food 
coupon system for distribution of rice and kerosene through PDS was introduced in 
Andhra Pradesh in 1998-99. The scheme was aimed at improving the delivery system of 
these two commodities. Under the scheme mere possession of card was not adequate to 
draw PDS rice.  Physical presence of the cardholder whose photo was affixed on the card 
was insisted upon for obtaining the coupons. This has reduced the scope of diversion of 
rice and kerosene to a great extent, if not totally eliminated it. However, private sector 
has to be ensured that they get reimbursements from the government without delay 
3.5.3  Hard Option: Replace it with Food for work Programme 
Effective implementation of Food for work programmes (FFW) can improve food 
security.  It is known that public works programmes have many direct and indirect 
benefits to the poor (see Dev, 1995, 2000). and these programmes have been in operation 
in India since the 1960s. Among the important ones are the Employment guarantee 
scheme of Maharashtra, JRY (Jawahar Rojgar Yojana) , and EAS (Employment 
Assurance Scheme), although the EGS is a cash for work programme. Even in the case of  
JRY and EAS the food component in payment is very less. There are two aspects to be 
considered in the functioning of public works programmes. One is how to utilize the 
available excess stocks effectively for FFW. The second is how to improve the 
effectiveness of the cash for work programmes like JRY in order to increase the 
purchasing power of the unskilled workers. With the increase in purchasing power 
workers can buy foodgrains in PDS or in the market. Therefore, food security can be 
increased directly by distributing foodgrains and indirectly by increasing purchasing 
power. Another question is how to link these programmes with the PDS. One possible 
way is to ensure that subsidized foodgrains under the PDS reach the workers working in 
FFW such that the workers reap double benefits (under FFW and PDS).  The recently 
announced Prime Minister￿s Sampoorna Rojgar Yojana (Rs.10, 000 crores) program is 
supposed  to provide full assistance for the states to implement FFW. 
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3.5.4  Which Option is better? 
In the medium term to long term, the last two options viz., food stamps, 
replacement with food-for-work/cash-for-work programmes can be tried. In the short run, 
PDS can be strengthened through targeting (the first option). A study done for IFPRI by 
Jha and Srinivasan (2003) shows that decentralization would improve the performance of 
PDS. With the involvement of Panchayats (local councils), targeting can be improved 
considerably. Also present PDS can be linked with employment programmes, ICDS etc. 
for better targeting.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter was to examine the performance of PDS and provide 
suggestions for more cost effective and better-targeted alternatives. An earlier attempt to 
look at the impact of PDS on consumption of the poor and poverty was done by 
Radhakrishna et al (1997) using the NSS data. Targeting was introduced in PDS for the 
first time in late 1990s and in this chapter, we compare the results of Radhakrishna with 
the latest data.  
Evaluation of performance is in terms of increases in food subsidy, coverage 
under PDS, impact on consumption, calories, impact on the poor, leakages including 
targeting errors, and cost effectiveness. The results show that the impact on consumption 
by the poor and the decline in poverty have increased in rural areas between 1986-87 and 
1999-00. The impact on urban areas has been more or less same. The impact is much 
higher on states like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Tamil Nadu. However, inspite of the 
increase in 1999-00, the impact of the PDS on the poor is still marginal at the all India 
level. We have also looked at the political economy of the PDS and find that the dealers 
of PDS, bureaucrats, politicians, and the civil supplies departments have a vested interest 
in keeping the present system of public distribution in operation. 
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Three options are mentioned in the chapter for reform of the PDS. They are: 
revamping the existing PDS through decentralization and targeting, the introduction of 
food stamps and replacing the PDS with food-for-work programmes. In the short run we 
have advocated decentralization of the PDS and better targeting with the help of 
panchayats.  We have also recommended that the PDS be linked with employment 
programmes and ICDS, in order to improve targeting. In the medium term, one should 
move towards one of the other two options of Food (cash) for Work programs and Food 
Stamps (coupons) to be distributed to those below the poverty line. 
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APPENDIX 3.1:  METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING ADDITIONAL 
DEMAND 
The methodology for estimating the additional demand that would have been 
generated in the nineties had the prices (price simulated demand) and growth patterns 
(growth simulated demand) of eighties prevailed in the nineties is as follows: Let yt be 
the total expenditure (in 1990-91 prices) for any year t in the nineties. If the growth rate 
of the total expenditure in the eighties is g, then yt￿ = (1+g)
ty1990 gives the total 
expenditure in year t if the growth rate of eighties persists. The additional growth 
simulated demand for the year t is given by  
                   ∆qy =  ηy (yt￿/yt -1)*q1990-91.  
where q1990-91 is the per capita demand for cereals in 1990-91.  Similarly the price 
simulated additional demand is given by 
                   ∆qp =  q1990-91 [Σ ηi (pit￿/pit -1)] 
where, ηi is the elasticity of cereal consumption with respect to the i th price,  pit is the 
relative price of the ith commodity in year t with base 1990-91 and pt￿= pit gip,  and gip is 
the growth rate of relative price of the ith commodity in eighties.  It may be noted that the 
cross price effects are ignored in the estimation of price-simulated demand.  
The expenditure and price elasticities were derived from a seven commodity 
Piece-wise Linear Expenditure System estimated using NSSO consumption data. For 
convenience all items of non-cereal food are combined in to one commodity group. 
Similarly all the non-food commodities are treated as one. The complete set of elasticities 
is available for four income groups separately for rural and urban areas. However, the 
following computations are based on the average elasticities for rural and urban areas.  
As mentioned in the text, for growth-simulated demand we first projected, starting 
from 1990-91 the total expenditure in each year (in 1990-91 prices) using the growth rate 
of eighties (1.7% pa in rural and 1.76% pa in urban). Taking 1990-91 is as base, the 
relative price of each commodity is moved using the growth rates of eighties to relative 
prices that would have prevailed had the eighties relative price movements continued. 
The percentage difference between the actual relative price and the simulated relative  
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price is multiplied by the price elasticity to estimate the price simulated additional 
demand.   
 
















Cereals  -0.256 -0.32 -0.098 -0.75 
Non-Cereal  Food  -0.034 1.69 -0.010 1.59 
Non-Food -0.020  -0.96  0.016  -1.16 
 
 
The estimated additional demand in the nineties are given in the table below 
 
Actual and Simulated Aggregate Consumption of Cereals in Rural and Urban Areas 
Simulated Difference 
Round Year Actual  P Y  P+Y  D(P)  D(Y)  D(P+Y) 
46 1990-91  133.36 133.36 133.36 133.36 0.00 0.00  0.00 
47 1991  131.82 133.40 130.65 132.23 1.58  -1.17  0.41 
48 1992  132.28 134.81 132.45 134.99 2.54 0.17  2.71 
50 1993-94  135.13 136.70 134.87 136.44 1.57  -0.26  1.31 
51 1994-95  136.74 139.33 137.33 139.93 2.60 0.60  3.20 
52 1995-96  136.87 139.04 137.84 140.01 2.17 0.97  3.14 
53 1997  139.26 142.39 137.44 140.57 3.13  -1.81  1.31 
54 1998  138.27 141.57 140.19 143.49 3.30 1.92  5.22 
55 1999-2000  121.13 122.68 120.12 121.66 1.54  -1.02  0.53 
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APPENDIX 3.2: COST OF ONE RUPEE TRANSFER TO POOR: 
METHODOLOGY PDS 
 
Appendix Table 1￿Cost of one Rupee transfer to Poor through Rice Subsidy 
Scheme of Andhra Pradesh ￿ 1999-2000 
 
   Item Units  Costs 
       
1  Total Annual Spending on the Subsidized Rice Scheme 
1    
     a) State  Rs. Million  10631.00
     b) Centre  Rs. Million  7390.00
     c) Total  Rs. Million  18021.00
2  Per capita Annual Income Gain due to Rice Scheme to all
2      
     a) Rural  Rs. 0.00  167.88
     b) Urban  Rs. 0.00  106.56
3  Average Annual Income Gain to All Consumers 
 3      
     a) Per capita  Rs. 0.00  151.2846
     b) Aggregate  Rs. Million  11308.53
4  Public Spending Required to Transfer 1 Rupee to any consumer (1c/3b)  Rs. 0.00  1.59
5  Per capita Annual Income Gain to Poor due to Rice Scheme 
2, 4      
     a) Rural  Rs. 0.00  173.16
     b) Urban  Rs. 0.00  144.24
6  Average Annual Income Gain to Poor
3,4   
     a) Per capita  Rs. 0.00  169.3234
     b) Aggregate  Rs. Million  2788.60
7  Public Spending Required to Transfer 1 Rupee to Poor consumer (1c/6b)  Rs. 0.00  6.46
8  Annual Income Gain under perfect targeting
6      
     a) Per capita   Rs. 0.00  686.65
     b) Aggregate  Ra. Million  11308.53
9  Public Spending Required for 1 Rupee under perfect targeting (1c/8b)  Rs. 0.00  1.59
 
Note: 1.    The State Spending is taken from the Budget volumes of Government of Andhra Pradesh. For 
                 the central spending, the average FCI subsidy rate given in HLC (2003) is multiplied by the rice  
                 off take for PDS from AP. 
          2.     Estimated from NSSO 55
th Round Survey on Consumer Expenditure. 
3.  See Table 2 for Population estimates used. 
4.  Deaton (2003) Poverty Lines were adopted for computations. 
5.  See Table 2 for Population estimates used. 
6.  The per capita annual income gain to poor under perfect targeting obtained by dividing 3b by 
the total number of poor. It is assumed that perfect targeting does not involve additional costs. 
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Appendix Table 2￿Basic Parameters for estimation of cost of transfers through AP 
Rice Scheme 
 
1 Population  Units Nos 
     a) Rural  Millions  54.52 
     b) Urban  Millions  20.23 
     c) Total  Millions  74.75 
2  Percentage of Poor      
     a) Rural  %  26.2 
     b) Urban  %  10.8 
     c) Total  %  21.88 
3  Number of Poor      
     a) Rural  Millions  14.28 
      b) Urban  Millions  2.18 
      c) Total  Millions  16.47 
 
Appendix Table 3￿Cost of one Rupee transfer to poor through PDS in India (1999-
2000) 
 
   Item Units  Costs 
1  Total Annual Spending on Rice and Wheat Subsidy
1  Rs. Million  73160.81
2  Per capita Annual Income Gain due to PDS supplies of Rice and Wheat  to all 
2      
     a) Rural  Rs. 0.00  50.4
     b) Urban  Rs. 0.00  42.72
3  Annual Income Gain to All Consumers 
3      
     a) Per capita  Rs. 0.00  48.21
     b) Aggregate  Rs. Million  48071.32
4  Public Spending Required to Transfer 1 Rupee (1/3b)  Rs. 0.00  1.52
5  Per capita Annual Income Gain to Poor due to PDS supplies of Rice and Wheat  
2,4     
     a) Rural  Rs. 0.00  47.04
     b) Urban  Rs. 0.00  62.4
6  Annual Income Gain to Poor
3,4  Rs. 0.00  49.40
7  Public Spending Required to Transfer 1 Rupee to Poor (1/6b)  Rs. 0.00  6.68
8  Annual Income Gain under perfect targeting
6      
     a) Per capita  Rs. 0.00  216.88
     b) Aggregate  Ra. Million  48071.32
9  Public Spending Required for 1 Rupee under perfect targeting (1/8b)  Rs. 0.00  1.52
 
Note: 1.    The central spending on PDS is taken from HLC (2003). The annual spending includes only  
                 central government expenditures.  The state subsidies have not been considered due to lack of 
                 data. Therefore, the estimated transfer costs give lower bound of the actual costs.  
2.  Estimated from NSSO 55
th Round Survey on Consumer Expenditure. 
3.  See Table 4 for Population estimates used. 
4.  Deaton (2003) Poverty Lines were adopted for computations. 
5.  See Table 4 for Population estimates used. 
6.   The per capita annual income gain to poor under perfect targeting obtained by dividing (3b) by 
the total number of poor. It is assumed that perfect targeting does not involve additional costs.  
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Appendix Table 4￿Basic Parameters for estimation of cost of transfers through 
PDS (Rice and Wheat) in India 
 
1  Population       
     a) Rural  Millions  713.34
     b) Urban  Millions  283.69
     c) Total  Millions  997.02
2  Percentage of Poor      
     a) Rural  %  26.3
     b) Urban  %  12
     c) Total  %  22.23
3  Number of Poor      
     a) Rural  Millions  187.61
     b) Urban  Millions  34.04




(1) First we get the govt. expenditure on JRY. Based on concurrent evaluation we 
get the expenditure on wages. According to concurrent evaluation on JRY, 53 % of the 
expenditure goes as wages to employees. It shows that govt. is spending Rs. 1.88 to reach 
Rs.1 of wage to JRY employees.  
However, all JRY employees are not poor. Again concurrent evaluation shows 
that 18% are non-poor i.e. 82% are poor. Then the cost of one rupee reaching the poor 
increases to Rs2.28 
 
Maharashtra EGS  
The same methodology is used in Maharashtra EGS also. Only difference is that 
wage share is high in MEGS (60%) and 90% of EGS are workers are poor. The 
calculations show that it needs Rs.185 to pay one rupee to the poor. 
 
ICDS 
Total cost= Health (salaries, traveling, medical kit) + welfare (salaries, wages, 
rents, traveling) + nutrition (cost of food). 
Cost of one rupee reaching the poor= Total cost / nutrition (cost of food) =1.44  
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4.  PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES AND FOOD SECURITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic access is important for ensuring food security at the household level. 
Public works programmes play an important role in raising economic access of the poor. 
The case for RWPs (Rural works programmes) lies in the self-targeting nature of the 
schemes. There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of public 
works programmes (or ’workfare’) on poverty alleviation (see Dreze and Sen, 1989; 
Ravallion, 1991; Besley and Coate, 1992; Besley and Kanbur, 1993; Sen, 1995). ’Workfare’ 
is supposed to enable the social planner to separate the non-poor from the poor by 
connecting income transfers to participation in public works. The public works also fit into 
the ideas of Ragnar Nurkse (1957) who regards surplus labour in low-income countries a 
potential saving useful for capital formation. The objectives of RWPs are to provide 
employment and to generate ’public goods’ such as physical infrastructure. Their policy 
attractiveness lies in their self-selection aspect since they can better screen out the non-
poor, and also provide wage incomes to the poor.  Furthermore they are also useful in the 
creation and maintenance of rural infrastructure, which in turn due to their public goods 
nature provides positive externalities. Generally priority is given to directly productive 
and economic infrastructure rather than social infrastructure. Some tertiary objectives are: 
While creating employment, more emphasis is given to women and socially       
disadvantaged sections 
(b) Seasonal and stabilization benefits. PWP can also function as     
      insurance  
(c) Creates an upward pressure on rural and urban wages 
(d) Slows down rural-urban migration 
(e) Incorporates the objective of environmental protection 
(f) Makes rural and urban poor a political force 
In India, the provision of employment has been extensively used as a tool of 
entitlement protection for many centuries. From the fourth Century BC when the ancient 
Indian political economist, Kautilya, wrote his Arthasastra, there has been an emphasis  
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on public relief works, particularly at times of famine, and employment from public 
works, later became the main and most effective element of strategies for famine 
prevention (World Bank, 1990). After independence in 1947, many schemes were 
sponsored by the central government, beginning with the Rural Manpower programme in 
1960. However, the most important programme at the state level is the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), introduced in 1972  - one of the most researched 
and discussed programmes in the country and commended by the UNDP￿s Human 
Development Report (1993) as one of the largest public works programmes in the 
developing world. It is a particularly interesting example because of its unprecedented 
feature of guaranteed rural employment at a defined wage, which makes it a model for 
other states in India and throughout the developing world. Agriculture in Maharashtra 
does not generate sufficient employment and therefore requires government intervention. 
The EGS is one such attempt to enlarge the scope of employment in order to alleviate 
poverty in the state. In developed countries such a security is offered by the state in terms 
of unemployment insurance, which is financed by a payroll tax on the working 
population. A programme such as the EGS acts as proxy unemployment insurance, and 
indeed is financed by a payroll tax at the state level in Maharashtra.  
At the national level, Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (JRY) and Employment Assurance 
Scheme (EAS) are the important programmes in rural areas
37. An important role was 
envisaged for the panchayats in JRY￿s implementation, who receive funds directly. In 
terms of person days of employment created, India’s rural public works programmes are 
the largest in the world. The JRY reached around a billion person days in recent years. 
JRY’s share is quite high in the social sector expenditure. Around  350 billion was spent 
on JRY during 1989-90 to 2000-01
38.  
In this chapter, we examine the impact of Maharashtra EGS and national level 
programmes on the food security at household level. We will discuss about the reforms 
needed in public works programmes for better implementation. 
 
                                                 
37 The National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and Rural Landless Employment Guarantee 
Programme (RLEGP) were working in the 1980s.  
38 JRY has been restructured in 1999 and renamed as Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY).  
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4.2 EMPLOYMENT  GUARANTEE  SCHEME IN MAHARASHTRA 
4.2.1   Expenditure and Benefits 
The Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) introduced in Maharashtra in the 
early 1970s is an innovative anti-poverty intervention. The EGS provides a guarantee of 
employment to all adults above 18 years of age who are willing to do unskilled manual 
work on a piece rate basis. The scheme is self-targeting in nature. It is totally financed by 
the state government. The main objectives of the EGS are to improve household welfare in 
the short run (through provision of employment) and to contribute to the development of the 
rural economy in the long run through strengthening rural infrastructure
39. Here we examine 
the costs and benefits due to EGS.   
The expenditures and employment generated under EGS for the period 1972-73 to 
2000-01 are given in Table 34. From a modest beginning of only 19 million in 1972-73, 
the scheme expanded to an expenditure of 5.78 billion in 2000-01 at current prices (see 
Table 34). In 2001-02, the expenditure seems to have increased significantly to around 9 
billion due to drought conditions. During the 1970s and 80s, the EGS has consistently 
claimed from 10 to 14 per cent of the total plan expenditure of the Maharashtra state. 
During the Eighth Plan period, however, the EGS share in the plan expenditure declined 
to around 8 per cent. The table shows that the employment created under EGS reached 
peak in 1985-86 (189.5 million person days). Since 1987-88, it started declining due to 
various reasons. Introduction of JRY could be one of the reasons for decline in the 
number of person days under EGS. However, still EGS created more than 110 million 
person days in 2000-01.     
One important development in the 1990s relates to linking of EGS to horticulture 
development. As shown in Table 35, the area under horticulture till 1990 was only 
173,000 ha. . In the 1990s, the area planted under fruit crops due to EGS linked 
horticulture programme was around - 970,000 ha. During this period, approximately 150 
million person days were created under this programme.  
                                                 
    39 For more details on EGS, see Mahendra Dev (1995, 1996).  
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Table 34￿Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme: Expenditure and 













































































































Note: 1 crore = 10 million 
Source: Planning Department, Government of Maharashtra. 
 
Table 35￿Area Under Fruit Crops in Maharashtra (Before and after EGS linked 
horticulture), Area in 000ha. 
 
Name of Fruit crop  Area before 1990 
(000 ha.) 
Area after horticulture 
linked programme 
with EGS (1990-91 to 


























































Source: Department of Agriculture& Horticulture.  
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4.3  BENEFITS DUE TO EGS 
(a)   EGS and Targeting 
There has been a debate about the effectiveness of the EGS in covering the target 
group. Using landless laborers as the criterion for target group, the PEO study (1980) 
shows that only 40 percent belonged to the target group under the EGS. Ravallion(1991) 
questions this criterion and rightly says that "it is the poor whom we are trying to reach, 
not the landless per se"(p.159). According to him a better test would be to compare the 
income distribution among participants with that for the rural population as a whole. 
Using the results of micro studies, he showed that EGS was well targeted to the poor. For 
example, Dandekar’s study (1983) shows that almost 90 per cent of the EGS workers 
belong to poorer sections.  
Using ICRISAT Village Level Studies’ data, a number of studies have examined 
the targeting performance of the EGS. Most of these studies have concentrated on 
Shirapur and Kanzara villages of Maharashtra. Walker and Ryan (1990) showed that 
wealth in the form of total assets was strongly and inversely related to participation in the 
EGS. Their results also reveal that the size of that relationship was larger for women as 
compared to men in both the villages. Between the two villages, the inverse relationship 
was much stronger in Kanzara, where the opportunity cost was higher because of 
abundant availability of agricultural employment opportunities. 
Deolalikar and Gaiha (1993) also examine the targeting performance in these two 
villages. On female participation, this study indicates that the scheme is well targeted to 
young female agricultural laborers with low levels of schooling who are household heads 
and who come from low-income and low-asset households. A study by Datt and 
Ravallion (1992) on these two villages shows that, in general, low wealth people 
participate in the programme. However, according to this study, there are signs that social 
stigma and work disabilities dilute targeting performance somewhat. In other words, the 
possibility of participation for low wealth high caste people and people with physical 
disabilities is less. 
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However, recent studies by Gaiha (1996a, 1996b) reveal that the EGS was 
mistargeted contrary to the conclusions of the former researchers. According to these 
studies, a little over 48 per cent of the EGS participants in 1979 were poor. In 1989, the 
share of the poor among EGS participants was a little over 27 per cent. Thus the 
proportion of non-poor rose more than moderately. Gaiha’s conclusions are based on data 
sets for two villages in Maharashtra (viz., Shirapur and Kanzara). First, this evidence may 
not be true for the entire Maharashtra. Secondly, the poverty lines used by the author 
appear to be much lower than official poverty lines. 
Most of the other evidence shows that EGS well targeted to the poor. 
(b)   Mitigation of Underemployment and Unemployment at the Aggregate Level 
Based on the estimates at the aggregate level it can be concluded that the 
contribution of the EGS to the total employment/underemployment in the state varies 
from less than 10 per cent to one third. However, the equivalent of 10 to 30 per cent of 
full time employment has an impact on a much larger part of the targeted group because 
the EGS employment is considered only supplementary or part-time employment. 
The average labor attendance under the EGS was approximately 0.50 million in 
the year 1993/94. In the same year the NSS 50th Round data revealed that there were 
23.2 million workers (self employed as well as wage employed) above 15 years. Thus the 
share of EGS workers in the total rural workers was only 2.2 per cent in the state. In the 
absence of EGS, at least theoretically, unemployment among rural workers would have 
been up by 2.2 per cent.  
This is reflected in the trends in unemployment rates for Maharashtra in Table 36. 
The incidence of unemployment declined much faster in Maharashtra as compared to all 
India. The decline was particularly significant between 1983 and 1987/88. This is true for 
female unemployment also. However, the unemployment for both males and females has 
increased in Maharashtra since 1987/88. During the same period the female 
unemployment for all India declined. The reasons for increasing person day 
unemployment in Maharashtra are yet to be explored. 
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(c)   Transfer Benefits of EGS 
At the aggregate level we can estimate transfer benefits to the workers under 
EGS. Assume that the available funds are Rs.100. The gross transfer benefit to the 
unskilled workers is Rs 60 (i.e. share of wage costs). Assuming 30 percent of wages as 
forgone income and targeting efficiency of 90 per cent, the net transfer benefit would be 
Rs.35 to Rs.40 out of Rs. 100. If we assume Gaiha’s finding of 27 per cent of transfer 
efficiency, only Rs.11 out of Rs.100 reach the poor. However, Ravallion and Datt’s study 
(1995) on two villages from Maharashtra (Shirapur and Kanzara) shows that half of the 
gross budget disbursement directly reaches the participants most of whom are poor. This 
study found that the foregone income from employment on the public works schemes is 
quite low - around one quarter of gross wage earnings. Most of the time displaced was in 
domestic labor, leisure and unemployment. It shows that workers are not losing much by 
participating in the EGS at least in the villages studied. 
 
Table 36￿Person-day Unemployment Rates for Rural Areas: Maharashtra and all 
India 
 
Maharashtra All  India   
































Note: Unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of unemployment days to labor force person days. 
Source: Economic Survey. 
 
(d)  Impact on Poverty 
One criticism of the EGS is that, despite the scheme’s existence, poverty in 
Maharashtra has not declined more rapidly than average. However, the performance of 
Maharashtra was better than all India in the 1990s. Also, it may be noted that the EGS 
alone cannot lead to poverty alleviation. As some calculations can show, even if workers 
work full time on EGS, they cannot earn enough to cross the poverty line. The problem of 
poverty is much wider than the coverage of EGS. The anti-poverty record of EGS is  
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better understood by looking at district or region level data. The macro-level poverty 
ratios do not fully capture the impact of EGS on the poor because EGS is concentrated in 
a few districts. Almost two-thirds of all EGS employment is concentrated in one-third of 
the districts. 
 
Table 37￿Rural Poverty: Maharashtra and all India 
 











Source: Economic Survey, 2001-02. 
 
 
(e) Wage  Debate 
The dilemma to be resolved is whether the wage should be below or equal to 
market wage rate or at the legally fixed minimum wage level (generally market wages are 
below minimum level). Initially the EGS wages were below the market agricultural 
wages. In 1988, with the doubling of the statutory minimum wage rate, the EGS piece 
rates were also doubled. Ravallion et al (1993) reveal that higher wages led to rationing 
in the guarantee of employment. They argue that lower wages should be maintained in 
order to have wider coverage, which would help the poor better as compared to the 
rationing due to higher wages. This issue should be resolved before replicating the EGS 
to other states. There is some merit in the low wage argument if one wants to concentrate 
on reducing the intensity of poverty. However, if the aim is to take the poor upto the so 
called poverty line, obviously higher wages are needed. In recent years, the workers seem 
to have been shifting from EGS to JRY in Maharashtra because of the higher wages 
(Prabhu, 1996). Therefore, one has to verify whether reduction in EGS employment has 
been due to increase in wage rates or shifting of workers to JRY. 
(f)  Indirect or Secondary Benefits 
The case for EGS relies more heavily on secondary (or indirect) and stabilization 
benefits, rather than on direct benefits. One of the second round effects of EGS is its 
contribution to the creation of rural assets. The EGS projects mainly relate to soil  
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conservation, land development, percolation tanks and roads. They can have substantial 
impact on agricultural growth (see Sathe, 1991). The EGS has been criticized for 
neglecting the creation of durable assets and paying more attention to employment 
generation. There is some merit in this argument but it may not be true for all EGS assets. 
The related criticism is that the agricultural growth in Maharashtra was very low in the 
1980s inspite of EGS
40. Here too one has to look at the disaggregate data i.e. trends in 
agricultural growth at the district level. 
Secondly, EGS puts an upward pressure on agricultural wages
41. The guarantee 
part of the EGS increases unskilled labourers’s bargaining strength in negotiations with 
an employer or landlord. There is evidence that the EGS wage rate has influenced the 
agricultural wage rate in Maharashtra (see Acharya, 1990). Thirdly, one of the important 
aspects of the EGS is its insurance function. In the absence of unemployment insurance 
in India, EGS can act as an insurance for the rural workers. The existence of a form of 
income/employment insurance could be quite significant although the increase in 
employment and income is not very large as compared with the aggregate needs. The 
EGS also have stabilization benefit in the sense that the employment under the scheme is 
high in the lean season (April to July) and low in the peak season (October to January) 
(see Table 38). Fourthly, it is worth noting that in rural Maharashtra, the EGS is known 
as a "programme of women". Various micro studies have shown that women constitute 
40 to 50 per cent of the EGS workers. These large percentages could be due to the 
predominance of female labor in casual unskilled work in rural areas. 
Fifth, by making employment to entitlement, the EGS facilitates collective 
political action by the poor, and promotes the realization of their common interest. The 
scheme also makes rural politicians to be more responsive to the demands of the poor. It 
provided the poor with opportunities for effective action and encouraged the mobilization 
of their political resources and also improved the bargaining position of rural poor. A 
number of organizations have come up to help the EGS workers
42. 
                                                 
 40 Suresh Tendulkar, Delhi School of Economics (personal communication). 
 41 There is also casual evidence  of a labour shortage in Maharashtra, along with significant seasonal   
unemployment.  
 42 Also see Echeverri-Gent (1988), Subbarao (1992), Hirway and Terhal (1994) on the benefits of EGS.    
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Table 38￿Average Monthly attendance on EGS sites (in  000￿s) 
 
  85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 
April  731 686 957 535  534 331 270 696 335 186 292 186 
May  820 765 940 532  532 347 282 773 385 223 318 182 
June  748 740 769 333  332 297 244 902 391 203 350 165 
July  515 621 523 174  173 148 164 502 298 123 283 132 
August  475 523 411 129  129 114 110 277 222 104 172 86 
September 587 482 357 80 110 90  104 181 196 106 148 63 
October  549 420 227 85 97  84  129 142 132 135 109 49 
November  505 374 266 90 96  75  161 124 101 147 89  49 
December  696 494 361 151  123 104 232 174 106 206 110 52 
January  649 601 446 182  186 190 360 226 134 259 117 NA 
February  639 739 472 238  246 247 511 270 150 285 131 NA 
March  668 1061  493 309  307 253 535 294 175 293 162 NA 
 
Source: Planning Department, Government of Maharashtra. 
 
(g)  Opportunity Cost to the Workers and to the society 
 Participation in EGS involves some costs to the workers. However, since most of 
the employment under EGS is created during lean season, the opportunity cost of the 
workers may be low. The social costs could be very low because EGS employment is a 
net addition to the society. 
(h)  Targeting Errors: EGS as compared to other Anti-poverty Programmes 
The success of the EGS needs to be judged against alternative anti-poverty 
programmes or policies. Many evaluation studies have shown that the performance of 
EGS is much better as compared to programmes like IRDP. None of the other 
programmes have sustained large-scale operations for a lengthy period or dealt with 
corruption and other administrative problems as effectively as the EGS. 
In recent years, there are comparisons between EGS and Public Distribution 
System (PDS). Actual information is not readily available for comparing the EGS and  
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PDS. A comparison by Guhan (1996) shows that although transfer efficiency is higher 
under PDS than in EGS, the benefit cost-ratio in the PDS may be only half of that in the 
employment programmes. This is because of better targeting in employment 
programmes. However, the coverage is much wider for the PDS (more on this see 
Mahendra Dev, 1996a). 
Cornia and Stewart (1995) divide the errors of ’target’ government expenditures 
on poor people into two: ’E’ mistakes in which benefits are provided to the non-poor as 
well as the poor, and ’F’ mistakes in which some of the poor fall outside the scope of the 
programme. In employment programs that are generally self-targeted, the ’E’ mistakes 
would be lower than ’F’ mistakes. In the untargeted programme like PDS, the ’E’ mistakes 
(coverage of non-poor) are expected to be larger than in targeted programmes.  
(i)  ’E’ and ’F’ mistakes for EGS 
In the case of employment programmes, ’E’ mistakes are expected to be less and 
’F’ mistakes are expected to be higher as compared to those of PDS. For example, 90% 
the workers working under Employment Guarantee Scheme were poor according to some 
estimates (Dandekar, 1983). In this case, ’E’ mistakes are very low. However, ’F’ mistakes 
are high under employment programmes because many of the poor are not generally 
covered. Another point is that EGS is considered superior over PDS even if it does not 
create any assets (see Parikh, 1994). EGS scores much more over other poverty 
alleviation programmes if secondary benefits such as asset creation, increase in 
agricultural wages, insurance benefits etc. are considered. If these benefits are 
considered, the impact of EGS on the poor could be much higher than that of PDS. 
To sum up, given some of the limitations in the EGS design and implementation, 
many studies, particularly at the micro level, have shown that the EGS has made a 
positive impact on the levels of living of the poor in Maharashtra. The unemployment 
rate has declined considerably and incomes of the poor have increased over time. 
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4.4  PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
4.4.1  Developments in Public works Over Time 
While public works programmes to provide employment in times of distress have 
a long history, the major thrust to wage-employment programmes in the country was 
provided only after the attainment of self-sufficiency in foodgrains in the 1970s. The 
National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and Rural Landless Employment 
Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) were started in the Sixth and Seventh Plans. The NREP 
and RLEGP were merged in April 1989. The JRY was revamped from April 1999 as 
Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY). The food-for-work programme was started in 
2000-01 as a component of the EAS in eight notified drought-affected states of 
Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Maharashtra and Uttaranchal. The programme aims at augmenting food security through 
wage employment. Foodgrains are supplied to states free of cost. Given the 
complementarity of the JGSY, EAS and Food for Work programme, all of which aim at 
the creation of employment opportunities in the rural areas, they were revamped and 
merged under the new Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yozana (SGRY) scheme from 
September 2001. The basic aim of the scheme continues to be generation of wage 
employment, creation of durable economic infrastructure in rural areas and provision of 
food and nutrition security to the poor (GOI, 2003). The amalgamation of the earlier 
schemes has led to an augmentation of resources for this programme. 
Evaluations are yet to be done on JGSY and SGRY. Therefore, we look at the 
impact of JRY and EAS on the employment and incomes of the poor.  
4.4.2  Contribution of JRY and EAS to Rural Employment 
Since both JRY and EAS are major programmes, which provide rural 
employment, it is useful to consider their contribution to rural employment creation by 
taking the two schemes together. The total employment generated by these two  
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programmes in 1998-99 is equivalent to 4.4 million person years (table 39). Compared to 
the size of the total labor force of over 300 million this is only 1.5 per cent and if 
adjustments are made for the likely over-reporting in official figures, the percentage is 
even lower. However, comparing the employment created under these schemes to the 
total labor force in rural areas is not appropriate since these schemes are aimed 
specifically at the rural poor. If we assume that this segment is about 30 per cent of the 
rural labor force, the contribution of the employment schemes increases to about 4.5 per 
cent of the labor force. This is still small but considering the scale of unemployment in 
rural areas (around 7 per cent) it can make a significant difference. One can therefore 
conclude that the schemes do help to contain the level of unemployment in a significant 
way.   
 
Table 39￿Financial & Physical Performance Under EAS/SGRY Since Inception 
 
  (Rs. in billions) 
Sl.No. Year Total  Utili. 
Of funds 
% of Utili. to 
Total Avail. 
Wage emp. generated 




1 2  3  4  5  6 
1 1993-94  1.8375  26.79  49.474  1397 
2 1994-95  12.3545  58.06  273.956  114199 
3 1995-96  17.2061  53.70  346.527  128420 
4 1996-97  21.6041  63.84  403.002  277014 
5 1997-98  29.0497  78.37  471.774  184699 
6 1998-99  28.8218  85.84  427.936  196589 
7 1999-2000  21.8261  75.02  278.617  156540 
8 2000-01  18.6111  84.38  218.392  137722 
9 2001-02*  5.3092  42.29  66.627  44872 
 TOTAL  103.6179  77.13  1.463346  billion  720422 
 
Note:  * upto September, 2001.  
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4.4.3  Concurrent Evaluation of JRY (1993-94) 
The findings of the report of the Concurrent Evaluation (1993-94), carried out by 
the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, are as follows: 
In about 77.18 per cent of the works, the panchayats were the executing agency 
and only 2.02 per cent of works were executed by the contractors; (ii) A substantial 
amount of JRY funds has been spent on roads and buildings; (iii) The wage to non-wage 
ratio has been 53:47; (iv) 47 per cent of employment is generated for Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) and 36 per cent for landless laborers; (v) Quality of 
majority of assets were found to be good and only 0.41 per cent of assets were not useful. 
86 per cent of assets were reported to be durable; (vi) 70 per cent of the assets created 
were maintained by the panchayats. However, 13 per cent of the assets were not 
maintained at all; (vii) On an average employment generated under JRY was 11 days per 
month
43 (GOI, 2001). 
Other evaluations show that the resources were spread thinly so as to increase the 
coverage of areas/ beneficiaries without any concern for the duration of employment. 
Projects selected bore no relationship to the local needs or the agricultural development 
strategy. A study on U.P. reports that the timing of works coincided with peak 
agricultural season and that the selection of works was not done in the gram sabha as 
required (GOI, 2000). Wage employment programmes, by effectively intervening in the 
labor markets, were expected to exert upward pressure on the market wages. This could 
not happen because of insufficient employment provided by these programmes. The share 
of women in employment generated under the programme was only 17 per cent. JRY and 
similar public works programmes have tended to breed corruption. The fudging of muster 
rolls and of measurement books is very common, resulting in a huge loss of funds that 
could otherwise have been invested in building rural infrastructure. 
                                                 
43 In the Concurrent Evaluation, the question in the survey relates to the employment generated under JRY 
in 30 days preceding the date of survey.     
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Notwithstanding some of the problems mentioned above, there are two positive 
aspects of the programme (GOI, 2000). First, the programme did succeed in creating 
durable community assets in rural areas, although it is true that some assets built have 
poor quality. Second, the programme led to empowerment of panchayats as the funds 
were placed at their disposal along with power to get the works executed through line 
departments. 
4.4.4  Evaluation of EAS     
The Programme Evaluation Organization (PEO) of the Planning Commission 
undertook the evaluation study on Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) for the 
reference period 1995-97. The main findings are as follows: 
(i)  The utilization of EAS funds is extremely low. Lack of planning, untimely release 
of funds - both from the center to DRDAs (District Rural Development Agencies) 
and from DRDAs to blocks - and other factors such as inability of the states to 
generate matching resources are the important reasons for the low utilization of 
EAS funds. 
(ii)  The coverage of villages and the target group is extremely low. A maximum of 32 
per cent of the villages and 5 per cent of the target group in a block are estimated 
to have been covered annually. 
(iii)  A large part of the EAS funds has been used in activities that are less labor 
intensive and more capital intensive. The normative capital labor ratio has not 
been generally adhered to.  
(iv)  The majority of EAS beneficiaries received less than 30 days￿ wage employment 
in a year. Non- poor households were also found to have been the beneficiaries of 
EAS.  
Several gaps have been noticed in the design and implementation of EAS, and 
there have been some major criticisms of the programme:  (i) There has been bogus  
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reporting to achieve targets (ii) Income is created but no assets are left behind and (iii) 
Corruption is prevalent both at political and administrative levels.   
4.4.5  Employment and Income Benefits: Concurrent Evaluation of JRY   
As mentioned above, according to the Concurrent Evaluation, JRY worker got on 
an average 11.06 days of employment (or 133 days per year) from panchayat JRY works 
during the reference period of 30 days preceding the date of survey. State-wise variations 
are given in table 40. In some poorer states like Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, JRY 
workers got less than 10 days per month. 
 
Table 40￿Average Person Days of Employment Generated During the Last 30 days 
           Preceding the Date of Survey: Major States, 1993/94 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
State     By  Self     State    By  Self   
    U n d e r   J R Y      U n d e r   J R Y  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Andhra  Pradesh    12.53   Madhya  Pradesh   9.34   
Assam     17.94   Maharashtra   11.80 
Bihar     10.13   Orissa    8.58 
Gujarat     10.67   Punjab    30.00 
Harayana   11.84   Rajasthan   11.02 
Himachal  Pradesh    15.00   Tamil  Nadu   12.30 
Jammu and Kashmir    9.65    Uttar Pradesh    12.22 
Karnataka       12.89   West  Bengal   8.52 
Kerala     11.59   All  India  11.06 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Source: GOI (1997a). 
 
According to the concurrent evaluation, the average daily wage rate was Rs.33.36 
(Rs.30.54 cash + Rs.2.82 value of food grains). On an average, a JRY worker at the all 
India level earned Rs.369 during the 30 days preceding the date of survey. The poverty  
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line income per month per family is around Rs.917
44. In other words, a JRY worker 
earned on an average 40 per cent of the poverty line threshold. Thus JRY seems to be 
contributing substantial income to the families working under the scheme. 
 
Targeting Under JRY 
The Concurrent Evaluation for the year 1993-94 shows that 82 per cent of the 
workers had annual family income of less than Rs.11, 000, which is the revised poverty 
line. Therefore, to a large extent, the workers who were provided employment belonged 
to the poorer sections
45. The picture varies at state level. In Andhra Pradesh, 52 per cent 
of JRY workers were non-poor. This percentage is quite high for Bihar, Karnataka and 
Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, it was less than 10 per cent for Assam, Gujarat, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Thus, there are significant variations in the 
coverage of poor under JRY across states. 
4.4.6  Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY)    
JRY has been restructured in 1999 and renamed as Jawahar Gram Samridhi 
Yojana (JGSY). The programme aims at creating need ￿based rural infrastructure at the 
village level to boost the rural economy and improve the quality of life. Priority will be 
given to develop infrastructure for SC/ST habitations, education and public health. The 
programme, not only develops rural infrastructure, but also provides individual assets to 
the poorest of the poor SCs/STs families, as 22.5 per cent funds are earmarked for them. 
The entire funds of the JGSY are devolved to village panchayats in order to create greater 
financial autonomy. The panchayats are empowered to take up works up to Rs. 50,000 
independently with the approval of Gram Sabha to ensure active people￿s participation at 
the grassroots level. 15 per cent of the allocated funds have been earmarked for 
                                                 
44 Annual family income of Rs.11, 000 is considered as poverty line. 
45 The concurrent evaluation for the year 1992, however, shows that around 56 per cent of the JRY workers 
were non-poor in 1992. This result could be due to the low poverty line (Rs.6400 per annum) used in this 
evaluation.  
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maintenance of assets created under the programme for greater durability. The main 
emphasis of the programme is to create rural infrastructure. 
Since its inception in 1999, a total of 1.57 million works have been completed 
upto March 2001. A total of 598,000 works have been completed under individual 
beneficiary schemes meant for SCs/STs. Around Rs.43 billion were spent under JGSY 
from 1999 to March 2001. Presently some gram panchayats are getting as low as Rs.5, 
000 per annum as per the criteria of allocation under the JGSY guidelines. With this 
meager amount it is impossible to create any meaningful infrastructure at the village 
level. In order to create tangible and meaningful infrastructure it is necessary that the 
gram panchayats at least get an allocation of Rs.50, 000. 
4.5   REFORMS NEEDED FOR RURAL PUBLIC WORKS 
The main criticism against public works is that they are relief oriented and are not 
creating durable assets. Around 40 to 50 per cent of total funds under public works are 
being used for non-wage purposes. What is happening to these funds? How productively 
are these funds being used? The major issue is how to generate productive assets without 
diluting the primary objective of employment guarantee and poverty alleviation.  
4.5.1. Reforms under Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of Maharashtra 
The EGS has been in existence for a long period-25 years so far. There is a need 
for some changes, which would be more effective in helping the poor without altering the 
basic structure of EGS. Some of them are the following. 
(a) Wage  Rate 
The workers under EGS in Maharashtra seem to be shifting from EGS to JRY 
because of the higher wage rates in the latter. The data for 1995/96 shows that around 
91.2 million person days were created under JRY. This number is almost equal to that 
created under EGS. There is a need to have some parity between these two schemes. The  
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wage rate must be raised in such a way that a person working 300 days a year can lift him 
or herself and dependents above the poverty line.   
(b)  Resources under EGS 
The Government may resort to employment rationing if the hike in EGS wages is 
not accompanied by a matching increasing in the outlay. This seems to have happened in 
the late 1980s. In real terms, there has not been much increase in the outlay under EGS in 
recent years. The resources have to be increased if the government is serious about 
increasing wage rates under the scheme. Apparently, there is accumulated surplus of 
nearly Rs. 20 billion in the Employment Guarantee Fund. These funds can be utilized for 
paying higher wage rates and better infrastructure.  
(c)  Asset Creation and Organizational Aspects 
 Some organizational aspects have to be sorted out in EGS. Inadequate planning, 
improper project selection and design, lack of technical and organizational supervision, 
and long delays in implementation have affected the productive quality of capital 
constructed. The EGS has been criticized for neglecting the creation of durable assets by 
paying more attention to employment generation. The initial emphasis on creation of 
durable assets got watered down due to public pressures for starting road works. One 
major weakness of the EGS is the lack of adequate planning for assets. It may be noted 
that volatile demands from the workers also creates problems for the projects. Droughts, 
natural calamities or even seasonal changes cause dramatic shifts in demand. Because of 
sudden increase in demand, new projects have to be undertaken which may be of little 
productive value (Dantwala, 1978)  
(d)  Maintenance of Assets 
Maintenance and utilization of assets are observed to be far from satisfactory. The 
problems in ensuring adequate maintenance are two-fold. First, there has been a 
considerable delay in handing over completed works to the Zilla parishads for 
maintenance. Second, even where the works have been handed over, the local bodies did  
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not allocate resources for the maintenance of the EGS assets. Consequently, the 
maintenance of assets has been neglected. There is a need to allocate some part of the 
EGS funds for maintenance of the assets. 
(e) People’s  Participation 
Some evaluations have shown that the EGS plans and implementation is 
dominated by bureaucracy without people’s participation. People’s participation in 
selection and management would improve the productivity and sustainability of the 
assets. 
(f)  More Importance to Watershed Development 
Water management is crucial for increasing agricultural production and 
productivity in Maharashtra. It may be noted that even after utilizing the ultimate 
irrigation potential, over 60 per cent of the cultivated area may have to depend on 
uncertain rainfall. Therefore, EGS projects should concentrate more on water 
conservation. Similarly, emphasis has to be given to the promotion of horticulture.
46 
There are already models like Pani Panchayats, Ralegaon Shindi etc. 
(g)  Involvement of voluntary organizations for effective implementation of EGS 
Along with local people’s participation, involvement of voluntary organizations 
would improve the working of EGS. Corruption and leakages in the EGS has been a point 
of major concern. A number of cases of corruption have been cited in the reports of the 
legislature committee on the EGS from time to time
47. Involvement of NGOs and local 
people can reduce the corruption. 
                                                 
 46 There are already one scheme on horticulture under EGS. 
 47 It may be noted, however, compared to other anti-poverty programmes in India, corruption may be lower in 
the EGS. The decisions of the officers responsible for planning and implementing the EGS are more open to 
outside scrutiny.  
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4.5.2  Reforms Under JRY 
(a)   Are the Resources Enough for Wage Employment Programmes? 
We have noted above that the person days under public works contribute only 3 to 
5 per cent to the total casual labor days in rural areas
48. This shows that the all-India 
programmes are thinly spread and are unlikely to have a significant impact in any given 
state
49. The implications may be interpreted in two ways. One view is that these funds 
should be diverted for investment purposes since they are not having much impact on 
poverty particularly in normal years. On the other hand, we can say that funds should be 
increased under wage employment programmes in order to have significant impact on 
poverty. For example, Parikh (1998) argues that ’a nationwide EGS with increased wage 
and easy access to all can provide individual food security against both chronic and 
transient hunger to the employable hungry. This can be done at a cost of about 147.75 
billion per year to cover both rural and urban areas. Of course here Parikh is assuming that 
other programmes like PDS are not necessary for employable persons
50. Obviously we need 
more resources for public works in order to have a significant impact on poverty. 
(b)   Minimum Wage Rate 
Higher wages in public works may be important from the point of view of income 
guarantee. The use of minimum wage rates for JRY work, however, raises several issues. 
Where the minimum daily wage is above the market wage, as may be the case in poorer 
localities, there is a danger that persons with other market based work opportunities will 
be attracted to JRY, which detracts from targeting and inflates demand for JRY 
employment, possibly necessitating rationing. On the other hand, in some places the 
minimum wage rate appears to be well below the market wage, in which case no one 
                                                 
 48 On the other hand, Nayyar (1996), Papola and Sharma (1996) show that JRY and EAS are taking care of 40 
to 50 per cent of the underemployment in the country. 
 49 This point is due to Suresh Tendulkar, Delhi School of Economics, (personal communication). 
 50 Parikh says along with EGS, a PDS to reach the old and the infirm who can not work on EGS would be 
required. The EGS with supplementary PDS for 5 per cent of the poor requires around 167 billion for both 
rural and urban areas.  
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would be attracted to engage in JRY work unless higher wages are paid in a disguised 
manner (violating JRY guidelines). The question that naturally arises is whether JRY is 
needed at all in areas where the market wage far exceeds the minimum wage. If there is 
no demand for JRY employment at the minimum wage rate, the programme could simply 
be dispensed with in that locality, leaving more resources available where they are truly 
needed ￿ that is, in poorer localities. Attraction of some of the non-poor to JRY 
mentioned above could also be due to higher wages under this programme.     
(c)   Using Excess Buffer stock for Public Works 
Sometimes governments have excess buffer stock as happened in 1995. It had 
reached a peak of 37 million tonnes in May 1995. Government has several options to 
dispose of this excess stock. These are: (a) export (b) sale in the open market, (c) sale 
through the PDS by reducing the issue price and increasing PDS demand, (d) distribution 
though public works programmes. Among these options, the last option of linking food 
grains with public works programmes like the JRY seems to be the most effective 
strategy for buffer stock reduction.  A similar view has been expressed by Ghosh et al 
(1996). According to them, existence of food stocks ’provides a tremendous opportunity 
in terms of a substantial non-inflationary expansion in public works and other 
infrastructure development and maintenance which can be organized through food-for-
work and similar schemes’ (p.1235).    
(d)   Public Works can be used for Targeting PDS   
Various options are being discussed regarding targeting of PDS to the poor. There 
is, however, some sort of consensus that PDS should be linked with public works 
programmes because they have an excellent self-targeting character. Giving food 
coupons as part of the wages to the workers in public works can also be experimented 
with.  
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(e)   Involvement of Institutions 
It is a general impression that the actual impact of the programmes on the lives of 
the people is low compared to the funds spent on the schemes. The major criticism of 
government based anti-poverty programmes relates to lack of people’s participation. 
Instead, there seems to be a more technocratic top-down approach in implementing these 
programmes. There is a need to involve Panchayats, NGOs, self-help groups, and 
community-based organizations to strengthen government employment programmes. 
More Involvement of Panchayats: With the 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendments, people at the village level are now empowered through participation in 
local government to exercise their rights and manage their own developmental activities. 
It opens up space for potentially meaningful and creative local development efforts with 
in-built pressures for accountability. Thus, people’s participation through Panchayats 
would serve to strengthen Government activities. There are, however, apprehensions that 
given the highly stratified and unequal socio-economic structure of Indian villages, the 
dominant landowning elite class would effectively control power and that they are 
unlikely to be concerned about the welfare of the poor and the women. However, over 
time poorer sections are likely to participate in the panchayat system.  
JRY is implemented through panchayats. However, as mentioned in the 
concurrent evaluation, only 43 per cent of the heads of elected panchayats imparted 
training for implementing the JRY works. Therefore, there is a need for more orientation 
of heads of village panchayats through training programmes. In general, panchayats are 
working better in West Bengal and Kerala.   
Voluntary Organizations (NGOs, CBOs): Wherever the voluntary organizations 
have shown interest, the effectiveness of Government programmes have improved. NGOs 
and CBOs (Community Based Organizations) thus play vital role in strengthening the 
hands of the Government. The voluntary organizations also make the Panchayats 
accountable. For accountability two instruments are needed. They are: (a) Right and 
access to information and (b) social mobilization. The activities of Government at the  
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local levels have to be transparent and the people should have the right to information 
regarding funding and other activities. The NGOs and CBOs can also facilitate for social 
mobilization of people and in particular women. Also some of the special employment 
programmes like DWCRA can be given to self help groups for implementation. 
(f)   Leakages Under the Programmes 
There are many stories throughout India on leakages under JRY. There is no 
accountability for officials as well as panchayats. The right to information and 
involvement of voluntary organizations can reduce the leakages. 
(g)   Better in Drought Years?  
 An interesting dimension of the rural works programmes is that they seem to 
work remarkably well during drought years as relief programmes. There is evidence that 
the poor have better access to food during periods of scarcity as compared to normal 
years
51. It is worth examining why the bureaucracy that works efficiently during drought 
years fails in the normal years. 
(h)   Need for linkages with Sectoral Programmes for Productive Employment 
The special employment programmes may have to be continued in the short run 
until growth process generates the required employment. However, it is necessary to 
recast the employment programmes with a view to making them more effective in 
meeting not only the short term objective of providing temporary work, but also in 
building up the productive capacity of individuals/areas which in turn, would make 
greater employment on a more sustainable basis feasible (Nayyar, 1995). For example, 
public works programmes should create assets that can provide a sustainable productive 
employment in future. They should not be relief programmes. The case for using rural 
                                                 
51 Regarding this, it is worth quoting here R.K.Laxman’s cartoon in the Times of India (December 3, 1996). A 
villager goes to see a minister. The minister’s P.A. conveys the villager’s observation to the minister as 
follows. "He is grateful for rushing food during the recent drought. He is asking what to eat when there no 
drought, sir’. Also see Sainath (1996) for interesting stories on droughts.  
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public works as a development tool and for providing productive employment has been 
argued by Hirway and Terhal (1994).    
The most glaring weakness of the expenditures made every year in public works 
is that they are not conceived in the framework of the overall development plan. Rao 
(1992) discusses the lack of integration of employment-generation programmes with 
development programmes in India. Action plans of JRY are nothing more than lists of 
schemes having hardly any interconnections between them. Again there is hardly any 
integration between the JRY programmes and the schemes of various line departments. 
The potentialities of JRY-type programmes can be fully utilized if the projects under 
these schemes are identified in the framework of the planned development of an area. 
Some novel experiments can also be tried for effective utilization of these programmes at 
local level. For instance, one can try Zimbabwe-type public works in which the 
government provides only the casual wage cost and requires the community to mobilize 
its own resources for non-wage expenses.   
(i)   Mid-year Utilization of Funds  
There are problem when one looks at mid-year utilization rates of funds under 
poverty alleviation programmes. This has been done in a study by Rajaraman (2001a and 
2001b). The study focuses on some major schemes of the Ministry of Rural Development 
for the year 2000-2001. The utilization rates of these funds, for most of the schemes, 
were less than 50% of the funds allocated for the first six months. In other words, in the 
first six months, less than 25 per cent of the annual allocation was used. The utilization 
rate of the two major employment schemes (the Employment Assurance Scheme and 
JGSY, the successor of JRY) was 42 per cent (of 50 per cent). This, according to 
Rajaraman, is especially surprising, ￿since the first six months of the fiscal year from 
April encompass the agricultural slack season, when the demand for rural employment 
should be at its peak.￿ (Rajaraman, 2001a: 20). The utilization rates at the end of the year 
are, however, much higher ￿suggesting hasty, wasteful utilization in the second half of 
the fiscal year￿ (ibid: 20). Underutilization of funds seems to be more in the poorer  
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States. ￿A simple regression shows a statistically significant rise in the mean mid-year 
utilization rate of 4 per cent for every increase in the SDP of Rs. 1000 per capita. The 
worse-off states are also less efficient in using JGSY funds￿ (Rajaraman, 2001b). So, 
although these schemes are meant to alleviate poverty, the poor States make less efficient 
use of them than the better-off States. 
Several reasons can be mentioned for explaining this underutilization. First, new 
schemes bring new guidelines and require new procedures. It takes time before State 
governments or local bodies are fully aware of these and are able to fulfill the criteria. 
Second, for some schemes, the central government gives a grant that has to be 
complemented by matching funds from the States. If these matching funds are not 
available, the CSS grant will not be given. Third, there can be a deliberately created or 
unintentional delay in the central bureaucracy, with spillover effects for the next year￿s 
allocation (which is partly based on spending figures of the previous year). Fourth, some 
schemes presuppose the availability of local infrastructure, such as rural primary health 
centers. If this infrastructure does not exist, the schemes make no sense and funds are not 
allocated. Some central schemes are also not relevant in each and every state. Fifth, there 
may be other forms of institutional disability or lack of interest. State governments may 
not be able to produce a well-designed plan (for instance for a rural road) and can 
therefore not receive the money. It may also be that low priority is given by some state 
governments to implement the schemes. This can be the case, for instance, when the 
states are ruled by a party that does not participate in the central (coalition) government. 
It may also be that there is hidden or open opposition. 
4.6  TASK FORCE AND STUDY GROUP ON WAGE EMPLOYMENT 
The Task Force on Employment Opportunities (2001)
52 reviews the special 
employment programmes. The Report says that wage employment programmes can play 
a very useful role in providing supplementary employment to vulnerable sections of the 
                                                 
52 Montek Ahluwalia is the Chairman of the task force.  
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population especially in seasonal lean periods, which are common in agriculture. They 
are also a potentially useful form of a social safety net to deal with situations of 
exceptional distress such as droughts. In the absence of an extensive system of social 
security the use of employment programmes as a form of social security to deal with a 
targeted population has a great deal of merit. According the report, wage employment 
programmes should focus on maximizing the developmental impact in rural areas 
through the creation of durable assets that serve as economic and social infrastructure. 
The Task Force concludes that ￿in a situation where resources are severely constrained 
and there are several other demands on the system our ability to expand the total volume 
of resources devoted to special employment programmes in the years ahead will be 
limited. In these circumstances a large expansion of size of these programmes in future is 
unlikely to take place and is also difficult to justify given the experience thus far￿ 
(p.5.16). 
On the other hand according to the Special Group on Targeting Ten Million 
Employment Opportunities per year (GOI, 2002)
53, of the proposed 50 million job 
opportunities to be generated over the Tenth Plan, nearly 20 million should come from 
specific employment generation programmes and 30 million from growth buoyancy. The 
Study Group says that there is a need to launch specific employment-generating 
programmes in some areas where aggregate growth has little impact. 
4.7   TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN PROPOSALS 
During the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), Swarnajayanti Gram Rojgar 
Yojana (SGRY) would be the single wage-employment programme. The programme 
would seek to provide productive employment opportunities in employment-intensive 
sectors. The government would try to generate a shelf of projects for execution under 
SGRY that fits into the overall development plan of an area. 
 
                                                 
53 S.P.Gupta is the Chairman of the study group.  
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SGRY would have three streams. (i) To address the need of rural infrastructure in 
all the states. (ii) To provide focused attention in areas facing endemic poverty and (iii) 
To respond to natural calamities. 
The wage employment programmes provides only short-term relief to the poor. 
Long-term sustainable poverty reduction in the underdeveloped regions can come about 
only if other sectors of the economy grow rapidly. It is imperative, therefore, to ensure 
that the growth process is inclusive and pro-poor. Agricultural growth still holds the key 
to poverty alleviation in the Indian context. There is considerable scope for increasing 
agricultural productivity through expansion of irrigation, better land and water 
management practices and infrastructure support. The planning of works under the SGRY 
would be undertaken keeping this in mind. Many assets have been created but 
maintenance has been neglected. Therefore, a specific proportion of allocations under 
SGRY would be used for the maintenance of assets. Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) 
would play a major role in the planning, implementation and monitoring of wage 
employment programmes and allocations under the SGRY would be routed through 
them. 
4.8   CONCLUSION 
This chapter shows that India needs public works as one of the mechanisms for 
poverty alleviation. The public works are often criticized, with some justification, for 
creating unproductive (low productive) assets. It is also argued that these programmes 
provide only short-term relief and supplementary income (current benefits) and are not 
useful for long-term benefits
54. It may be noted, however, that they are not meant to 
function as a permanent escape route from poverty. Their main value derives from the 
insurance or stabilization function that they perform with respect to incomes of the poor. 
                                                 
    54 Another valid criticism of public works is that they do not increase the skills of workers. Also, in future, 
skill based workers are going to get much higher wages and the wage employed people continue to get lower 
wages (Dantwala, 1996). The gap between unskilled and skilled would widen further particularly after the 
introduction of economic reforms in the country.  
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Moreover, as mentioned above, the success of a public works programme needs to be 
judged against alternative poverty alleviations programmes. In other words, one has to 
examine whether there are any other programmes that can reach the poor cost effectively 
as compared to public works.  Our analysis in this chapter shows that wage employment 
programmes such as the EGS, JRY and EAS seem to be more pro-poor than programmes 
such as the IRDP (self-employment programmes) and the PDS.   
However, a case can be made for creating productive assets under wage-
employment programmes without diluting the primary objective of poverty alleviation. 
Effective involvement of panchayats, planning of projects at the local level using local 
priorities, involvement of voluntary organizations, the right to information at the 
panchayat level, social mobilization etc. can contribute to the creation of productive 
assets and better maintenance of the created assets. Also, for the effectiveness of the 
programmes, it is important that projects under these schemes are identified in the 
framework of the planned development of an area. 
In the changing context of trade liberalization, public works can also be used to 
promote diversification of agriculture.   
Finally, special wage employment programmes are not a substitute for a sustained 
and broad based growth process. However, in a country like India, which has surplus 
labor and poor infrastructure, public works can be a useful component for providing food 





 5.  INTEGRATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 
AND FOOD SECURITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines two direct food based intervention programs for pre-
school children in India, the Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) operational in 
most parts of the country and the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP) well 
known for its achievement in reducing undernutrition in the south Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu. Such an analysis could provide insights about ￿successes￿ and ￿failures￿ and hence 
would be helpful in any policy reformulation during the phase of economic restructuring. 
This study is based on secondary data and available literature focusing on the decade of 
1990s. The emphasis would be on the three main aspects of any intervention program 
namely: targeting - whether it covers the entire group for whom it has been designed, 
effectiveness -does the program bring about the anticipated results, and efficiency -for a 
unit of money spent per person, how much eventually reaches the individual and the 
benefit-cost ratio of such a program.  
The Integrated Child Development Services target children below the age of six 
years and expectant and nursing mothers across rural and urban areas in India and a 
similar program in rural Tamilnadu in India is assisted by the World Bank. These are 
both direct intervention programs having a food and a non-food component and the 
impacts can be considered short term in nature. Though there have been a large number 
of studies looking at the impact of ICDS and TINP on the nutritional status of children, 
this study proposes to study the impact of such intervention programs during a decade 
when market reforms have been initiated at both the national and sub-national levels. 
Many studies have looked into the potential impact of the reforms on poverty and food 
security in India, but there is little consensus on the issue. However, given the potential 
risk of an adverse impact, the importance for safety nets cannot be ignored. Moreover, 
while the need for such safety-net programs during times of reform may in fact be 
greater, reform measures might also affect the level of social sector expenditure within  
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the country, leaving a smaller amount of resources for such programs. This brings to light 
the need for effective, efficient and well-targeted spending of the scarce resources 
intended to reach the vulnerable sections of society. 
Section 2 looks at the location and trends in nutritional status of children which 
gives an understanding of the magnitude and current status of the problem of 
undernutrition among children in India. Sections 3 and 4 are a discussion of the 
performance of the ICDS and TINP respectively. Section 5 concludes the study.    
 
5.2  LOCATION AND TRENDS IN NUTRITION STATUS AMONG CHILDREN 
IN INDIA 
 
Malnutrition among children can be classified into protein energy-malnutrition 
and micronutrient malnutrition. The former is captured mainly through anthropometric 
measures like weight for age, height for age and weight for height. If the growth indicator 
of the child falls two standard deviations below the reference median on weight for age, 
height for age or weight for height then the child is considered to be underweight, stunted 
or wasted respectively. Each of these measures reflects different aspects of 
undernourishment. Underweight indicates chronic and acute undernutrition, stunting 
indicates chronic undernutrition caused by inadequate nutrition over a long period of time 
and wasting indicates prevalence of acute undernutrition due to seasonal variations in 
food security and recent episodes of illness. The present study uses underweight as the 
indicator of undernutrition as most studies uniformly report this measure and it takes into 
account both chronic and acute undernutrition. Micronutrient undernourishment is 
primarily analyzed by deficiency of iron, vitamin A and iodine but is undertaken in this 
study.  
The information base on nutritional status is inadequate to do a trend analysis 
across states or across income classes or occupational classes particularly based on the 
outcome approach. The data set provided by the National Institute of Nutrition (NIN) is 
the only source that provides information on select states in India for the rural areas. The  
129 
database for input approach is available from the NSS data at regular intervals at the 
household level but intakes of individual members of the household like children or 
women are not given. The NIN does provide information on intakes for individual 
members of the household but its coverage is limited to a few states for the rural areas. 
Given the limited database the following aspects can be summarized on the nutritional 
status of children:
55 
Prevalence rate of moderate plus severe undernourishment is still very high 
ranging from 35 percent to 50 percent and above in many rural areas as shown in Table 
41.  However, severe undernourishment (below 3 standard deviation of the reference 
median) has come down over time in all the states in India in both the rural and urban 
sectors. 
5.2.1  Rural areas show larger percentages of undernourishment than urban areas. 
The relation between level of economic development (indicated by per capita 
growth rate in state domestic product) and nutritional status is very weak. States like 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu where per capita (real) state domestic product has grown 
significantly in the last decade have not shown dramatic improvements in measures of 
nutritional status of children. Nevertheless, the prevalence of under nutrition is lower in 
states with high growth rates of state domestic product (SDP) than in states with low 
growth rates of SDP. Also, in all the states the percentage of undernourished children are 
larger among poorer households even though richer households also show prevalence 
rates ranging from 15 to 30 percent in 1998-99 (Table 41). 
Apart from income, other socio-economic determinants of nutritional status are 
family size, literacy status of the head of the household and mother, and the occupation of 
the head of the household, as shown in Table 41. 
                                                 
55 These observations are summarised based on author￿s own calculations and studies by Ramana et.al 
(1997), NIN reports on nutritional status for select states, World Bank (1999, 2001).  
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Not only does the general standard of living of the household directly affect the 
nutritional status of the children, but it is also found that the percentage of 
undernourished children is higher among households where adults are chronically energy 
deficient. 
Children belonging to the socially disadvantaged groups like the scheduled castes 
and scheduled tribes show a lower nutritional status (Table 42). 
Gender differentials in nutritional status are not apparent.  
Based on the NIN data Kerala and Tamil Nadu reduced the severely malnourished 
by one fourth among children below five years since mid 1970s while most of the other 
states reduced by one half. However, there is a marginal decline in the moderately 
malnourished in all states except Orissa. 
The percentage of normal status for children below five years showed slow 
improvement till 1990 and seems to have picked up in 2000 for all the states covered 
under the NIN database. 
The analysis of the district profile data of DWCD across states indicates that 
severe undernutrition rates are the highest in Bihar (about 25%) followed by Rajasthan 
(about 11%) and the remaining states below 5 percent. 
However when moderate malnutrition magnitudes are compared, states like Bihar, 
Tripura and Rajasthan show a prevalence rate of above 40 percent, with Himachal 
Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab and Manipur in the range of 20-30 percent and the remaining 
states (excluding the southern and eastern states) in the range of 15 to 20 percent. 
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Table 41￿Percentage of Undernourished Children across Place of Residence and 
Standard of Living in India 
 
Place of Residnce  Standard of Living 







@  1992-93 1998-99 1992-93 1998-99 Low Medium High 
             
Andhra  Pradesh  3.6  52.1  40.7  40.2  28.6 48.5 36.5 16.1 
Bihar  2.1  51.8  36.6  37.3  27.3 59.5 52.1 32.7 
Gujarat  4.9  45.8  49.3  40.5  38.1 63.0 46.2 25.9 
Haryana  3.1  39.4  35.6  33.0  31.3 42.8 40.8 23.5 
                
Himachal  Pradesh  5.1  48.3  28.7  30.2  44.8 52.7 46.3 33.1 
Jammu & Kashmir  2.5  na  37.2  42.6  20.7  58.7  34.7  21.1 
Karnataka  5.8  25.5  28.0  24.3  22.4 54.6 45.3 20.0 
Kerala  4.0  30.6  58.4  22.9  44.3 35.8 28.8 19.2 
                
Madhya  Pradesh  2.8  59.4  53.2  50.1  44.1 61.5 58.0 33.6 
Maharashtra  3.5  57.5  55.5  45.5  45.3 60.4 49.5 27.5 
Orissa  2.3  44.7  31.8  38.4  18.6 61.9 48.9 27.8 
Punjab  2.7  47.4  51.9  40.0  46.0 45.9 37.0 19.2 
                
Rajasthan  4.6  41.1  38.3  43.9  33.5 57.6 52.4 37.2 
Tamil  Nadu  5.4  57.3  53.6  32.3  42.6 47.2 35.4 10.3 
Uttar  Pradesh  3.0  na  52.6  Na  31.5 61.5 51.1 34.4 
West  Bengal  5.5  54.2  49.6  39.8  38.4 56.5 44.2 21.4 
All  India  -  59.9  49.6  45.2  38.4 56.9 46.8 26.8 
Standard Deviation  -  10.63  10.26  8.40  9.62  8.55  8.23  7.55 
 
Source:  Deaton and Dreze (2002) for the annual per capita growth rate of SDP; Radhakrishna (2001) for 
1993-94 and various National Family Health Survey Reports for 1998-99 for undernourished 
children. 
Notes:   (1) Undernourished Children are classified based on weight for age below 2 standard deviation 
from the median. 
(2) The data is for the children are below the age of 4 years in 1993-94 and below the age of 3 
years for 1998-99. 
(3) The Standard of Living is calculated based on the asset holding of households and the details 
are in National Family Health Survey: 1998-99 (2001), pp34-35.(4) The standard deviation does 
not include All India values.@ SDP: State Domestic Product. 
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Table 42￿Percentage of Undernourished Children Across Socio-economic 
Variables in 2000 for Rural Areas in Select States 
 
Social groups  Scheduled Caste  Scheduled Tribe  Backward Caste  Others 
  68.6 62.4 58.8 56.4 
MPCI
@  (Rs.)  <300 300-600  600-900 >900 
  64.9 59.2 51.2 43.3 
Occupation 
Landless Agri. 
Labourer  Other labour  Owner Cultivator Others 
  67.9 66.8 70.3 68.4 
Education of head 
of household  No literacy  Read & Write  School Education  College Education 
  65.2 61.7 58.2 17.8 
Family Size  1-4  5-7  8-10  >=10 
  58.8 60.3 61.9 65.1 
 
Source: NIN (2002) 
Note: (1) This covers only the rural areas in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala     
                Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamilnadu and West Bengal. 
          (2) The nutritional status is according to the weight for age standard deviation classification. 
                @ Monthly per capita income. 
 
Clearly the above summary indicates that there are overall improvements in 
prevalence of severe undernutrition among children in the 1990s though large variations 
exist across states as well as across economically and socially disadvantaged groups. It is 
apparent that to reduce undernutrition to the developed country levels would require not 
only socio-economic development but, more importantly direct intervention by the state 
to address this issue in a large scale. There has been state intervention in India since mid 
1970s to address the problem of child undernutrition and the next section analyzes the 
performance of this scheme.   
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5.3 INTEGRATED  CHILD  DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (ICDS) 
5.3.1   About the Program 
ICDS forms a part of the government￿s nutrition direct food based transfer 
program. The integrated package consists of nutrition, health and early child development 
services as the efficacy of one service depends on the complementary support it receives 
from other services. The Scheme was started in 1975-76 on an experimental basis in 33 
blocks. Based on encouraging results, it was decided to expand the coverage of the 
scheme and as on 30.9.99, 4200 Centrally Sponsored ICDS Projects have been 
operational. As on 30.9.99, 370908 Anganwadis were providing supplementary nutrition 
to 25.78 million children and 5.16 million mothers and pre-school education was 
available to 12.69 million children. The VIII Five Year Plan witnessed the massive 
expansion of ICDS Scheme throughout the country. During this period, further 1346 
projects were operationalised bringing the total coverage of 3946 Projects under ICDS 
(General). There was also substantial growth in the number of beneficiaries of 
supplementary nutrition in Centrally Sponsored ICDS Projects from 17.27 million in the 
beginning to 22.11 million at the end of the VIII Five Year Plan. Since the beginning of 
1990 the World Bank started providing credit for some components of the ICDS project 
in a few select states.  
The World Bank assisted ICDS projects are: 
ICDS-I Project which was in operation since 1990 in the States of Orissa and 
Andhra Pradesh, ended on 31
st December, 1997. This Project covered 191 blocks of 
Orissa and 110 blocks of Andhra Pradesh at a total cost of Rs. 3436.8 million. 
ICDS - II Project in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh became operational in September, 
1993 for a period of seven years and will come to an end in September, 2000. This 
Project covers 210 blocks in Bihar and 244 blocks in Madhya Pradesh in predominantly 
tribal and difficult area, in a phased manner. There are 75 and 177 tribal blocks in Bihar 
and Madhya Pradesh respectively. In addition to normal ICDS activities this project  
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provides some additional services which include civil works, strengthening of health 
services and training, community mobilization, communication, women￿s empowerment, 
etc. 
ICDS-III Project has been started in five states of Kerala, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh in March, 1999 after getting clearance from the Govt. of 
India on 26.3.99. The total cost of the Project is Rs. 1000.11 crores for a period of five 
years from 1998-99 to 2003-2004 (excluding country-wide training cost). The Project has 
been divided into two primary components Service Delivery and Programme Support-
which include Service Quality Improvement, Women￿s Empowerment , Staffing and 
Infrastructure Development, Management and Institutional Development, Community 
mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation etc. 
Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring (APER) Project was launched in Andhra 
Pradesh in March 1999 covering a total of 251 blocks for a total period of 5 years from 
1998-99 to 2003-2004. The project components under this Project are nearly the same as 
that of ICDS-III Project. 
The services under ICDS are interlinked with various sectors with the aim of 
providing a lasting benefit on the well being of children and their mothers.  
The services provided by the ICDS in its current form are as follows: 
a)  Supplementary nutrition program (SNP) 
b) Immunization   
c)  Health check-up  
d)  Referral services  
e) Non-formal  pre-school education (PSE)  
f)  Nutrition and health education (NHE).   
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The classification of beneficiaries and their availing of the services as mentioned 
above are given below: 
Children  0-12 months:      (a) to (d)  
  1-3  years    (a)  to  (d) 
  3-6  years    (a)  to  (e) 
Girls   11-18  years    (f) 
Mothers  Expectant and nursing   (a) to (d) 
Women 11-45  years    (f) 
This program is implemented by the department of women and child development 
at the center in coordination with the state governments with the aim of holistic 
development of the child.  The financing of ICDS is both by the government and 
international agencies. The central government bears the operational cost including the 
establishment cost and the health component with support from United Nations 
International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for equipments. The state government finances the 
supplementary food distributed to the beneficiaries and the local transportation, storage, 
fuel and condiment costs. Some states receive food aid from the World Food Program 
(WFP) and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) to meet the 
supplementary food requirements. The Swedish International Development agency 
(SIDA) provided support to over 40 ICDS centers in Tamil Nadu up to 1998. Apart from 
this the World Bank provides training and management in some states for ICDS. 
5.3.2   Targeting 
The number of operational ICDS projects varies substantially across the states and 
looking at the state level figures may not give a clear picture whether within a state they 
are appropriately distributed across the economically backward regions. A survey study 
in mid 1980s showed that there was a clear shortfall in the regions where they were 
required the most and there was a certain gap between the allotted and operational  
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projects. At the same time even within the project regions not all eligible beneficiaries 
were enrolled.   
The identification of child beneficiaries is based on their nutritional and socio-
economic status. Special attention is supposed to be given to children with very low 
levels of nutritional status. Targeting also takes place area wise and for vulnerable 
sections of the populations. In the former case emphasis is given to relatively backward 
areas with large number of poor people, tribal areas and drought prone areas and in the 
latter case children belonging to households of landless agricultural laborers, marginal 
farmers or households whose monthly income is below a certain amount (in 1984, this 
was taken as Rs. 500 per month) are considered.
56 The coverage of beneficiaries could be 
classified according to project location: rural, urban and tribal. In 1995-96 the rural 
projects constituted about 81 percent, tribal 13 percent and urban 6 percent. Consequently 
the number of beneficiaries has also grown over time with different rates for different 
groups.  
Among the various services provided by ICDS, the children in SNP has grown at 
a faster rate and is the largest among the beneficiaries. This is followed by the children, 
attending the PSE who numbered about 3.7 million in 1992. The number of mothers 
attending SNP has grown at a rather slow pace, from about 0.5 million in 1981 to about 
2.7 million in 1992. If a comparison of the coverage of child beneficiaries is made 
between 1981 and 1992, it is observed that increases have mainly taken place in tribal 
areas with the rural and urban areas showing a marginal improvement. Further, it is noted 
that the beneficiaries mainly belong to the lower income groups and vulnerable groups. In 
1999 the coverage under SNP of children and mothers was only about 40 percent in 
rural/urban areas and 75 percent in tribal areas. For PSE the coverage was 50 percent in 
rural/urban areas and 75 percent in tribal areas.
57 
 
                                                 
56 In 1992 also the same income criteria was being used without an attempt to convert it to real terms.  
57 These are as reported in NIPCCD (1992).  
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The National Sample Survey data collects information on food intakes and 
expenditures across households for a large number of disaggregated commodities and is 
available at unit record once in five years since mid 1980s. This data also provides 
information on the number of meals taken outside the house out which one of the 
components is the meal taken in school. The data indicates hardly any positive numbers 
for households in many of the states across all expenditure classes in both rural and urban 
areas. The average number of meals per household was about three for all India rural in 
1993-94, which increased to four in 1999-2000 for the poorest per capita expenditure 
class. The states with positive numbers are in Gujarat, Kerala and Tamil Nadu in 1993-94 
increasing to a larger number in the 1999-2000 survey (mainly in the rural areas) with the 
exception of Bihar, Haryana, Himchal Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. 
Tamil Nadu figures are the highest at about 25 meals for 1993-94 and 21 for 1999-200 in 
rural areas but this would include children up to the age of fifteen as the state also 
provides noon meals scheme at the school level. Thus large-scale survey data like NSS 
shows near absence of beneficiaries across rural and urban areas indicating a rather poor 
targeting. However this aspect needs to be explored further particularly when the scheme 
is being universalized in the X Plan (of the central government) period.   
5.3.3  Impact of ICDS 
The impact of ICDS has usually been studied based on the health outcomes from 
the different services provided. There is virtually no evidence of the impact of ICDS on 
the impact on household food security and poverty and one can perhaps infer about 
positive improvements in these two aspects based on the assumption that one of the 
reasons for improved health status is quantitative and qualitative improvement in food 
intakes. Further, the improved health status improves productive efficiency of an 
individual thereby bringing more income to a household and hence alleviating the 
poverty status of the household.  
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Based on the outcome indicators, there seems to have been a definitive 
improvement in infant mortality, nutritional status, morbidity pattern, immunization 
coverage and utilization of health services once ICDS was introduced. The PSE of 
children in ICDS areas has had an impact on enrollment and scholastic performance in 
the later years with better language, cognitive and conceptual skills compared to children 
from non-ICDS areas. Apart from SNP the other services under nutrition component are 
NHE and prophylaxis against nutritional anemia and vitamin A deficiency. It is 
understood that the NHE component of the program for women and mothers has had a 
significant impact on their awareness about their personal and child￿s nutritional needs. 
The present study focuses only on the impact of the nutrition services as it is directly 
linked to household food security with the focus on improving intra-household 
distribution.  
5.3.4 Supplementary  Nutrition
58 
Supplementary nutrition is a major component of the program in terms of 
importance and cost. All the beneficiaries who attend the anganwadi center are given the 
feed. The children in the 3-6 years attend the pre-school and have the lunch provided by 
the center whereas the expectant and nursing women and children in the 0-2 years age 
group come to center for their supplementary feed. In some sense self-targeting takes 
place with regard to supplementary feeding as richer households usually do not prefer to 
eat this food, however children from these households may attend the pre-school. The 
food to the children is provided either as ready to eat food or hot cooked meals or 
sometimes dry ration. The effectiveness in terms of impact has been the maximum for 
cooked meals as in the other two cases there is tendency for the food being shared by 
other members of the household. The nutrition supplement is supposed to be provided for 
300 days in a year; however, there is a significant variation across the states in the 
                                                 
58 This section summarises the findings from Subbarao (1989), NIPCCD (1992), Ramana et. al. (1997), 
World Bank (1998a 1998b and 2001).  
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number of days. Tamil Nadu is the only state, which shows the target days being 
achieved whereas states like Bihar are at the lower end (Shariff, 2002).  
Low birth weight (LBW) is the one of the main causes of infant mortality and 
high morbidity rates and is the first step leading towards an undernourished child (among 
the survived children). One of the ways to improve low birth weight is to improve the 
nutritional and health status of the expectant mothers and the SNP feeding to expectant 
mothers under ICDS seems to have a definitive impact in improving LBW. Table 43 
shows that there is definitely a positive difference between the ICDS and non-ICDS with 
larger impact in the tribal areas. However, if the absolute percentages within the ICDS 
areas are compared only about 60 percent of children are 2.5 kgs and above at birth and 
there is still a large gap in achieving the best results. What is starker is the percentage of 
the mothers who know the birth weight of their child in both ICDS and non-ICDS areas. 
Even within the ICDS areas there does not seem to have been adequate knowledge and 
facilities to document the birth weights as is seen from the large proportion of women 
who either did not know or failed to recall the weights. However, the presence of ICDS 
project does have a small impact in creating the awareness as noted in the higher 
percentage compared to non-ICDS area. 
The target age group of children in ICDS is below the age of 6 years; the 0-3 year 
children are brought to the feeding center by the mother for their ready to eat laddu 
preparation and the 3-6 age old children obtain food at the pre-school center. The 
NIPCCD evaluation finds a large proportion of children below normal nutritional status 
along with the fact that average weight was below the normal weight for different age 
groups in the ICDS areas. 
Studies indicate that the targeting of the 0-3 year olds is usually poor for two 
reasons: (a) irregularity in obtaining the quota (due to dependence on an adult for coming 
to the center) and (b) possibility of sharing the food with other members of the household 
or not completing the entire meal as they are not under the surveillance of the ICDS 
worker once they get back home. The NIPCCD evaluation showed lower mean weight 
for age and also higher proportion of children below the required standard compared to  
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the 3-6 year olds even in the ICDS areas. Table 43 shows that between ICDS and non-
ICDS areas severe malnutrition status (reflected by grade III & IV) is not very different 
in both the age groups as well as across the locations. However, in the 0-3 years age 
group the urban area had smaller (larger) proportion of children with normal (grades I & 
II) nutritional status than in non-ICDS areas. 
 
Table 43￿Difference between ICDS and Non-ICDS areas in select indicators 
 
 Rural  Tribal  Urban  All 
Low Birth Weight 
  -26 -38 -20 -15 
Mothers who knew birth weights (%) 
ICDS  24 19 30 24 
Non-ICDS  18 9  27 17 
Weight for Age 
0-3 years 
Gr  I  1 -1  6 1 
Gr  II  -2  3 7 2 
Gr III & IV  3  1  1  2 
Normal  -2 -3 -14  -5 
3-6 years 
Gr  I  1 -1  7 2 
Gr  II  1 4 7 4 
Gr III & IV  3  1  -2  2 
Normal  -5 -4 -12  -8 
 
Source: NIPCCD (1992). 
 
The NIPCCD study looks at the impact based only on ICDS and non-ICDS areas 
however there could be significant differences within ICDS areas between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries. A better understanding of the performance would be to look at the 
improvements within ICDS areas over the period of time as many of these outcomes take 
effect after a longer time and also knowledge dissemination about nutritional  
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requirements etc. takes time. Ramana et al. (1997) analyze the results from the district 
profile survey (again for select states only) for the period 1988 to 1996 to get an 
understanding of the trend within ICDS areas.
59. The main findings are: severe 
malnutrition level which was below 5 percent in the beginning of the survey period came 
down to nearly nil levels at the rate of 0.34 percent per year. The total (moderate plus 
severe) malnutrition levels showed a fall of about 0.69 percent per year. This analysis is 
mainly based on the northern and North-eastern states. Another study indicates that 
between 1975-79 and 1988-90, the contribution of ICDS to the decline in the percentage 
of severely malnourished is about 8% and notes that in the absence of ICDS, it would 
have still declined by 5.8 percentage points.
60 
There clearly seems to be lack of enough evidence to highlight the achievements 
of ICDS and whatever little data there is indicates only a marginal improvement since the 
introduction of the program in the mid 1970s.  
5.3.5 Other  Services 
Apart from supplementary nutrition, regular health check-ups, growth monitoring, 
immunization and education for the pre-school children are the other components of the 
ICDS package. Several government departments and voluntary organizations provide 
many of these services but there is a definitive difference in its utilization between ICDS 
and non-ICDS areas according to the NIPCCD study. The difference was large in the 
education component compared to the health check-up and immunization component. 
However, even within the ICDS areas utilization of services by the expectant and nursing 
mothers was less than 50 percent (except in the case of pre-school education for 3-6 years 
which was about 56 percent) showing that accessibility and higher awareness due to the 
presence of ICDS did not make a significant impact. The tribal areas showed a larger 
utilization rate compared to the rural and urban areas. The community participation in 
                                                 
59 This survey covered 131 districts in the states of Haryana, Punjab, Bihar, Rajasthan, Manipur, Sikkim, 
Mozoram, Meghalaya, Tripura, Goa, Daman and Diu and was conducted by the department of woman and 
child development of the central government. 
60 This is reported in Radhakrishna (2000).  
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rendering services to ICDS was only about 8 percent, which was higher in the tribal 
areas. 
5.3.6  Investment and Efficiency 
There are very limited studies that look into the cost effectiveness of investment 
in ICDS. The possible reasons for absence of cost-benefit studies could be lack of 
adequate information on costs as well as impacts. Before the results from these studies 
are summarized an analysis of the public expenditure by the central and state government 
is considered. The expenditure by the government on nutrition indicates a commitment 
towards providing social security to the poor through schemes that have a nutrition 
component. 
5.3.7  Trends in Government Expenditure on Nutrition and Malnutrition Reduction  
In 1997-98 the entire food based transfer program accounted for about 0.9 percent 
of the GDP. Out of this 97 percent was the government￿s share and remaining by the 
international aid agencies. The direct nutrition interventions (ICDS Program and various 
other supplementary feeding programs like Balwadi Nutrition Program, Day Care Center 
Scheme, Iron and Vitamin A supplementation) accounted for 19% while the value of 
food grains transferred through employment programs was at 0.4%.
61 Among the direct 
intervention programs ICDS has the largest share in which the supplementary nutrition 
program accounts for two-thirds of the cost. The ICDS scheme is managed by the 
department of woman and child development of the government of India and the 
expenditure on this component accounts for more than 80 percent of the entire 
expenditure by this department. The expenditure (in constant 1993-94 prices) for ICDS 
was about 2 crores in 1988-89, which increased three fold to about 6 crores by 1997-98 
indicating the emphasis on this project by the government since the VIII Plan period.  
 
                                                 
61 These figures are form World Bank (2001).  
143 
As the central government bears mainly the operational cost and a small 
proportion of the food cost the state level expenditure on nutrition indicates the amount 
spent on supplementary feeding for ICDS. There are however states like Gujarat, Orissa 
and Tamilnadu where the mid-day-meal schemes are in operation for the school going 
children up to the age of 15 years and the nutrition expenditures is higher for these states. 
The studies that have analyzed social security expenditures in India during the 
1990s indicate that the expenditure on nutrition constitutes less than 10 percent (of total 
revenue expenditure) in all the states except Tamil Nadu with about 18 percent share 
during the period 1991-95. Though the expenditure on nutrition includes other schemes 
of individual states apart from the ICDS, the expenditure on supplementary nutrition 
component of ICDS forms a major share in all the states.
62   
The rate of growth in real expenditure on nutrition dipped towards mid 1990s 
across the states but after 1994 posted a 10 percent average growth rate across states. 
Tamil Nadu posted the highest annual growth rate (37%) in nutrition expenditures in real 
terms (1997/98 prices) during this period. Table 44 shows the share of nutrition 
expenditure as percent of total revenue expenditure across states for select years since 
1970s. No definitive picture emerges regarding the trend except for Tamil Nadu has 
consistently increased its share from 0.3% to about 4% in 1991. However, since 1990 
there is a clear decline for all the states except Andhra Pradesh. The state of Tamil Nadu 
still spent a larger share of about 2.5 to 3 percent in the entire decade of 1990s. In Andhra 
Pradesh the average share increased to about 6.5 percent in 1995-99 from 0.27 percent in 
1991-95 and then declined to 4.1 percent in 1999-2002. No clear reason merges from the 
studies for this pattern in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
                                                 
62 At the central level this constitutes more than 90 percent after 1997 (World Bank, 2001).  
144 
Table 44￿Select Indicators on Nutrition Expenditure Across States 
 
 
Ratio of Nutrition Expenditure to 
Total Revenue Expenditure
1 (%) 








 1990-91  1991-95 1995-99 1999-02 1991-95 1995-00 1997-98 
Andhra  Pradesh  0.3 0.3 6.5 4.1  67.6  2.8  62.9 
Bihar  0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2  58.9  92.6  43.4 
Gujarat  1.4 1.7 1.3 0.9  100.0  100.0  91.1 
Haryana  0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3  45.6  37.0  99.0 
          
Himachal Pradesh  na  0.2  0.2  0.2  77.3  69.8  100.0 
Jammu and Kashmir  na  0.1  0.0  0.0  33.3  37.3  88.4 
Karnataka  1.6 0.8 0.7 0.6  29.7  45.6  100.1 
Kerala  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0  24.8  12.8  86.7 
          
Madhya  Pradesh  0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5  39.6  37.6  17.8 
Maharashtra  0.6 0.6 1.0 0.4  62.9  76.4  84.6 
Orissa  0.7 0.6 1.5 0.7  55.7  82.9  70.5 
Punjab 0.0  na  Na  na  Na  Na  98.0 
          
Rajasthan  0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6  75.0  96.0  55.6 
Tamil  Nadu  4.0 3.3 2.9 2.6  36.7  37.3  116.4 
Uttar Pradesh  0.0  na  Na  na  Na  Na  15.1 
West  Bengal  0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3  53.6  73.6  48.1 
 
Source:  Colum 1 and 2 databank of National Institute of Public Finance, Delhi. 
Column 3 Annual plan expenditure annexure 6.5 from planning commission document, 
http://planningcommission.nic.in. 
 
The plan and non-plan components of nutrition expenditures indicate the new 
investments and recurring expenditures respectively and a comparison of the two could 
indicate any possible expansions in the nutrition schemes at the state level. Some states 
like Bihar show only plan expenditures during the entire decade. In Andhra Pradesh for 
the pre-1995 period the plan component was in the range of 60-70 percent but after 1995 
this changed dramatically and reduced to about 3-4 percent with the non-plan taking up 
the major share. The other state with a large shift is Rajasthan while most of the 
remaining states show a marginal increase/decrease or constancy in the plan/non-plan 
shares.   
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An important aspect noted in the mid term appraisal of the 9
th Plan of government 
of India is the effective utilization of funds allocated to the social sectors schemes. It is 
observed that the amount allocated in the plans is usually underutilized by the state as 
well as the central government as only a proportion of the amount allocated under the 
planned heading is actually expended. The reason for this could be that resources are not 
available when expenditures have to be made and perhaps indicates a lack of priority by 
the governments to find resources to finance the schemes under this head.  
Given that a lower amount is spent than allocated it would be informative to know 
how much of the amount spent is productive. As the share of nutrition expenditure is a 
very small component in the social expenditure as well as total expenditure (even smaller 
as a proportion of domestic product) except in Tamil Nadu, one may expect only a weak 
correlation between this expenditure and child (and adult) malnutrition status. Firstly no 
clear trend emerges as to the outlay and nutritional status of children across the states. 
Richer states like Gujarat and Maharshtra have lower expenditures as a proportion of 
total expenditures but the number of undernourished children is very large. Tamilnadu 
spends a substantial amount of its total expenditure on nutrition has lower level of 
malnutrition and Andhra Pradesh which has substantially increased proportion of 
nutrition expenditure over the years is showing reductions in malnutrition levels. The 
states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which have higher numbers of percentages of 
children malnourished, have not altered their priorities.  
Studies have shown that instead of universal targeting of the nutrition schemes if 
targeting is done either for children in poorer households or malnourished children then 
perhaps the expenditure could be more effective. Though the ICDS has been in operation 
for more than two decades there are very few studies that conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
of it. Only recently some evidence has been provided towards this extent.  
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5.3.8  Benefit cost ratios and cost effectiveness 
The costs in a program like ICDS mainly includes wages of the workers, cost of 
food, health and education services. The quantification of benefits is more difficult as 
improvement in undernutrition is not just improvements in physical growth but also 
improvements in cognitive abilities in the school going age, having tremendous impact 
on earnings and productivity as an adult.
63  In other words, a program like ICDS could 
have long term economic and non-economic benefits due to a qualitatively better labor 
force with lower absenteeism and increased innovation in individual tasks arising from a 
healthier individual and reductions in human costs of mortality and illness with reduced 
costs of health care. 
The benefit cost ratio estimated varied from Rs.2.3 to Rs.26.4 depending on 
various assumptions about program efficiency and productivity loss (combination of 
three parameters: productive life expectancy, average annual wage rate for an adult and 
average rate of employment) for different nutritional deficiency disorders.
64 The highest 
benefit cost ratio was for protein energy malnutrition programs followed by the iodine 
deficiency and anemia programs. Since the benefits are difficult to capture in such 
programs the alternative approach is to look at the cost effectiveness of the program. 
With the focus on provision of supplementary nutrition in ICDS it is estimated that in 
order to transfer Re.1 worth of food to the beneficiary it costs about Rs. 1.22. A 
comparison with the indirect food transfer program namely the public distribution system 
in the country ICDS cost about 80 percent less to transfer 100kcal of nutrition to a 
beneficiary. This effectiveness would improve further if leakages are plugged and 
targeting is towards needy children as mentioned in the previous section. 
The experience of other nations on malnutrition reduction programs indicates that 
the most cost effective interventions are related to micronutrient programs where the cost 
per unit is less and effects are dramatic followed by (well-designed) education programs 
                                                 
63 The cost-effectiveness of investments in various nutrition programs around the world is discussed in 
Horton (1999). 
64 These results are from Ramana et. al (1997).  
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for changing behavior. The next cost-effective programs are the feeding programs, 
provided they are highly targeted and are supplemented with nutrition and health 
education. Thus there is clearly a need for restructuring the existing ICDS for better 
impacts given limited resources learning from experiences of other countries particularly 
China and Thailand. Within India TINP in rural Tamil Nadu has been successful in its 
impact and targeting and a brief discussion on its performance is useful in understanding 
the role of management and political will required for effective functioning of such 
programs.  
5.4  NUTRITION SECURITY FOR PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN IN TAMILNADU
65 
5.4.1  About the Nutrition Program 
Tamilnadu has a history of feeding programs for children dating back to the mid-
1950s with as many as 25 nutrition programs in operation in the early 1980s. These 
schemes were mainly to combat hunger and the focus was not so much on the nutritional 
aspect. The main beneficiaries of these feeding programs have been the children and later 
on old age pensioners and pregnant and nursing mothers were added. Since the beginning 
of 1980 the government reorganized its nutrition programs and they were combined into 
the three feeding programs- Puratchi Talaivar M.G.R.Nutritious Meal Program (PT MGR 
NMP), Tamilnadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP) and the ICDS. These schemes 
have a food and a non-food component to improve the nutritional status of the 
beneficiaries. The food component consists of providing either supplementary food in the 
nutrition or welfare centers or noon meals in the school. The non-food component 
includes periodic growth monitoring, pre-school education and health-care, 
immunization, nutrition and health education and post-natal care for mothers. The 
schemes vary in terms of beneficiaries, geographic coverage and its component.  
 
                                                 
65 This section draws heavily from Reddy et.al (1992), World Bank (1994), NIN (2001) and Rajivan (2001) 
and Horton (1999).  
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Table 45 shows the different schemes that have been in operation in Tamilnadu 
since the 1980s. The standard ICDS in Tamilnadu was introduced in the year 1975 when 
the scheme was initiated by the central government. To begin with, three projects were 
launched at three places on an experimental basis, which have now been expanded to 113 
projects covering 67 projects in rural areas, 44 projects in urban areas and 2 projects in 
tribal areas. Each project covers 60 to 130 (Anganwadi) Centres with each such Centre 
covers about 1000 - 1500 population. 
The main objective of the PT MGR NMP scheme (which is a mid-day feeding 
program) is to provide adequate nutrition to economically disadvantaged children; to 
improve the health and nutritional status of children; to develop their mental and physical 
ability and to increase the enrolment in schools and reduce dropouts. This scheme is now 
a combination of ￿hunger-health-nutrition￿ effort and also includes social security for the 
old, destitute and widowed. The school going children eat at the school and the other 
beneficiaries eat at the pre-school centers. The food provided consists of hot cooked rice 
along with vegetable supplements. Since 1999-2000 all child welfare centers (CWCs) 
except 718 Municipal centers have been brought under the standard Integrated Child 
Development Services Scheme and World Bank Assisted Integrated Child Development 
Services Scheme - III. The details of the current status of the program are in Table 46. 
The success story of two important nutrition programs the Tamilnadu Integrated 
Nutritious Meal Program (TINP) I and II in reducing severe malnutrition in the state has 
been the focus of many studies.
66 Apart from this the other main contributions were the 
creation of a well-functioning health system at the grass roots level to supplement the 
nutrition component and a training and communication center to serve the workers and 
functionaries across the state. 
 
 
                                                 
66 The WB ICDS III is the ongoing program and is an extension of the TINPs. There are no reports as yet 
evaluating program whose project term is nearing completion.    
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Table 45￿Various Nutrition Schemes in Tamilnadu 
 
Sl.  No.  Scheme  Beneficiaries  Services Provided  Year of 
Starting or 
Duration 





Children in the age 
group of 0 to six 
years and pregnant 
and nursing women 
Supplementary nutrition, 
pre-school education, health 
check up, immunization, 




2  Children in the age 
group of 2+ to 4+ 
Nutrition, education and 
health care 
1982 
  Children in the age 
group of 5+ to 9+ 
Nutrition and education  1982 
  Old age pensioners, 
ex-servicemen 
Nutrition 1983 
  School students in 
the age group of 10 
to 15 years 









Pregnant Women  Nutrition  1995 





Children below 3 
years 
Selective supplementary 
nutrition, growth promotion 
for child below 3 years and 
educating the family and 
the mother on feeding 
practices 
1981-1989 




Children below 3 
years, children 3-5+ 
years and pregnant 
and nursing 
mothers 




education for preschool 
children (3-6 years) 
1991-1997 
5  WB-ICDSIII  Children below 3 
years, children 3-6 
years, pregnant and 
nursing mothers, 
adolescent girls  
As in TINP-II plus nutrition 
and health education, health 
services by health 
personnel, referral services 
and training to adolescent 
girls for self development 
and skill formation 
1998-2003 







in class I to V 
Cooked food equivalent to 






Table 46￿Direct Nutrition Coverage in Tamil Nadu, 2002-2003 
 










Child Welfare Centers 
1  ICDS (General)  10420  
 




(WB ICDS  III)  
19500  
  
787247 293334   
 
1080581  




30096   3105  
  
33201  
Total   30638   1257393   401025   1658418 
School Nutritious Meal Centers 
1   PTMGRNMP    
(Rural)  
38925   6015252   Nil   6015252   
2 PTMGRNMP 
(Urban)  
2087   476410   Nil   476410   
Total  41012   6491662      6491662 
Total (All Centers)  71650  7749055  401025   8150080 
 
Source: Government of Tamilnadu (2002a). 
 
The state-level schemes have been sponsored primarily by the state governments, 
with substantial assistance from foreign donor agencies like Swedish International 
Development Assistance (SIDA), the World Bank (International Development 
Assistance-IDA) and Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) from 
time to time. Unlike the other nutrition schemes in Tamil Nadu, the general ICDS is a 
centrally sponsored scheme and all expenses (including salaries of State, District and 
Project Level functionaries) except the expenditure on weaning food are reimbursed by 
the Government of India.   
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A recent district level data on the prevalence of undernutrition shows much lower 
prevalence rates compared to the ICDS data as shown in Table 47. The percentage of 
normal and mildly undernourished children in the age-group 0-3 years varies from 85% 
to about 98% with some states showing very similar rates. The rank correlation between 
1996 (during TINP II period) and 2001 (during WB ICDS III) is about 0.65. Though 
there seems to be some link between economic and social development and nutritional 
impact the rank correlation between prevalence rates 2001 and (a) Gross District 
Domestic Product (GDDP) (b) percentage of agriculture in GDDP (c) and female literacy 
rates are 0.37, 0.31 and 0.30 respectively. The inference that can perhaps be drawn from 
these low correlation values is that the program is effective irrespective of the socio-
economic indicators. Since a lot has been written and analyzed about the TINP the 
present study summarizes the main findings in the following section. 
 
How different is TINP? 
 
•  The percentage of expenditure on nutrition in total revenue expenditure is highest in 
TN. 
•  Reduction in severe malnutrition among 6-60 months old children in 5 years during 
TINP-I. 
•  TINP-II showed systematic improvements in severe and moderate malnutrition 
reductions with increase in normal and mild malnourished categories for the 
children and reductions in low birth weights.  
•  Regular growth monitoring and selective feeding based on this information were 
identified as the main causes of success. 
•  Immunization of children and mothers was regular with (universal) coverage of 
90% and massive doses of micronutrient supplementation like Vitamin A, iron and 
folic acids with a coverage rate varying from 35 to 60 percent. 
•  Better targeting of the schemes due to decentralization.  
•  Better management of the schemes leading to low level of leakage.   
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•  Good coordination with health services in the later stages of the program. 
•  The nutrition centers in rural areas had two workers, one looking after the needs of 
the 0-3 year olds and the other to take care of pres-school education and nutrition of 
the 3-6 year olds. This resulted in good impacts for both the age groups unlike the 
experience in ICDS areas, which favored the 3-6 year olds. 
•  Calorie-protein content of the food supplement is clearly stated with regular 
surveillance of the quality. Few deviations form quality had been observed. 
•  Some success seems to have been achieved in changing permanent nutritional 
behavior. 
•  Institutional sustainability is apparent as the program is now being completely 
managed by the staff as the World Bank input has come to an end. 
•  Strong political commitment to implement and improve the nutrition schemes. 
•  A recent policy note by the state government indicates a plan for (a) making the 
state malnutrition free along the United Nations advocated approach of ￿nutrition 
throughout the life-cycle￿ (b) change in focus of the programs from management to 
prevention of malnutrition (c) convergence of health and nutrition services under 
one department (d) focusing on nutrition and education of the adolescent girls and 
(e) economic empowerment of women. 
Though Tamilnadu has been leading in nutrition expenditures as a percentage of 
total revenue expenditure and is among the leading states on per capita social security 
expenditure there is declining trend in the 1990s towards 2000-01. As in ICDS there are 
very few studies analyzing the cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit of the successful 
nutrition programmes in Tamilnadu. However indications are that as supplementary 
nutrition was selective and the food cost having the largest share in the total cost of the 
project there was a definitive reduction in project cost resulting in sustainability of the 
project. It is found that the unit cost of TINP was about US$9-12 per year per child and is 
among one of the cost effective programs around the world. At the same time the ratio of 
mobilizers to children was 1: 300 and is considered to be good enough to achieve 
sustainable impacts as not only effective investment but also a required level of effort is  
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required in achieving the desired result. As in any other nutrition program the impacts 
have been studied only on the basis of growth monitoring and other impacts of better 
nutritional and health status like school achievement, improved living conditions and job 
opportunities have not been ascertained. 
 
Table 47￿Nutritional Status of 0-36 month old Children and Rankings for Select 
economic and social indicators by districts in Tamil Nadu 
 
Rankings Based on 




















1  1996 2001  1998-99  1998-99  2001 
Coimbatore 96.6  1  2  1  4 4 
Cuddalore 90.5  19  14  13 15  10 
Dharmapuri 90.5  11  14  4  17  14 
Dindigul 94.1  5  7  9  12   
Erode 95.4  8  4  5  5  12 
Kanniyakumari 97.8  1  1  16  6  1 
Madurai 94.3  4  6  6  16  4 
Nagapattinam 87.7  16  16 17  8  5 
Ramanathapuram 90.6  10 13  18  9  8 
Salem 95.6  12  3  3  3  12 
Sivagangai 93.1  13  9  19 11  9 
Thanjavur 91.1  15  11  14 14  6 
Tiruchirapalli 93.0  14  10 15  2  11 
Tirunelveli 91.1  6  11  7  13  5 
Tiruvannamalai 89.6 7  15  8  7  3 
Toothukudi 94.5  2  5  10  18  2 
Vellore 94.0  3  8  2  1  8 
Villupuram 86.0  14  17  12  10  13 
Virudhunagar 90.7  9  12 11  19  7 
 
Sources: (1) Government of Tamilnadu (2002b) Table 27.8. 
               (2) Based on Rajivan (2001) for 1996 and author￿s own calculation based on 2001 rates. 





About 50 percent of children below three years are undernourished in rural India 
and about 38 percent in urban India. In several large states, over 40-50% of adults suffer 
from chronic energy deficiency. The results of the NSSO 1999-2000 quinquennial 
consumer expenditure survey, used to roughly approximate nutritional intake, suggest 
that the poorest 20% of the rural population consumed on average 1,700 calories or less 
per day, in contrast to the average RDA of 2400 calories. The poorest 20% of the urban 
population consumed on average 1650, calories per day or less, compared to the average 
RDA of 2,100 calories. All this clearly shows the need to improve the nutrition status of 
the population in India suffering from undernutrition and persistent hunger as well as 
others who are at the risk of being so in the near future.  
There are a large number of studies showing that complex set of factors determine 
hunger and malnutrition. Not only household food insecurity but also a cleaner 
environment, people￿s knowledge and behavior influence the nutritional status. Policies 
can influence all causes to help improve the nutritional status of the households. In India, 
the central and state governments, implement several food based transfer programs to 
alleviate household undernutrition - the Targeted Public Distribution System, food for 
work programs, mid-day school feeding program, and nutrition programs that include 
food supplementation, such as the Integrated Child Development Services Program, 
Balwadi Nutrition Program, and Day Care Center Scheme.  
The present study has looked at the performance of the Integrated Child 
Development Service focusing mainly on the decade of 1990s along with a discussion of 
trends in nutrition expenditure as a proportion of revenue expenditure and the nutritional 
status of pre-school children. The nutrition expenditure by the states mainly consists of 
expenditure on food supplementation for the ICDS program except in few states where 
mid-day meal for school children is also provided. At the national and sub-national levels 
there is a decline in allocations in terms of share of revenue expenditure to nutrition  
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expenditure. Despite this decline Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh showed higher values. 
A comparison of the nutritional status of children, one in the early part and one in the 
later of the decade, show significant improvements at the all India level as the states. 
However what emerges is that there is no clear link between nutrition expenditure in the 
state or the economic growth of the state. 
The recent evaluation studies of the ICDS has shown improving trends in child 
nutritional status in the project areas. The studies found a reduction in severe 
undernutrition but minimal impact in reducing moderate undernutrition. The projects also 
contributed to a reduction in the infant mortality rate and the incidence of low birth 
weights. Most noteworthy among these is the national evaluation which found that the 
nutritional status of children in ICDS areas were only slightly better than in non-ICDS 
areas. The percentage of severely malnourished children under-three in ICDS areas is 
lower by 1.8 percentage points than the non-ICDS areas, and for children 3-6 years old, 
by 1.5 percentage points. The percentage of moderately malnourished children in ICDS 
areas is 2.5 and 3.4 percentage points lower than in the non-ICDS areas for the two 
subgroups. The two major limitations of this study are that it does not address the issue of 
the cost-effectiveness of the programs and that it does not provide regional disaggregates. 
In contrast to the rather unsatisfactory impact of the scheme like ICDS, the TINP stands 
apart in its impact. The good progress in reducing severe malnutrition without any fear of 
the reversal of impacts is the achievement of this program. The important lessons are 
effective management of the scheme with little leakages, education of the mother and 
adolescent girls about good nutrition and health practices, and increasing participation by 
the community as well as the involvement of the government machinery in sustaining the 
project at a high level of efficiency. However, the question of sustainability in terms of 
the cost of the program and its contribution in reducing moderate and mild undernutrition 
is yet to be answered. 
There is an increasing concern towards improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of these programs provided by the state and three major factors can be attributed towards 
this concern. First, despite the fact that many of these programs have been in existence  
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for nearly a decade or more and that the government spends considerable resources on 
these transfer programs, the impact seems to be limited as is observed from the 
persistence of large number of undernourished adults and children. Second, there is 
apprehension over the impact of the market oriented economic reforms that were set in 
motion in 1991 on the poor. Therefore not only is the state expected to provide social 
safety nets to guard against potential adverse impacts on the poor, but it must also ensure 
that there is improved targeting and cost efficiency of the programs, as it may well be the 
case that budgetary allocations for social expenditure during times of reform are reduced. 
A final remark is that this study finds the need to improve the database on the 
nutrition programs being implemented by the government. There is a provision for 
management information system (MIS) for all the ICDS blocks that is supposed to keep 
track of bottlenecks in the program and maintain regular records of the nutritional status, 
immunization rates, and participation rates. However, data is not very easily available for 
analysis. More importantly this database does not include relevant information about the 
socio-economic status of the households to identify and track the beneficiaries and 
vulnerable groups. By maintaining an updated database it would be possible to (1) track 
the status of the beneficiaries after they leave the program (2) to identify the vulnerable 
groups who could be affected by reforms so that they may be better targeted. The study 
also finds that most evaluations in the past have focused on analyzing the impact based 
on anthropometric indicators. There is considerable scope to fine-tune the research 
further by including aspects such as the status of cognitive development, school 
achievement or poverty status of the household. Information on these aspects will go a 
long way in convincing (a) the policy makers about the need for such programs and (b) 
the participants about the positive impacts so that there is better community participation, 
which will enable more effective outcomes.  
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6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although there is little consensus on the impact of trade liberalization on poverty 
and food security, it is nevertheless acknowledged that there is a need to guard against 
any potentially harmful effects on the poor and vulnerable sections of society. Against 
this background, government programs aimed at food security and poverty alleviation 
gain increased importance in the reform era. This study aims to evaluate several such 
programs that are currently in place in the country from the point of view of their impact, 
efficiency and financial sustainability. The purpose is to determine the weaknesses in the 
system and propose policy options for reform, keeping in mind possible challenges of the 
future. 
Specifically, the study examines the changing consumption patterns in India for 
various expenditure classes and in the rural and urban areas. Against this understanding 
of the consumption patterns, the study evaluates the various government programs in 
operation that aim to provide subsidized food to the poor and needy sections of the 
population.  In particular, the PDS, public works programs, and certain food-based direct 
intervention programs such as the ICDS and TINP are studied with a view to suggest how 
they can be improved in terms of cost effectiveness, impact on the targeted population 
and financial sustainability. This chapter puts together the findings and conclusions of the 
study. 
6.1 CHANGES  IN  PATTERNS  OF FOOD CONSUMPTION 
To achieve the first objective, trends in food consumption patterns are analyzed in 
the second chapter of this report, and the following important results emerge: 
1.  The consumption patterns of an average Indian are undergoing significant changes. 
In general there is an expansion of the shares of non-cereal food and non-food in 
the consumption basket, while the share of cereals is shrinking. This is true even 
for the bottom 30% of the population.   
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2.  Total food consumption is stagnating in the recent periods in absolute terms. 
3.  The substitution of non-cereals with cereals is resulting in a decline of calorie 
intake and is not contributing substantially to protein intake.  
4.  While the decline in the cereals consumption can be explained by the slow down 
in the growth in the incomes of the poor and adverse prices of cereals versus non-
cereal food, its decline in the seventies and eighties seem to be related to shifts in 
tastes and preferences. 
5.  The complete set of expenditure and own and cross price elasticities are estimated 
by the demand system. The following results emerge from the exercise: 
a.  There are marked differences in consumption behavior among the income 
groups and between rural and urban areas.   
b.  Estimated price effects indicate the importance of cereal price, especially in 
rural areas.  
c.  The simulation exercise indicates that the adverse relative price of cereals 
dampens the demand of not only cereals but also that of other food items. 
d.  The adverse movements in the relative price of cereals together with lower 
growth in rural incomes may have resulted in the stagnant food 
consumption in rural areas. 
6.  It is noted that during the economic reform period, cereal prices increased faster 
than in the 1980s. The increase in prices in the 1990s was primarily on account of 
the increase in procurement price. Procurement prices rose due to devaluation and 
because the government wanted to compensate the farmer for the prevailing 
restrictions on trade.  
7.  Consumption of non-cereal food, particularly fruits and vegetables, has increased 
faster during the reform period than in the 1980s.  
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6.2  AN EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
The second important part of the analysis studies the effectiveness of public 
distribution of food within the country. In particular, the objective is to examine the 
performance of the Public Distribution System (PDS) with a view to provide suggestions 
for cost-effective and better-targeted alternatives. This is probably the first study to look 
at the impact of the PDS on consumption and poverty after the introduction of targeting 
in 1997. 
Two basic questions are addressed with respect to the performance of the PDS: 
(a) Does the target group receive significant subsidy? 
(b) Are the subsidies provided in a cost-effective manner?  
The evaluation of performance is in terms of extent of food subsidy provided, 
coverage, impact on consumption and calories, impact on the poor in particular, leakages 
from the system and targeting errors, and cost effectiveness. The political economy of the 
PDS is also discussed. The following are the findings from this exercise: 
1.  The impact on consumption by the poor increased in rural areas between 1986-87 
and 1999-00 and poverty also declined during this period. The impact on urban 
areas has been more or less same.  
2.  A higher impact of the PDS on consumption by the poor is found in certain states 
like Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Tamil Nadu. However, overall the impact of the 
PDS on the poor is still marginal at the all-India level.  
3.  The finding in terms of the political economy of the PDS is that the dealers of the 
PDS, the bureaucrats, politicians, and the Civil Supplies departments have a 
vested interest in keeping the present system in operation. 
Based on the findings, three options for reform are suggested: (i) revamping the 
existing PDS through decentralization, (ii) introducing food stamps, and (iii) replacing it 
with the food-for-work program. In the short run the authors also recommend that 
decentralization of the PDS and better targeting through village-level government units,  
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known as Panchayats, can be attempted. The study is also in favor of linking the PDS 
with employment programs and the ICDS in order to improve targeting. This aspect is 
discussed in greater detail in a later section of the study. In the medium term, a move 
toward food stamps and the replacement of the PDS with a food-for-work or cash-for-
work program are suggested. 
6.3  THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES ON FOOD SECURITY 
The third part of the study looks at the impact of the Public Works Programmes 
on food security in the country. Public works programs play an important role in raising 
economic access of the poor. The case for RWPs (Rural Works Programs) lies primarily in 
the self-targeting nature of the schemes. However, public works are often criticized, with 
some justification, for creating unproductive (low productive) assets, providing only short-
term supplementary income, and for not raising the skill-levels of workers. The analysis 
shows that wage employment programs like the Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
Jawahar Rojgar Yojana and Employment Assurance Scheme seem to be more pro-poor 
than programs like the Integrated Rural Development Program (self-employment 
programs) and the Public Distribution System.  They also achieve the additional objective 
of creating productive assets. However, the authors recommend the effective involvement of 
Panchayats (village-level government units) in order to ensure better planning of projects at 
the local level using local priorities and greater involvement of voluntary organizations as 
ways to ensure that the assets created may be more productive and better maintained.  
Finally, the authors also make the point that in the changing context of trade 
liberalization, public works also can be used promoting diversification of agriculture. 
Although they are not a substitute for a sustained and broad based growth process, the 
authors believe that in a country like India, which has surplus labor and poor 
infrastructure, these programs can be a useful component for providing food security at 
the household level.  
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6.4  A STUDY OF TWO SPECIFIC DIRECT FOOD-BASED INTERVENTION 
PROGRAMMES 
The next section of the report analyzes two direct food-based intervention 
programs for pre-school children in India, namely the Integrated Child Development 
Service (ICDS) and the Tamilnadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP). These schemes 
are evaluated using three parameters: targeting - whether they cover the entire group for 
whom they have been designed, effectiveness ￿ do the programs bring about the 
anticipated results, and efficiency - for a unit of money spent per person, how much 
eventually reaches the individual and the benefit-cost ratio of the programs. The 
important findings of the study are presented below: 
1.  About 50 percent of children below three years are undernourished in rural India 
and about 38 percent in urban India. Even in states like Maharashtra and Tamil 
Nadu where per capita (real) state domestic product has grown significantly in the 
last decade, commensurate improvements in nutritional status cannot be seen.  
2.  The recent evaluation studies of the ICDS have shown improving trends in child 
nutritional status in the project areas. The studies found a reduction in severe 
under-nutrition but minimal impact in reducing moderate under-nutrition. The 
projects also contributed to a reduction in the infant mortality rate and the 
incidence of low birth weights. 
3. A national evaluation of the ICDS, however, revealed an unsatisfactory 
performance overall. The nutritional status of children in ICDS areas was found to 
be only slightly better than in non-ICDS areas. The percentage of severely 
malnourished children below the age of three in the ICDS areas is lower by 1.8 
percentage points than the non-ICDS areas, and for children 3-6 years old, by 1.5 
percentage points. The percentage of moderately malnourished children in ICDS 
areas is 2.5 and 3.4 percentage points lower than in the non-ICDS areas for the 
two subgroups. The two major limitations of this study are that there has not been  
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an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the ICDS program and regional 
disaggregates have not been provided.  
4.  The Tamil Nadu Integrated Program on the other hand has been hailed a success. 
The scheme has reduced severe malnutrition without any apparent need to fear a 
reversal of the problem. The important lessons to be drawn from this scheme￿s 
success are effective management with very few leakages, educating the mother 
and adolescent girls about good nutrition and health practices, and increasing 
participation by the community and the involvement of the government in running 
the program efficiently. However, the questions of sustainability in terms of the 
cost of the program and its contribution in reducing moderate and mild under-
nutrition are yet to be addressed. 
5.  This study finds that there is a paucity of relevant, reliable and timely data to 
study the trends in nutritional status even in the areas where the ICDS program is 
being implemented. There is a provision for a Management Information System 
(MIS) for all the ICDS blocks that is supposed to keep track of bottlenecks in the 
program and maintain regular records of the nutritional status, immunization 
rates, and participation rates. While this is a good idea. the data must be made 
more accessible for research purposes. 
6. The study also finds that most evaluations have assessed impact on 
anthropometric indicators, rather than aspects like improvements in cognitive 
development, school achievement of the child or poverty status of the household. 
Information on these aspects will go a long way in convincing (a) the policy 
makers about the need for such programs and their efficient management, and (b) 
the participants about the impacts in order to encourage greater community 
participation, which would result in more effective outcomes.  
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6.5  A FEW RELATED POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
The evidence in support of a shift in tastes from cereal to non-cereal crops 
suggests a large potential for the food processing industry in India. However, although it 
is one of the largest producers of raw material for the food processing industry in the 
world, the industry itself is underdeveloped in India. Less than 25% of fruit and vegetable 
production is processed compared with 70% in Brazil, 78% in the Philippines and 80% in 
Malaysia. By any standards therefore the unutilized potential of food processing in India 
is enormous. Expansion of this sector is an ideal way of bringing industry to rural areas, 
expanding the value chain of agricultural production, providing assured markets for 
farmers and enabling them to diversify into higher value horticultural crops, and 
expanding employment by creating high quality non-agricultural work opportunities in 
rural areas. 
Further with the diversification towards non-cereal crops, employment is expected 
to increase ￿ especially in the case of fruits and vegetables, fisheries, and animal 
husbandry. For example, in Maharashtra, the requirement of person days per hectare per 
crop season for wheat is 143 while for vegetables it is 200. The corresponding numbers 
for fruits and grapes are 855 and 2,510 respectively. However, there is a higher risk and 
uncertainty associated with diversification. Also, technology, infrastructure and markets 
have to be improved in order to shift the farmers to non-food grain crops. 
6.6 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
This study has shown the critical need to examine the safety nets in India in the 
era of reforms. By providing a detailed analysis of some of the major government-
operated programs in place today, the hope is that there is a better understanding of the 
specific areas where the government needs to focus its attention and resources to achieve 
better targeting and greater cost-efficiency. In this way the reforms can be undertaken 
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